Source
Ceylon Daily News, 20 December 1974; H. A. I. Goonetetileke (1978): The Sri Lankan Insurrection of 1971: A Select Bibliographical Commentary, published in Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia, Bardwell L. Smith (1978).

Quotation

“In reaching our decisions as to the sentences to be imposed on the subjects, whom we have found guilty of the charges, we have attempted to to take account of several considerations which we think are relevant. In the case of the 13th suspect, Wijeweera, [who] also founded and led the JVP and who was primarily responsible for the decision to strike against the Government, we see no alternative but to impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life.” Criminal Justice Commission, 20 December 1974, as reported in the CJC Report, 1977.

Related events
14 May 1965
10 August 1970
April 1971
April 1971
2 November 1973

Extracts from defence statement
“A representative of one social class is addressing the representatives of another social class. That is what is happening here. A representative of the exploited and oppressed proletariat is addressing the representatives of the exploiting and oppressing class. We should not forget that the living really with transpires here is a struggle for the fulfilment and class interests of two opposed social classes. Although I have been designated the ‘thirteenth suspect’ by this Commission in the present inquiry, the Chairman himself has stated that I am the chief suspect. That begin so it will be necessary right at the beginning to tell you who I, the thirteenth suspect, am. I am a Marxist-Leninist. I am a modern Bolshevik. I am a proletarian revolutionary. Marxism-Leninism is a clear doctrine. In no way is a terrorist. As a proletarian revolutionary, however, I must emphatically state that I am committed to the overthrow of the of the prevailing capitalist system and its replacement by a socialism system…

“To disown capitalism which had turned grey, reactionary and obsolete in the course of human social development, to say that this system must be replaced with the fore as befitting the latest and noblest historical stage in the course of the development of human society, and to act accordingly, is an no way a conspiratorial act. I am not a conspirator in the context of the development of history. I am no conspirator in the context of the development of society and humanity…
“Honourable Members of the Commission, may I make one request to begin with? I have been subjected to every possible indignity and harassment at the hands of the ruling class and have been for several years the target of numerous defamations, slurs and slanders, mudslinging and character assassination and all this without any protection from the law. The only request that I make of you, is to respect my right to express my innocence freely and without any let or hindrance. The ruling clique of capitalists will gag me for a long period, if not for all time. In these circumstances I do not wish to blame myself for not saying all that I have to say before you now. I beseech that I be not gagged…

“My view is that conditions were not ripe for organizing an armed revolutionary uprising to seize state power. The objective conditions were maturing fast, but they were still unripe. It had not reached a stage where the masses saw no other solution but revolution. It is true, however, that then, as now, society was moving in that direction. The subjective conditions were also lacking: that is, the existence of a revolutionary party that has steeled itself, won the support of the masses and is fit to lead them in an armed struggle for power. The Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna was developing and moving towards that goal, but had not reached full maturity. We had failed at that time to established the JVP in the Northern and eastern provinces and in the Estate sector as a political force. And then there was the question of mass support. It is true that out of the millions who voted for the Coalition Government, tens of thousands had by this time washed their hands of it. It is also true that this section was the politically developed section. They were abandoning the Coalition Government and moving Leftwards towards the JVP. But there was a section which, although disgusted and frustrated, did not break away from the government during those either months. On other words the JVP had not yet reached the stage where the masses could see it as a real alternative to the government, accept its leadership and join in the class under its banner. In our Marxist conception, a revolution – an armed uprising – is not something done behind the backs of the masses.

“In conclusion this is what I have to say: I admit that the capitalist class has been temporary victorious. But I do not see it as a defeat for the proletariat. This is only a big retreat for the proletariat; yes, I call it a big retreat. A retreat is not a defeat, but a phase from which it is possible to recover and march again to certain victory. No revolutionary movement has raced non-stop to victory in a straight line from start to finish. Forward marches followed by retreats are quite common in revolutionary movements. That is the position with which we are confronted today and it is from this position that I have come to give evidence before you. I have not spoken here by stretching my principles for personal gain. I remain an unrepentant Marxist and what I am defending here are Marxist principles rather than myself. For as a revolutionary Marxist I have nothing else to defend.

“Whatever the capitalist class may have expected to gain through the April incidents, their ultimate result has already been expressed by a revolutionary poet in the following stanza:

See these blossoms strewn on earth and withered lie
Their fragrance shall abide, shall never die.
To raise its sweetness high to limits limitless,
More buds will bloom and bloom and multiply.

