Sources
If Sri Lanka does not want our help what can we do? Daily Mirror, 29 March 2008; International experts pull out but government backs human rights inquiry, IRIN News, 4 April 2008.

Quotations

“If we stayed on, business would go on as usual. By withdrawing we are creating a situation where Sri Lankan authorities have to clearly take up the responsibility in protecting human rights. Most of the suggestions that were made by the IIGEP have been ignored or rejected. So we no longer see how we can contribute further to the protection and enhancement of human rights in Sri Lanka. … A two pronged response is needed to safeguard the perception of validity and legitimacy of the commission. The first is a national response. It is up to the government to ensure that the CoI is effectively independent. The government must now show that it has a political will which it hasn’t shown up to now to allow the commission to do its job. Secondly, the international community must get involved with the whole issue of human rights protection and the prosecution of violators. … There is a real problem of witness protection in this country which goes far beyond legislation and this is something that we have tried to address in our modest level. The burden of the question lies clearly with the government to address the climate of fear and find ways of ensuring that witnesses are protected. … After a certain time we were just repeating ourselves. I understand the constraints of the government, but we have to say that this is a lack of political will. … Generally successful procedures have been developed after the conflict or with a change of administration. But now you have an ongoing war and an ongoing administration. I do understand the difficulties in such a context. Once again Sri Lanka has to decide what it wants.” Jean-Pierre Cot, Emeritus Professor of the University of Paris and Judge, an eminent person in the IIGEP.

“We didn’t ask the IIGEP to leave. They had their reasons for going to which the COI and the attorney general’s department have put forward their own positions. We still have confidence the COI will produce results. I’m as desperate as anyone else to show results, especially when I have to go before international forums.” Mahinda Samarasinghe, Minister of Human Rights and Disaster Management.

“President Mahinda Rajapaksa, once a rights advocate, has now led his government to become one of the world’s worst perpetrators of forced disappearances. The end of the ceasefire means this crisis will continue until the government starts taking serious measures.” Elaine Pearson, Human Rights Watch Deputy Asia Director.

Extracts from Human Rights Watch report

“In the great majority of cases documented by Human Rights Watch and Sri Lankan groups, evidence indicates the involvement of government security forces – army, navy, or police. …

“Relatives frequently described uniformed policemen, especially members of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), taking their relatives into custody before they “disappeared.” The police claimed that these individuals were needed for questioning, yet did not say where they were being taken and did not produce the required “arrest receipt.” After these arrests, the families did not manage to obtain any information on the detainees’ fate or whereabouts. …

“Most of the victims are ethnic Tamils, although Muslims and Sinhalese have also been targeted. In many cases, the security forces “disappeared” individuals because of their alleged affiliation with the LTTE. Clergy, educators, humanitarian aid workers, and journalists also were targeted – not only to remove them from the civil sphere, but also to warn others to avoid such activities. …

“Vairamuththu Varatharasan, a 40-year-old truck driver and father of five, was abducted from his home in Colombo on January 7, 2007, and has not been seen since. His wife told Human Rights Watch:

“A group of about 20 men – some in police uniforms, some in civilian clothes surrounded the house. One policeman came inside and asked for our identity card. I went into one of the rooms to get the identity card. By the time I came out of the room, my husband was not there; neither was the policeman. I ran out and spotted a van parked in a dark place on the road. I ran to the road, but by the time I got there, the van started and left.”

Related events
6 November 2006
11 June 2007
25 June 2007

Related links
The President’s Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious Violations of Human Rights website; Recurring Nightmare: State Responsibility for “Disappearances” and Abductions in Sri Lanka, Human Rights Watch, 6 March 2008.

Source
Enforced Disappearances and Abductions, Return to War, Human Rights Watch, August 2007; US ‘concerned’ about disappeared, BBC Sinhala, 29 June 2007.

Sources
Lanka slams Indian-led international panel over rights charges, The Hindu, 24 June 2007; Evidence in aid worker massacre in Sri Lanka may be missing: jurist group, International Herald Tribune, 25 June 2007.

Quotations

“In the view of the Government of Sri Lanka, the IIGEP has exceeded its mandate indirectly proposing to the government that an international human rights monitoring mechanism be established or invited to Sri Lanka”. C.R. De Silva, Attorney General, 24 June 2007

“There is, therefore, evidence to indicate that the 5.56 caliber bullet was removed from the evidence submitted as exhibits to the Kantale magistrate, and that another bullet of a different type was substituted. Given this new information, the ICJ is calling for the president of Sri Lanka to order renewed, impartial and thorough investigations into the killing of the 17 aid workers … and to ensure those responsible are prosecuted”. Statement of the International Commission of Jurists, 25 June 2007

Responding to the criticism of the IIGEP, the Attorney General’s office argues that the statements of the IIGEP were “inappropriate” and suggested it stays to its mandate to only “make observations and recommendations”.

