On 4 January, thirty observers from Norway and Iceland who had been mandated to monitor ceasefire violations had been ordered to leave by the Sri Lankan government within 12 days

Sources
SLMM pulls out of Sri Lanka, Relief Web, 17 January 2008; Sri Lanka crisis in new perspective, Newstrack India, 5 January 2008

Sources
Most Sri Lankan bus ambush victims were shot, Reuters 17 January 2008; Bloody End to Sri Lanka ceasefire, Reuters, 17 January 2008

The statement further notes that “Accordingly, the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and the Management of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) dated 18th March 2002 between the Royal Norwegian Government and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka will also stand terminated with effect from 16th January 2008″.

Sources
Violence kills off Sri Lanka ceasefire, The Guardian, 3 January 2008; Sri Lanka truce end worries Norway, BBC, 3 January 2008; Sri Lanka: Cease-Fire Is Annulled, New York Times, 3 January 2008.

Quotations

“The Ceasefire Agreement had been violated nearly 10,000 times by the Tamil Tigers, so we should annul this agreement… national security was threatened at every corner.” Keheliya Rambukwella, the Government spokesman on security matters.

“This comes on top of the increasingly frequent and brutal acts of violence perpetrated by both parties, and I am deeply concerned that the violence and hostilities will now escalate even further,” Erik Solheim, Norwegian Foreign Minister.

“An intensification of hostilities will likely have a devastating effect on the human rights of many Sri Lankans from all communities… violations of these rules by any party could entail individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law, including by those in positions of command,” Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, statement released 15 January 2008.

Related events
Ceasefire Agreement signed
GoSL closes the A9 highway
SLMM reports death toll figures
Suspected LTTE bomb attack in Buttala

Bishop of Mannar Rayappu Joseph told the BBC that the Tamil Tigers had agreed to refrain from fighting in the area of the church to ensure the safety of the pilgrims: “The Military had already agreed to make commitment to stop fighting in the area during the festival. With that assurance I went to meet the Tiger leadership”.

Source
‘No War Zone’ declared, BBC, 29 June 2007.

Sources
Military contradicts SLMM report on civilian killings, The Island, 23 March 2007; SLMM backs down on breakdown, Associated News, 12 March 2007;

Related events
January 2002

Between 1994 and 2002, the A9 remained permanently closed; with the start of the peace process in February 2002 the road was opened.

Source
Tough times continue for Jaffna residents, IRIN, 10 March 2008; Sri Lanka to open road to Jaffna, BBC, 20 November 2006.

Quotations

“The Government of Sri Lanka was compelled to temporarily close the A9 highway, entry/exit checkpoint at Muhamalai situated at the isthmus of the Jaffna peninsula on 11 August 2006. … The closure was necessitated due to the massive artillery and mortar attack launched by the LTTE on the government forces on that day which destroyed the entire infrastructure built by the GoSL at Muhamalai to facilitate the movement of people and goods. The GoSL is unable to open the checkpoint until the area is safe for the movement of civilians and supplies and until it can be assured that national security will not be compromised.” Government of Sri Lanka statement.

“Surely the government can find a way to open the A9 highway at least for humanitarian purposes, and negotiate with the LTTE about the issues that concern it? As these matters concern the humanitarian interests of the Tamil people, the LTTE will also be motivated to cooperate. The opening of the A9 highway could be the first step to opening the door to peace and the opening of the A9 to negotiations on the core principles of the final solution.” Jehan Perera, National Peace Council, Sri Lanka reels under humanitarian crisis, 9 November 2006.

“This road remains to be the main source of local income to the LTTE who patrol a stretch of this road from Muhamalai to Omanthai in the Northern Province. … It is believed that the LTTE daily collects more than Rs. 900,000 in the form of illegal tax and other revenue in [sic] this road. From Omanthai in the cleared area, an average of 7000-8000 civilians and 1000- 1200 vehicles cross the stretch of land daily.” A-9 Issue a ploy of the LTTE to avert peace talks, 7 November 2006, Ministry of Defence.

“The single road into the area, the A9, was an economic and humanitarian lifeline for Jaffna’s residents. Everything from food, basic commodities, pharmaceuticals, petroleum, even reconstruction materials, was soon in short supply.” Boosting food and livestock production in conflict-hit Jaffna, IRIN, 3 June 2008.

Related events
22 February 2002
20 May 2002
28 October 2006

Related events
22 February 2002
10 April 2002
4 September 2002
10 June 2003
14 April 2003

Source
Tamil rebels detain truce monitors, BBC, 14 July 2002.

Extract from BBC article
“A statement issued by the SLMM describes how the incident occurred. Two trawlers belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) entered Sri Lankan territorial waters in Palk Bay, south of the Jaffna peninsula, on Saturday evening. They were intercepted by the Sri Lankan navy, and one trawler fled the scene. The Sri Lankan Navy sought the advice and assistance of the naval SLMM monitors in Jaffna, who having obtained the full agreement of the Tamil Tiger political leadership in Kilinochi, went aboard the vessel.