“The poet expresses himself in clear and plain terms. The flowers of revolution have blossomed, but how they lie withered and dead. But their perfume has not ceased. To enhance that perfume and with that aim in view other buds will continue to bloom. In fact, gentlemen, the capitalist cause has no real reason to celebrate its success. For in the class struggle victory is a see saw until the proletariat finally emerges victorious. That is our belief. I have concluded my evidence.” Rohana Wijeweera, Statement before the Criminal Justice Commission, 2 November 1973.

Related events
14 May 1965
10 August 1970
April 1971
April 1971
20 December 1974

Source
Ceylon Daily News, 14 June 1972; H. A. I. Goonetetileke (1978): The Sri Lankan Insurrection of 1971: A Select Bibliographical Commentary, published in Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia, Bardwell L. Smith (1978).

Quotation

“Of the 41 suspects, Wijeweera, the thriteenth suspect, was found guilty by the CJC on the charges of conspriing to wage war against the Queen and for waging war against the Queen punishable under section 115 and 114 respectively of the Penal Code. These charges were constituted by (1) membership of the JVP, (2) attendance at all five lectures, (3) participation at educational camps, (4) speeches made at JVP meetings, and (5) delivery of the fifth lecture. As expected, Wijeweera who conducted his own defence did not plead guilty.” Rohan Gunaratna (1990): Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP.

“Some 18,000 persons were taken into custody in connection with the April 1971 insurrection, of whom about 13,500 had been released after full inquiry, and there were less than 4,500 still in custody. Of those released, only 50 were re-arrested. “The government had no intention of following a vindictive policy on this matter”. Justice Minister Felix Dias Banadaranaike on the question of the release of all those detained without trial under the Emergency Regulations, including in connection with the 1971 insurgent activities; National State Assembly Debates, Official Report, Volume 6, No. 9, 21 June 1973.

Source
Ceylon Daily News, 14 June 1972; H. A. I. Goonetetileke (1978): The Sri Lankan Insurrection of 1971: A Select Bibliographical Commentary, published in Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia, Bardwell L. Smith (1978).

Sources
For a comprehensive list of publications on the April 1971 insurrection and the emergence of the JVP, we recommend H. A. I. Goonetileke (1978): The Sri Lankan Insurrection of 1971: A Select Bibliographical Commentary, published in Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia, Bardwell L. Smith (1978).

Much of the material published on PACT on the insurrection and related events has been extracted from this useful annotated bibliography.

Quotations

“The aim of this first attack seems to have been to capture a stock of modern arms, and to consolidate in a liberated region of the interior, blocking communications across the island and providing a base for a second offensive. On this first night several police stations fell, and the government soon evacuated many more: at the height of the government soon evacuated many more: at the height of the insurrection between 90 and 100 police stations, but this may have understated the number of attacks on that night and they certainly remained silence about subsequent attacks. Later in April a truer picture emerged: the government which had earlier said only about 25 posts were attacked, now says more than 30 were captured and held for several days by the insurgents. In at least nine areas of the countryside covering hundreds of square miles, the rebels maintained control uncontested by government forces.” New York Times, 25 April 1971.

“The 1971 insurrection lasted for five weeks. The rebels did not succeed in assassinating a single prominent member of the ruling coalition or for that matter physically hurting (either a Parliamentarian or a Cabinet Minister) or a senior police officer. It cannot be credibly argued that they posed anywhere as serious a threat to state power as they were to do in 1987-90. The UF government which had come into office less than one year earlier was still popular; the anti-people and at times bizarre economic policies which made the regime unpopular were still to be implemented…Most importantly its charismatic ‘maximum leader’ Rohana Wijeweera was already in custody. And the regime had the complete backing of the UNP, the main opposition party, against the JVP. Despite all these favourable factors the UF government unleashed a firestorm of repression which is yet to be matched proportionately: 15,000-20,000 killed in just 5 weeks. This is an average of 3,500 deaths per week – far higher than the 625 per week figure for the second insurrection which was suppressed by the UNP.” Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, Tisaranee Gunasekara, Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1990.

“The JVP cadre[s] did not have guns or sufficient explosives to counter the fire power of the state. Instead they carried wooden replicas of guns, to frighten the police or the security forces whom they had to subdue.” Sri Lanka in Crisis: A Lost Generation: The Untold Story, Prins Gunasekara (1998).