Related events
6 November 2006
11 June 2007
6 March 2008

The IIGEP attacks the methods of the Presidential Commission created to investigate human rights violations as failing to satisfy international standards. It further alleges that it has been “plagued with conflicts of interest”. Responding to the criticism, the Attorney General’s office argues that the statements of the IIGEP were “inappropriate” and suggested it stays to its mandate to only “make observations and recommendations”.

Source
IIGEP Statement of 11 June 2007

Extracts from interim statement
“We reported to the President that the Commission has so far made hardly any noticeable progress in investigations and inquiries since its inception in November 2006. Moreover, since our formation in February 2007, we have identified and raised a number of concerns with the Commission and the Government of Sri Lanka. We remain concerned that current measures taken by the Government of Sri Lanka and the Commission to address issues such as the independence of the Commission, timeliness and witness protection are not adequate and do not satisfy international norms and standards.

Independence
We are concerned about the role of the Attorney General’s Department as legal counsel to the Commission. The Attorney General’s Department is the Chief Legal Adviser to the Government of Sri Lanka. Members of the Attorney General’s Department have been involved in the original investigations into those cases subject to further investigation by the Commission itself. As such, members of the Attorney General’s Department may find that they are investigating themselves. Furthermore, it is possible that they be called as material witnesses before the Commission. We consider these to be serious conflicts of interest, which lack transparency and compromise national and international standards of independence and impartiality that are central to the credibility and public confidence of the Commission.

We are concerned that the Commission’s finances are managed by the Presidential Secretariat. The Commission does not have financial independence enabling it to exercise control of its human resources and operations. In particular, the Commission should be allocated sufficient funds to secure the permanent confidentiality, safety and integrity of its victim and witness protection scheme.

Timeliness

We are concerned that the Commission did not commence even preliminary investigations and inquiries until May 2007, despite being constituted six months earlier in November 2006. To date, internal processes have not been transparent; no detailed work plan has been announced; essential staff have not yet been fully recruited; investigative and witness protection units are not functioning; and significantly, evidence already known to be in the possession of Governmental bodies relating to the cases has not been gathered and transmitted to us. Such unnecessary delays undermine public confidence in the ability of the Commission to carry out its mandate in a timely manner.

Witness protection
We are concerned that there are no adequate victim and witness protection provisions under Sri Lankan law. We are of the view that witness protection is absolutely essential in order to investigate serious violations of human rights that are within the Commission’s mandate. Appropriate legislation that accords with international norms and standards should be enacted and implemented as soon as possible to protect victims and witnesses. We regret that the Commission still has no functioning victim and witness protection mechanism. In the absence of appropriate legislation, an effective scheme or functioning protection unit, we fail to understand how the Commission could have invited the public, as it did as recently as 14 May 2007, to come forward and give evidence. As the Commission is operating without witness protection legislation, it is unable to guarantee the safety and security of witnesses. Summoning and examining potential victims and witnesses may create fear in their minds about safety and security, deterring them from coming forward to give evidence.

Mandates
The Presidential Warrant limits the scope of the Commission to a retrospective and fact finding role. The core work of the Commission is to obtain information, investigate and inquire into alleged serious violations of human rights arising since 1 August 2005, including 16 specific cases; and to examine prior investigations into these cases. The Commission is required to make findings and report to the President on the facts and circumstances pertaining to each case; the descriptions, nature and backgrounds of the victims; the circumstances that may have led to, or resulted in, those persons suffering such deaths, injury or physical harm; the identities, descriptions and backgrounds of the persons and groups responsible for the commission of deaths and other acts; measures of reparation to be provided to the victims; and recommendations in order to prevent the occurrence of incidents in the nature of those investigated and any other recommendations considered as relevant.

The IIGEP, comprising of 11 Members, has been invited by the President to observe the investigations and inquiries of the Commission, in order to ensure transparency and observance of international norms and standards. The IIGEP does not have a mandate to conduct independent investigations and inquiries; nevertheless, we are open to all persons who wish to provide information and evidence on the cases under review by the Commission. Although we are obliged by the Presidential Invitation to transmit third party information to the Commission, it would not be right for us to disclose any information without the consent of the third party, or which may impair the safety or security of such third parties until we are satisfied that effective, functioning and credible witness protection measures are in place.