According to the SLMM statement, the two monitors found communication equipment on board which was controlled by four rebel soldiers. The SLMM then suggested that the vessel be vacated and taken into the custody of the Sri Lankan navy as it was in violation of the terms of the peace agreement. This was rejected by the Tamil Tiger leadership. The four rebel soldiers refused to disembark, and started to move the vessel heading towards the Tamil Tiger-controlled coastal area. The statement says that at this time the two SLMM naval monitors were held against their will by the Tiger cadres, and physically hindered from leaving the trawler.

The vessel was then brought ashore in the early hours of Sunday morning and the monitors were released.”

Sources
Ceasefire signed in Sri Lanka, BBC, 22 February 2002; Text of Sri Lanka truce deal, BBC, 22 February 2002

Quotations

“It feels very good and so many people have worked so hard for so long but the hardest part is ahead. … This is a basis for future efforts. You can’t sit and negotiate when people are shooting at each other.” Erik Solheim, Norway’s peace envoy.

“I have a strong belief that we will have peace, but I have no illusion that it will be easy.” Ranil Wickramasinghe, Sri Lankan Prime Minister.

“A favourable feature [of the current peace process] is the mediation of a third party. Besides, Ranil Wickremasinghe has taken some bold decisions. I am satisfied with the peace talks. … I believe that these will bring success to some extent to the peace efforts.” Velupillai Prabhakaran quoted in Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 09, Apr. 27 – May 10, 2002.

“We have told the Government and we have informed the Norwegians that de-proscription is a necessary condition for the commencement of the talks…. We want to be de-proscribed properly. The provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act should be amended properly so that we can be de-proscribed and accepted as the authentic representative of the Tamil people and so that we will participate in the peace process as representatives of our people with equal status [to that of the Sri Lankan government representatives]. That has been our official position.” Anton Balasingam quoted in Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 09, Apr. 27 – May 10, 2002.

“The president expressed surprise and concern that she was being informed, for the first time, of the contents of the agreement after it was signed by Mr V Prabhakaran and just a few hours before the prime minister proposed to put his signature to it.” Statement from the office of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, 2002.

Opinion
Interview with Austin Fernando, a Peacetime Secretary of Defence in Sri Lanka, Groundviews, 2 November 2008.

Text of Ceasefire Agreement
Preamble
The overall objective of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

The GOSL and the LTTE (hereinafter referred to as the parties) recognise the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict.

Bringing an end to the hostilities is also seen by the parties as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken.

The parties further recognise that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it.

This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.

With reference to the above, the parties have agreed to enter into a ceasefire, refrain from conduct that could undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of this agreement and implement confidence-building measures as indicated in the articles below.

Article 1: Modalities of a ceasefire

The parties have agreed to implement a ceasefire between their armed forces as follows:

1.1 A jointly agreed ceasefire between the GOSL and the LTTE shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Article 4.2, hereinafter referred to as D-day.

Military operations

1.2 Neither party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as:

a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;
b) Aerial bombardment;
c) Offensive naval operations.

1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.

Separation of forces

1.4 Where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL’s armed forces and the LTTE’s fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, maintaining a zone of separation of a minimum of 600 metres.

However, each party reserves the right of movement within 100 metres of its own defence localities, keeping an absolute minimum distance of 400 metres between them.

Where existing positions are closer than 400 metres, no such right of movement applies and the parties agree to ensure the maximum possible distance between their personnel.

1.5 In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 December 2001 shall continue to apply pending such demarcation as is provided in article 1.6.

1.6 The parties shall provide information to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) regarding defence localities in all areas of contention, cf. Article 3. The monitoring mission shall assist the parties in drawing up demarcation lines at the latest by D-day + 30.

1.7 The parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other party.

1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.

Freedom of movement

1.9 The parties’ forces shall initially stay in the areas under their respective control, as provided in Article 1.4 and Article 1.5.

1.10 Unarmed GOSL troops shall, as of D-day + 60, be permitted unlimited passage between Jaffna and Vavunyia using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9). The modalities are to be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the SLMM.

1.11 The parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, on the recommendation of their area commander, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other party. Such visits shall be limited to six days every second month, not including the time of travel by the shortest applicable route. The LTTE shall facilitate the use of the Jaffna-Kandy road for this purpose. The parties reserve the right to deny entry to specified military areas.