“[I received instructions] to collect empty tins, fused bulbs, empty bottles, explosives, oil cloths, medicines to manufacture hand bombs and molotov cocktails…Wasantha informed Gunaratna, Podiappuhamy, Sunil and me that the revolution will commence on the night of April 5, 1971…We had also brought blue drill and stitched uniforms at Kegalle at the tailor shop of one Vincent. On April 5, 1971 at about 4.30 pm Sunil informed me that he will manufacture hand bombs, Molotov cocktails and come with his gang to the back of the police station by about 11.00pm and wait till my arrival with the others. He also took 25 dynamite sticks and 25 caps. He promised to bring about 30 – 40 members to attack the station.” Extracts from the confession of an area leader who led a significant group during the rebellion, reproduced in Rohan Gunaratna (1990) Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP.

“My view is that, conditions were not ripe for organizing an armed revolutionary uprising to seize state power. The objective conditions were maturing fast, but they were still unripe. It had not reached a stage where the masses saw no other solution but revolution. It is true, however, that then, as now, society was moving in that direction. The subjective conditions were also lacking: that is, the existence of a revolutionary party that has steered itself, won the support of the masses and is fit to lead them in an armed struggle for power. The Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna was developing and moving towards that goal, but had not reached full maturity. We had failed at that time to establish the JVP in the Northern and Eastern provinces and in the Estate sector as a political force. And then there was the question of mass support. It is true that out of the millions who voted for the Coalition government, tens of thousands had by this time washed their hands of it,” Rohana Wijeweera, Leader of the JVP, Statement before the Ceylon Criminal Justice Commission, 2 November 1973.

“The insurrection failed because it had no support from the people. The insurgents presented no serious alternative political program to the people. They were not the spearhead of a popular outburst against an unpopular regime. Instead they were opposed by a popularly elected left-of-center government which had taken office only 10 months before the insurrections broke out. There were few areas in the country the insurgents controlled for brief period in April. And during their rule of these areas they demonstrated an amazing immaturity and naivete. They showed no imagination, no fresh thinking in the administrative structure they devised. Instead their administrative machinery was a grotesque parody of the very system they were pledged to destroy. Their outlook was archaic and not modern. Finally, while these youthful revolutionaries managed to control if not occupy some areas of the island and compelled government forces to confine their activities to the large towns and main trunk roads, they never showed any solid grasp of strategy. They diffused their energies in sporadic attacks spread over many parts of the country, when concentration on a few strategic points might have suited their purposes better.” K M de Silva & Howard Wriggins (1989): J R Jayewardene of Sri Lanka – A Political Biography – Volume Two: from 1956 to His Retirement.

“As far as we know, the insurgency was entirely an indigenous affair, prepared and carried out by a movement of young revolutionaries, that has been building up for four or five years…There was no question of any outside support of influence,” Mrs Srimavo Banadaranaike, interview published in Sunday Times, 31 October 1971.

“We have learnt too many lessons from Vietnam and Malaysia. We must destroy them completely,” Cyril Ranatunga, quoted in the International Herald Tribune, 20 April 1971.

“From the Victoria Bridge on 13 April I saw corpses floating down the river which flows through the north of the capital, watched by hundreds of motionless people. The police, who had killed them, let them float downstream in order to terrorize the populatio.” Dumont, Rene (1971): Ceylon during the insurrection, who estimated that 8,000 people had been killed in connection with the insurrection.

“Wijeweera, in a statement from prison in 1972, said that 15,000 revolutionaries had been killed, but twice that number of innocent people had also died. Other estimates rage from the official figure of 12,000 as high as 50,000 (Nouvel Observateur, 23 May 1971). What is clear is that the police and armed forces lunched as indiscriminate attack on the peasant population as a whole. The Washington Post (9 May 1971) reported in early May that an army major had even welcomed the insurrection: ‘We have never had the opportunity to fight a real war in this country,’ he was quoted as saying. “All these years we have been firing at dummies, now we are being put to use” (Washington Post, 9 May 1971). In fact, the army have resorted to mass arrests, torture, executions and other terror tactics in attempting to put down young well-organized armed insurgents.’ New York Times, 25 April 1971).” Fred Halliday (1971): The Ceylonese Insurrection, New Left Review; No 79, Sep.-Oct. 1971.