We regret that public statements from State officials are creating the misleading impression that the Commission and IIGEP have wide mandates and powers and the resources to address ongoing alleged human rights violations in Sri Lanka. This is not the case. In the current context, in particular, the apparent renewed systematic practice of enforced disappearance and the killings of Red Cross workers, it is critical that the Commission and IIGEP not be portrayed as a substitute for robust, effective measures including national and international human rights monitoring. P N Bhagwati, Chairman, IIGEP.

Related events
6 November 2006
25 June 2007
6 March 2008

Eight national Commissioners were formally announced and mandated to obtain information, investigate and inquire into alleged serious violations of human rights arising since the 1st of August, 2005, that also included 16 specific cases and the examination of prior investigations into these cases.

The President had initially intimated (on 4 September 2006) that there would be an international, independent Commission to probe alleged abductions, disappearances and extra judicial killings. On 6 September, the President instead called for an International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) to act as observers of investigations conducted by a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Serious Human Rights Violations. The IIGEP was also expected to comment on the Commission’s compliance with international norms and standards and propose correctional action.

Sources
UN rights chief hails [probe into extrajudicial killings but voices concerns, UN News Centre, 7 November 2007; Amnesty International urges effective action to end impunity, Amnesty International, 1 December 2006. Strengthen national institutions to deal with human rights violations and overcome national regression, Media statement, National Peace Council, 3 July 2007.

Quotations

"It will be critically important for the Commission to establish not only individual responsibility for crimes, but the broader patterns and context in which they occur.” High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour.

"Amnesty International recognises that the human rights situation in Sri Lanka has been characterized by decades of impunity for perpetrators of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In this regard, the creation of a Commission of Inquiry could be a timely and potentially valuable undertaking. However, the organisation is concerned that the Government of Sri Lanka has cut too many corners in establishing its currentnational Commission of Inquiry and the accompanying International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP)." Amnesty International, 1 December 2006.

The 16 cases
Case No. 1: Assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar, Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka.
Case No. 2: Killing of 17 aid workers of the international non-governmental organisation Action Contra La Faim in early August 2006.
Case No. 3: Alleged execution of Muslim villagers in Muttur in early August 2006 and the execution at Welikanda of 14 persons from Muttur who were being transported in ambulances.
Case No. 4: Assassination of Joseph Pararajasingham, Member of Parliament on 25 December 2005.
Case No. 5: Killing of 5 youths in Trincomalee on or about 2 January 2006.
Case No. 6: Assassination of Ketheesh Loganathan, Deputy Director General of the Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat (SCOPP) on 12 August 2006.
Case No. 7: Death of 51 persons in Naddalamottankulam (Sencholai) in August 2006.
Case No. 8: Disappearance of Rev. Nihal Jim Brown of Philip Neri's Church at Allaipidi on 28 August 2006.
Case No. 9: Killing of 5 fishermen and another at Pesalai beach and at the Pesalai Church on 17 June 2006.
Case No. 10: Killing of thirteen 13 persons in Kayts police area on 13 May 2006.
Case No. 11: Killing of 10 Muslim villagers at Radella in Pottuvil police area on 17 September 2006.
Case No. 12: Killing of 68 persons at Kebithigollewa on 15 June 2006.
Case No. 13: Incident relating to the finding of 5 headless bodies in Avissawella on 29 April 2006.
Case No. 14: Killing of 13 persons at Welikanda on 29 May 2005.
Case No. 15: Killing of 98 security forces personnel in Digampathana, Sigiriya, on 16 October 2006.
Case No. 16: Assassination of Nadarajah Raviraj, Member of Parliament on 10 November 2006.

Related events
4 August 2006
11 June 2007
25 June 2007
6 March 2008

Headed by former Chief Justice, Suppiah Sharvandana, the Commission’s mandate was to “inquire into the nature, cause and extent of the gross violation of human rights, the destruction and damage to property committed as part of the ethnic violence which occurred from the beginning of 1981 to the end of 1984 with special reference to Black July 1983, including the circumstances which led to such violence”.

Sources
Report on the Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence
(1981 – 1984), Volume I; S. Sharvananda, S. S. Sahabandu, M. M. Zuhair;
September 2002; Scripting the Welikade Massacre Inquest and the Fate of Two Dissidents, Supplement to Special Report No.25, University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) UTHR(J), 31 May 2007; Remembering Conflict, The Hindu, 20 July 2003.

