Facilitated by Norway, the Government and LTTE sign a permanent ceasefire agreement. The Ceasefire Agreement was signed by Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. The decision was announced by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen, in Oslo. The ceasefire will take effect on 23 February 2002.
Sources
Ceasefire signed in Sri Lanka, BBC, 22 February 2002; Text of Sri Lanka truce deal, BBC, 22 February 2002
Quotations
“It feels very good and so many people have worked so hard for so long but the hardest part is ahead. … This is a basis for future efforts. You can’t sit and negotiate when people are shooting at each other.” Erik Solheim, Norway’s peace envoy.
“I have a strong belief that we will have peace, but I have no illusion that it will be easy.” Ranil Wickramasinghe, Sri Lankan Prime Minister.
“A favourable feature [of the current peace process] is the mediation of a third party. Besides, Ranil Wickremasinghe has taken some bold decisions. I am satisfied with the peace talks. … I believe that these will bring success to some extent to the peace efforts.” Velupillai Prabhakaran quoted in Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 09, Apr. 27 – May 10, 2002.
“We have told the Government and we have informed the Norwegians that de-proscription is a necessary condition for the commencement of the talks…. We want to be de-proscribed properly. The provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act should be amended properly so that we can be de-proscribed and accepted as the authentic representative of the Tamil people and so that we will participate in the peace process as representatives of our people with equal status [to that of the Sri Lankan government representatives]. That has been our official position.” Anton Balasingam quoted in Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 09, Apr. 27 – May 10, 2002.
“The president expressed surprise and concern that she was being informed, for the first time, of the contents of the agreement after it was signed by Mr V Prabhakaran and just a few hours before the prime minister proposed to put his signature to it.” Statement from the office of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, 2002.
Opinion
Interview with Austin Fernando, a Peacetime Secretary of Defence in Sri Lanka, Groundviews, 2 November 2008.
Text of Ceasefire Agreement
Preamble
The overall objective of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
The GOSL and the LTTE (hereinafter referred to as the parties) recognise the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict.
Bringing an end to the hostilities is also seen by the parties as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken.
The parties further recognise that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it.
This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.
With reference to the above, the parties have agreed to enter into a ceasefire, refrain from conduct that could undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of this agreement and implement confidence-building measures as indicated in the articles below.
Article 1: Modalities of a ceasefire
The parties have agreed to implement a ceasefire between their armed forces as follows:
1.1 A jointly agreed ceasefire between the GOSL and the LTTE shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Article 4.2, hereinafter referred to as D-day.
Military operations
1.2 Neither party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as:
a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;
b) Aerial bombardment;
c) Offensive naval operations.
1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.
Separation of forces
1.4 Where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL’s armed forces and the LTTE’s fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, maintaining a zone of separation of a minimum of 600 metres.
However, each party reserves the right of movement within 100 metres of its own defence localities, keeping an absolute minimum distance of 400 metres between them.
Where existing positions are closer than 400 metres, no such right of movement applies and the parties agree to ensure the maximum possible distance between their personnel.
1.5 In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 December 2001 shall continue to apply pending such demarcation as is provided in article 1.6.
1.6 The parties shall provide information to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) regarding defence localities in all areas of contention, cf. Article 3. The monitoring mission shall assist the parties in drawing up demarcation lines at the latest by D-day + 30.
1.7 The parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other party.
1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.
Freedom of movement
1.9 The parties’ forces shall initially stay in the areas under their respective control, as provided in Article 1.4 and Article 1.5.
1.10 Unarmed GOSL troops shall, as of D-day + 60, be permitted unlimited passage between Jaffna and Vavunyia using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9). The modalities are to be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the SLMM.
1.11 The parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, on the recommendation of their area commander, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other party. Such visits shall be limited to six days every second month, not including the time of travel by the shortest applicable route. The LTTE shall facilitate the use of the Jaffna-Kandy road for this purpose. The parties reserve the right to deny entry to specified military areas.
1.12 The parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall notwithstanding the two-month restriction, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit immediate family (ie spouses, children, grandparents, parents and siblings) in connection with weddings or funerals. The right to deny entry to specified military areas applies.
1.13 Fifty unarmed LTTE members shall as of D-day + 30, for the purpose of political work, be permitted freedom of movement in the areas of the North and the East dominated by the GOSL. Additional 100 unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement as of D-day + 60. As of D-day + 90, all unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North and the East. The LTTE members shall carry identity papers. The right of the GOSL to deny entry to specified military areas applies.
Article 2: Measures to restore normalcy
The parties shall undertake the following confidence-building measures with the aim of restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka:
2.1 The parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.
2.2 The parties shall refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could offend cultural or religious sensitivities. Places of worship (temples, churches, mosques and other holy sites etc.) currently held by the forces of either of the parties shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. Places of worship which are situated in “high security zones” shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public.
2.3 Beginning on the date on which this agreement enters into force, school buildings occupied by either party shall be vacated and returned to their intended use. This activity shall be completed by D-day + 160 at the latest.
2.4 A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended use shall be drawn up by the parties and published at the latest by D-day + 30.
2.5 The parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population. Such systems shall be in place from D-day + 60.
2.6 The parties agree to ensure the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from the LTTE-dominated areas with the exception of certain items as shown in Annex A. Quantities shall be determined by market demand. The GOSL shall regularly review the matter with the aim of gradually removing any remaining restrictions on non-military goods.
2.7 In order to facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, the parties agree to establish checkpoints on their line of control at such locations as are specified in Annex B.
2.8 The parties shall take steps to ensure that the Trincomalee-Habarana road remains open on a 24-hour basis for passenger traffic with effect from D-day + 10.