“At Galle, in [the] south, we saw three ‘terrorists’ who had just been arrested and whom the police were taking away. A local inhabitant remarked: “They will be killed tonight, and their bodies will be thrown into the river”. The police, traditionally hated and today used without reserve by the ‘progressive’ government, are openly compared to Duvalier’s tontons macoutes and their crimes have shocked the population. Here are some examples, which would be wrong to see as isolated indents. At Kataragama, a village in the South, a girl was stripped and killed on the spot. At Akuressa, two young people were shot in front of the inhabitants and left to die, but only did so later, when their bodies were burnt. At Kosgoda, corpses were left hanging in public for several days. At Kandy, a lecture in geography was so savagely beaten that he died in hospital; a history student was tortured for two days. At Bandaragama a youngman was beaten up and the sole of his foot was cut open and covered with pepper. Another young man, while on a road outside Colombo, was arrested, tortured and left to the red ants. What is the point of going on?”. Le Monde, 16 June 1971: Decornoy’s series of four articles on the insurrection, beginning in Le Monde of 16 June give a forceful account of both the uprising itself and the subsequent repression.” Fred Halliday (1971): The Ceylonese Insurrection, New Left Review; No 79, Sep.-Oct. 1971.

“Explores the implications of the insurrections as an attack on the indigenous elite as a class, and not only against the government in power. The insurgents were nto peasants. The JVP not a rural movement and the insurrection was not a peasant revolt. Popular notions that the insurgency was activated by low caste based frustrations of rural students and unemployed youth mainly from the universities are dispelled. Review of Obeyesekere, Gananath, “The Barbarians at the gates”, Part 2, Some comments on the social backgrounds of the April 1991 insurgency in Sri Lanka, Journal of Asian Studies, May 1974, 367-384, reviewed by H. A. I. Goonetileke (1978): The Sri Lankan Insurrection of 1971: A Select Bibliographical Commentary.

“During the insurrection, the CP and the LSSP set up home guards to protect police stations and to search and destroy JVPers. The UF government introduced repressive labour laws banning the distribution of handbills and posters within the workplaces without employer permission and arresting all those who did not report to work. While carrying out a systematic purge of the workplaces, the government decreed that in recruitment to the armed forces, anyone under the age of 35 should be totally excluded in forming the National Service Regiment. Hundreds of JVP cadres sacrificed their lives in combat and non-combat situations, and thousands were arrested and destroyed by security personnel trained and motivated in cold-war political ideology. After capture, some were burnt alive, buried alive and some were cut to pieces using chain saws. Even some of those who surrendered following the call of the then Prime Minister Mrs Bandaranaike were killed,” Lionel Bopage, former General Secretary of the JVP and former member of the District Development Council, Galle, in an interview published in Lines magazine.

“There is no doubt that the villages are sympathetic to the young rebels. They were all received in a friendly manner by the local population.” Le Monde, 30 April 1971.

‘This is the first time since Independence that Indian personnel have been sent out to help a friendly neighbouring country in distress, barring India’s participation in the international peace-keeping operations under the auspices of the United Nation in Korea, West Asia, the Congo, Cyprus and the Indo-China states. But India has given arms aid to countries like Burma, Indonesia and Malaysia in the past for their internal defence against insurgency and subversion.’ The Hindu, 16 April 1971.

Related events
JVP is formed
JVP holds its largest public meeting
Sri Lankan government proscribes the JVP
Charges brought against 41 JVP members
Rohana Wijeweera delivers speech before the Criminal Justice Commission

Related events
14 May 1965
April 1971
15 February 1977
1982
1994

Quotation

“We will continue to support the government if they progress towards socialism, they will receive all our support, but if they fail to reach the socialist goal, then we will do so”. Rohana Wijeweera, published in Ceylon Daily News, 11 August 1970.

Quotation

“With Wijeweera’s release the JVP organised a large number of public rallies. The first was at Nanuoya Railway in the Nuwara-Eliya district. Mass meetings of the JVP at Anuradhapura, Hingurakgoda, Kegalle, Kurunegala, Wellawaya, Tangalla, Tissamaharama, Kandy, Galle, Negombo, Chilaw, Moratuwa and Elpitiya drew large crowds. In September 1970 Wijeweera held the first two meetings of the JVP Politbureau in Ambalangoda…Wijeweera directed a bureau member Loku Athula to head the arms section. He was requested to collect 100,000 bombs and to table what he collected at the next meeting”. Rohan Gunaratna (1990)” Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP.

Related events
10 August 1970
12 May 1970
April 1971
April 1971

Quotation

“By April 1970 the Criminal Investigation Department has substantial information about this organisation [JVP] and Wijeweera was a wanted man. The police went all out for him…On May 12 1970, just prior to the general elections, the Hamanthota police arrested him. Disguided as a labourer, Wijeweera was propagating his political ideology in a village. At the time of the arrest, Wijeweera has with him a revolver.” Rohan Gunaratna (1990)” Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP.