Extracts from the report
“It is necessary to emphasise the difficulties of giving a complete picture of these events, firstly because no official records of any investigation are available; secondly, almost all reports were censored at the time from publications; and thirdly most of the victims are still living outside the country – some in South India, most of the others in Western countries. We have restricted these records to those who made representations, almost all of which were verified by a competent team of investigators appointed by the Commission and to he accounts of those who were able to give oral testimony before the Commission. We are in no position sitting as we do, nearly 19 years after these events of July 1983 to give a reasonably complete picture of the events of 1983.

“We regret to find that the government had failed to prosecute those involved in the crimes of the July 25th and 27th. The domestic inquiry initiated by the Head of Welikade Prison Mr Leo de Silva was not proceeded with. There is not evidence that investigations commenced by the Borella Police had been proceeded with, beyond the stage of the inquest. the efforts of the commission to trace the police records turned futile. It is the responsibility every government to ensure that perpetrators of crimes are punished and that no one acts with impunity or gets away without responsibility. The government of the day has failed to discharge these obligations.

“The question arises as to why the government failed to declare the curfew in the morning of Monday 25 July, when trouble had already broken out in several parts of Colombo, in addition to the troubles that had occurred in Borella, the previous evening? This was [a] question that Sarath Muttetuwegama MP raised in Parliament, for which no satisfactory response came from the government. … The government however declared the curfew only in the afternoon of 25th July, which came into effective operation late in the evening.

“Another important aspect concerns the role of the media. … There was a lot of disinformation, distortions, exaggerations, inflammatory bloating of events: they all led to an escalation of domestic violence. I would specifically refer to a newspaper that is no longer in print, that of the Dawasa Group. Much before “Black July” on 17th July 1983, there was a headline, “Uthure Thrasthawadaya madinna Thawath Thrasthawadayak” (“To counter Northern terrorism, there is going to emerge another terrorism”). It was a banner headline. The newspaper went on to the extent of stating that after the 22nd of July a very strong course of action will be taken to exterminate or to defeat terrorism. It significantly mentions the date, “after 22nd and 23rd”.

Recommendations

1. The President and the Prime Minister must give leadership to a new era of ethnic reconciliation and national unity;
2. The support and participation of the people of the country in the towns and the villages must be obtained and sustained by the country’s leaders for the above purpose;
3. Legislation similar to the South African, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 32 of 1995, by enacted to establish the legal framework for sustaining the process of ethnic reconciliation and to provide for the elimination of all forms of racism and ethnic related discrimination;
4. The leadership, support and cooperation of religious leaders, the civil society, the mass media, the schools, the police and the armed forces be ensured in the process of reconciliation and national unity;
5. National unity and ethnic amity [must] be fostered with due regard and recognition for pluralism and diversity;
6. The establishment of just and fair governance that will eliminate all forms of racism and discrimination be promoted, with perpetrators of discrimination losing the right to hold public office for specified periods of time;
7. The media be made to recognise that sections from amongst them did contribute to the sustenance of ethnic misgivings and that they have a major responsibility to support and promote national unity and ethnic reconciliation;
8. The government must pay full compensation to the victims (or their dependents) on the basis of the Commission’s Recommendations;
9. An Investigations Division of officers with police powers functioning entirely under the direction of the Human Rights Commission (HRC) to apprehend and prosecute persons holding public office acting in violation of fundamental rights with particular reference to ethnic related discrimination;
10. The HRC in all cases on its own, or upon complaints of unsatisfactory investigations by police relating to ethnic violations or issues, must take over and conduct investigations through its Investigations Division and ensure appropriate action;
11. The perpetrators of ethnic violence whether they be members of the public, the police, the armed forces or the public service by prosecuted whenever any ethnic violence occurs in the future;
12. Truth Commissions be appointed mandating to cover ethnic violence during the post-1984 period and to compensate all victims of ethnic violence and to achieve national unity and ethnic reconciliation.

Quotations

“I dare say much of the facts were not available to the Commission because of the long period that had ensued between ‘83 and the appointment of the Commission in the year 2001. … I am aware the Commissioners went into in great detail and took much trouble to investigate these complaints placed before them. And as you know they have been able to find evidence of what was nearly a 1,000 killings during that period and I believe 18,000 properties were destroyed, mainly by fire, and thousands of others were injured in incidents of violence. We suppose that there must have been many more incidents that have not been reported to the Commission, simply because there is nobody to report them anymore, either in this world or in this country,” President Chandrika Kumaratunga at the 21st Anniversary of ‘Black July’, Presidential Secretariat, Colombo, 23 July 2004.