2.9 The parties shall facilitate the extension of the rail service on the Batticaloa-line to Welikanda. Repairs and maintenance shall be carried out by the GOSL in order to extend the service up to Batticaloa.
2.10 The parties shall open the Kandy-Jaffna road (A9) to non-military traffic of goods and passengers. Specific modalities shall be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the Royal Norwegian Government by D-day + 30 at the latest.
2.11 A gradual easing of the fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D-day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed, subject to the following exceptions: (i) fishing will not be permitted within an area of 1 nautical mile on either side along the coast and 2 nautical miles seawards from all security forces camps on the coast; (ii) fishing will not be permitted in harbours or approaches to harbours, bays and estuaries along the coast.
2.12 The parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall not take place. Arrests shall be conducted under due process of law in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.
2.13 The parties agree to provide family members of detainees access to the detainees within D-day + 30.
Article 3: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
The parties have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this agreement. Both parties shall fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their respective sides. The mission shall conduct international verification through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments entered into in this agreement as follows:
3.1 The name of the monitoring mission shall be the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM).
3.2 Subject to acceptance by the parties, the Royal Norwegian Government (hereinafter referred to as the RNG) shall appoint the Head of the SLMM (hereinafter referred to as the HoM), who shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this agreement.
3.3 The SLMM shall liaise with the parties and report to the RNG.
3.4 The HoM shall decide the date for the commencement of the SLMM’s operations.
3.5 The SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries.
3.6 The SLMM shall establish a headquarters in such place as the HoM finds appropriate. An office shall be established in Colombo and in Vanni in order to liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively. The SLMM will maintain a presence in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.
3.7 A local monitoring committee shall be established in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. Each committee shall consist of five members, two appointed by the GOSL, two by the LTTE and one international monitor appointed by the HoM. The international monitor shall chair the committee. The GOSL and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.
3.8 The committees shall serve the SLMM in an advisory capacity and discuss issues relating to the implementation of this agreement in their respective districts, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues. In particular, they will seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of this agreement at the lowest possible level.
3.9 The parties shall be responsible for the appropriate protection of and security arrangements for all SLMM members.
3.10 The parties agree to ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM members in performing their tasks. The members of the SLMM shall be given immediate access to areas where violations of the agreement are alleged to have taken place. The parties also agree to facilitate the widest possible access to such areas for the local members of the six above-mentioned committees, cf. Article 3.7.
3.11 It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the agreement, and to enquire into and assist the parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints.
3.12 With the aim of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level, communication shall be established between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and the LTTE area leaders to enable them to resolve problems in the conflict zones.
3.13 Guidelines for the operations of the SLMM shall be established in a separate document.
Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the agreement
4.1 Each party shall notify its consent to be bound by this agreement through a letter to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe on behalf of the GOSL and by leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on behalf of the LTTE respectively. The agreement shall be initialled by each party and enclosed in the above-mentioned letter.
4.2 The agreement shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4.3 This agreement may be amended and modified by mutual agreement of both parties. Such amendments shall be notified in writing to the RNG.
4.4 This agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by either party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given 14 days in advance of the effective date of termination.
Annexes
Annex A: List of goods
Annex B: Checkpoints
Source: Full text of the ceasefire agreement, The Guardian, 22 February 2002.
Related events
GoSL closes the A9 highway
SLMM reports death toll figures
Suspected LTTE bomb attack in Buttala






PAC programme said,
“Even though the peace agreement with the LTTE is still in effect it is only limited to a piece of paper. Even now the LTTE is coming secretly to our village and they collect information that will be useful in their attacks and even they don’t care about the government and police rules like wearing helmets when driving a bike. When they are caught for those sorts of things they used to show an identity card and get away from the fines. So some times even the police won’t check them.
“We think that for these three years the LTTE must have being collecting useful information to organise attacks and even they had a good chance from the peace process. The LTTE is very shrewd and they are very keen on organising their attacks without getting captured. Even they are in their uniforms in the areas, which they control. The government forces are helpless and clueless because of this agreement”. Male respondent from Gonagala, Ampara talking about the impact of the ceasefire agreement on their area.
Source: Moving Out of Poverty in Conflict Affected Areas, Poverty and Conflict programme, 2006.
ranjit said,
(1) The word ‘permanent’ in your timeline would be incorrect because the agreement specified how it could be terminated.
(2) Peace and conflict as depicted in your timeline are not in my opinion positions that could be clearly demarcated as you have done above.
(3) This is particularly true of the signing of the CFA which was done in an arbitrary manner and without consultation with the President of the country at the time.
(4) Also because there was and in fact, still is, opposition to the LTTE position from Tamil political parties and other Tamil citizens and the CFA gave the LTTE a position of advantage over dissenting opinion outside a democratic framework which others such as the EPDP had already embraced.
(5) The CFA was indeed a landmark event towards resolving the conflict with the LTTE.
pact team said,
(1) The use of the word ‘permanent’ here is with reference to the earlier entry where the government and the Tigers agreed to a ‘one month ceasefire’ (December 2001), hence this development was ‘permanent’ relative to the earlier event. That said, we take your point that the word ‘permanent’ is misleading here if read in isolation, for the reasons you have put forward.
(2) We agree that peace and conflict demarcations are not easy and there are different interpretations of what is a peace related event and what is conflict related. A development could be considered a ‘peace initiative’ by one party or group and considered conflict causing by another, including those who may have been excluded from the particular development. Our intention behind the demarcation is that it would trigger reaction and discussion to elicit different perspectives, in the way it has elicited your points (3) to (5).