1.12 The parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall notwithstanding the two-month restriction, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit immediate family (ie spouses, children, grandparents, parents and siblings) in connection with weddings or funerals. The right to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

1.13 Fifty unarmed LTTE members shall as of D-day + 30, for the purpose of political work, be permitted freedom of movement in the areas of the North and the East dominated by the GOSL. Additional 100 unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement as of D-day + 60. As of D-day + 90, all unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North and the East. The LTTE members shall carry identity papers. The right of the GOSL to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

Article 2: Measures to restore normalcy

The parties shall undertake the following confidence-building measures with the aim of restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka:

2.1 The parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.

2.2 The parties shall refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could offend cultural or religious sensitivities. Places of worship (temples, churches, mosques and other holy sites etc.) currently held by the forces of either of the parties shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. Places of worship which are situated in “high security zones” shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public.

2.3 Beginning on the date on which this agreement enters into force, school buildings occupied by either party shall be vacated and returned to their intended use. This activity shall be completed by D-day + 160 at the latest.

2.4 A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended use shall be drawn up by the parties and published at the latest by D-day + 30.

2.5 The parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population. Such systems shall be in place from D-day + 60.

2.6 The parties agree to ensure the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from the LTTE-dominated areas with the exception of certain items as shown in Annex A. Quantities shall be determined by market demand. The GOSL shall regularly review the matter with the aim of gradually removing any remaining restrictions on non-military goods.

2.7 In order to facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, the parties agree to establish checkpoints on their line of control at such locations as are specified in Annex B.

2.8 The parties shall take steps to ensure that the Trincomalee-Habarana road remains open on a 24-hour basis for passenger traffic with effect from D-day + 10.

2.9 The parties shall facilitate the extension of the rail service on the Batticaloa-line to Welikanda. Repairs and maintenance shall be carried out by the GOSL in order to extend the service up to Batticaloa.

2.10 The parties shall open the Kandy-Jaffna road (A9) to non-military traffic of goods and passengers. Specific modalities shall be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the Royal Norwegian Government by D-day + 30 at the latest.

2.11 A gradual easing of the fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D-day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed, subject to the following exceptions: (i) fishing will not be permitted within an area of 1 nautical mile on either side along the coast and 2 nautical miles seawards from all security forces camps on the coast; (ii) fishing will not be permitted in harbours or approaches to harbours, bays and estuaries along the coast.

2.12 The parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall not take place. Arrests shall be conducted under due process of law in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.

2.13 The parties agree to provide family members of detainees access to the detainees within D-day + 30.

Article 3: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

The parties have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this agreement. Both parties shall fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their respective sides. The mission shall conduct international verification through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments entered into in this agreement as follows:

3.1 The name of the monitoring mission shall be the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM).

3.2 Subject to acceptance by the parties, the Royal Norwegian Government (hereinafter referred to as the RNG) shall appoint the Head of the SLMM (hereinafter referred to as the HoM), who shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this agreement.

3.3 The SLMM shall liaise with the parties and report to the RNG.

3.4 The HoM shall decide the date for the commencement of the SLMM’s operations.

3.5 The SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries.

3.6 The SLMM shall establish a headquarters in such place as the HoM finds appropriate. An office shall be established in Colombo and in Vanni in order to liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively. The SLMM will maintain a presence in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.

3.7 A local monitoring committee shall be established in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. Each committee shall consist of five members, two appointed by the GOSL, two by the LTTE and one international monitor appointed by the HoM. The international monitor shall chair the committee. The GOSL and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.

3.8 The committees shall serve the SLMM in an advisory capacity and discuss issues relating to the implementation of this agreement in their respective districts, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues. In particular, they will seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of this agreement at the lowest possible level.

3.9 The parties shall be responsible for the appropriate protection of and security arrangements for all SLMM members.

3.10 The parties agree to ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM members in performing their tasks. The members of the SLMM shall be given immediate access to areas where violations of the agreement are alleged to have taken place. The parties also agree to facilitate the widest possible access to such areas for the local members of the six above-mentioned committees, cf. Article 3.7.

3.11 It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the agreement, and to enquire into and assist the parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints.

3.12 With the aim of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level, communication shall be established between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and the LTTE area leaders to enable them to resolve problems in the conflict zones.

3.13 Guidelines for the operations of the SLMM shall be established in a separate document.

Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the agreement

4.1 Each party shall notify its consent to be bound by this agreement through a letter to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe on behalf of the GOSL and by leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on behalf of the LTTE respectively. The agreement shall be initialled by each party and enclosed in the above-mentioned letter.

4.2 The agreement shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

4.3 This agreement may be amended and modified by mutual agreement of both parties. Such amendments shall be notified in writing to the RNG.

4.4 This agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by either party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given 14 days in advance of the effective date of termination.

Annexes
Annex A: List of goods
Annex B: Checkpoints
Source: Full text of the ceasefire agreement, The Guardian, 22 February 2002.

Related events
GoSL closes the A9 highway
SLMM reports death toll figures
Suspected LTTE bomb attack in Buttala

Source
Sri Lanka enters truce with rebels, BBC, 21 December 2001.