Related events
10 August 1970
29 May 1970
April 1971
April 1971

Quotations

“On Wesak day in May 1965 several members of the Peking Wing [Communist Party], at the invitation of Wijeweera, gathered at a home in Akmeemana in the Galle District and discussed the deterioration of the left movement. The discussions went on for two days and two nights and it was decided that an internal ideological struggle should be launched within the Peking Wing. This was with the intention of creating genuine revolutionaries…Wijeweera met for a second time at Akmeemana and at Kalattawa towards the end of 1967. The Kalattawa meeting lasted three days and three nights. It was at these two meetings a new political organisation, ‘Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna’ or the Peoples’ Liberation Front was concevied.” Rohan Gunaratna (1990)” Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP.

“Nine individuals led by Rohana Wijeweera formed the movement in May 1965. By the time Rohana alias Loku Mahaththya was expelled from the CP (Peking wing) he had laid a strong foundation for building the new movement. To finance the movement it had established two agricultural farms in Hambanthota and Anuradhapura. The movement was of the view that it should arm itself to confront the potential threat of a neo-colonial dictatorial regime that could have been established by the pro-US elements of the then UNP government. The movement was able to establish some contacts within the armed forces. In 1969, it started holding educational camps based in the famous five lectures. At the end of 1969 the ‘group twenty one’, the first central committee of the movement, met. In May 1970 Rohana and several other activists were arrested, but they were released following the May 1970 general elections, which brought the United Front (UF) government to power. The first public event of the JVP was held at Vidyodaya University in July 1970 and the news organ of the JVP, ‘Janatha Vimukthi’ came into circulation in August 1970. The first public rally was held in Hyde Park in August 1970 and the newspapers of the day carried a statement issued by the secretaries of the SLFP, the CP and the LSSP ‘urging’ the people to fight the right-wing reactionary force. The Secretary to the Ministry of Defence declared that the JVP was public enemy No. 1 and that it had to be eradicated.” Lionel Bopage, former general secretary of the JVP and former member of the District Development Council, Galle, in an interview published in Lines magazine.

“During this time groups of revolutionaries, disillusioned with all established political parties, met to discus the future of Ceylon and how to establish a true socialist government. We discovered in the course of our discussions that there wasn’t a true Marxist-Leninist party, or a revolutionary party, or a party for the poor masses in the country. We realized the urgent necessary to mobilize the people to establish socialism in Ceylon…Our discussion lasted several months. We decide it was necessary to visit the villages and spoke with the people and convinced them of the correctness of Marxist-Leninism. In the villages we also studied thoroughly and deeply the difficulties and problems of peasants, workers, students, fishermen and even street hawkers and unemployed young men and women. We went all over the island and met the poor masses.” President of the Deshapremi Student Front of the JVP, in an interview published in the Ceylon Sunday Observer, 23 August 1970.

“The JVP spent its first five years concentrated in the rural sector. JVP cadres gave elementary classes in political thought, divided into five categories, and these political lectures often hid themselves behind curtains, while speaking, to avoid police detection. According to one account the five lectures were on the following subjects: the greatness of the Sinhalese past and of the Buddhist kings; the economic crisis and the colonial formation of the tea economy; Indian expansionism through the tea plantations; the history of the ‘left’ in Ceylon and the failure of parliamentarism; the ‘Sinhalese road’ to revolution.” Fred Halliday (1971): The Ceylonese Insurrection, New Left Review; No 79, Sep.-Oct. 1971.

“Look back and see the picture of our public meetings held in various parts of the country such as Kandy, Kegalle, Kurunegala and Southern Province and Colombo – you will see the mass of humanity, thousands and thousands of people that flocked round us, to see us and listen to us. And these were not people we had forced or cajoled with the use of guns to attend our rallies, nor have we supplied them with free lorries and buses, but people who had come of their own accord because of their interest in our politics. With every passing day we were moving forward. This process continued while another parallel process was taking place: dissatisfaction with the UNP result, with our blessing, in the election of the United Front government, with over a two-thirds majority. The LSSP and CP had told the people that if they were brought into power with a two-thirds majority they would amend the constitution, change the system of internal administration and open the way to socialism. The ordinary people took them at their world. They expected the new government to perform miracles and that is why they put the cross against the star and key and not against the elephant.” Rohana Wijeweera, Leader of the JVP, Statement before the Ceylon Criminal Justice Commission, 2 November 1973.

Related events
10 August 1970
12 May 1970
29 May 1970
April 1971
April 1971