“Where the Welikade massacres were concerned for instance [the Commission] did hardly any – if any – investigation of its own. It relied on me for practically everything and seemed more than happy with just our material. What it should have done is taken our material as a starting point and then followed up from there, with all its powers of investigation and summoning witnesses, which we didn’t have. For instance it could and should have tried to obtain the statements recorded by the police after the first massacre. The instructing attorneys in the 35 civil cases filed by dependents of victims called for these time and time again in preparation for the trials, but were met with evasion after evasion by the police. The cases never came to trial because they were eventually settled, with the state paying some compensation but without admitting liability. …  Welikade was only a small part of the Commission’s whole remit. In its report the Commission did pay CRM and me a handsome tribute, which was certainly gratifying, but we had really hoped that it would investigate further and uncover information which we had not already found out for ourselves,” Suriya Wickremasinghe, Civil Rights Movement, who had appeared before the Commission.

“[The] indications were clear enough that [the Commission] was not meant to be taken too seriously, and that it was really meant to serve a cosmetic purpose. The time frame of 1981 to 1984 was absurd as the State terrorism clearly began in 1977. However, the Commissioners ignored that time frame and went into the antecedents leading up to 1981. They were required to submit their report in January 2002 – that is, in no more than just six months. The report was in fact submitted in September 2002. It noted that the South African Truth Commission had a staff of 750 to assist it, the media gave it wide coverage, and there was something like national participation in what was seen as a process of reconciliation by establishing the truth. There was hardly any of that here. The report emphasized the need to set up new Commissions to continue the work of establishing the truth as part of a continuing process of reconciliation and nation-building. There has been none of that, and all that has happened is that President Kumaratunga issued a perfunctory apology over 1983. Clearly at the level of the State also there has been a resistance to establishing the full truth about what happened in 1983,”Izeth Hussain, 1983 July Anti – Tamil Violence – State Terrorism, transcurrents.com.

Sources
Report on the Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence (1981 – 1984), Volume I; S. Sharvananda, S. S. Sahabandu, M. M. Zuhair; September 2002; Scripting the Welikade Massacre Inquest and the Fate of Two Dissidents, Supplement to Special Report No.25, University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) UTHR(J), 31 May 2007.

Related events
31 May 1981
24 July 1983
23 July 2004

Source
Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999.

Source
Ceylon Daily News, 20 December 1974; H. A. I. Goonetetileke (1978): The Sri Lankan Insurrection of 1971: A Select Bibliographical Commentary, published in Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia, Bardwell L. Smith (1978).

Quotation

“In reaching our decisions as to the sentences to be imposed on the subjects, whom we have found guilty of the charges, we have attempted to to take account of several considerations which we think are relevant. In the case of the 13th suspect, Wijeweera, [who] also founded and led the JVP and who was primarily responsible for the decision to strike against the Government, we see no alternative but to impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life.” Criminal Justice Commission, 20 December 1974, as reported in the CJC Report, 1977.

Related events
14 May 1965
10 August 1970
April 1971
April 1971
2 November 1973

Extracts from defence statement
“A representative of one social class is addressing the representatives of another social class. That is what is happening here. A representative of the exploited and oppressed proletariat is addressing the representatives of the exploiting and oppressing class. We should not forget that the living really with transpires here is a struggle for the fulfilment and class interests of two opposed social classes. Although I have been designated the ‘thirteenth suspect’ by this Commission in the present inquiry, the Chairman himself has stated that I am the chief suspect. That begin so it will be necessary right at the beginning to tell you who I, the thirteenth suspect, am. I am a Marxist-Leninist. I am a modern Bolshevik. I am a proletarian revolutionary. Marxism-Leninism is a clear doctrine. In no way is a terrorist. As a proletarian revolutionary, however, I must emphatically state that I am committed to the overthrow of the of the prevailing capitalist system and its replacement by a socialism system…

“To disown capitalism which had turned grey, reactionary and obsolete in the course of human social development, to say that this system must be replaced with the fore as befitting the latest and noblest historical stage in the course of the development of human society, and to act accordingly, is an no way a conspiratorial act. I am not a conspirator in the context of the development of history. I am no conspirator in the context of the development of society and humanity…
“Honourable Members of the Commission, may I make one request to begin with? I have been subjected to every possible indignity and harassment at the hands of the ruling class and have been for several years the target of numerous defamations, slurs and slanders, mudslinging and character assassination and all this without any protection from the law. The only request that I make of you, is to respect my right to express my innocence freely and without any let or hindrance. The ruling clique of capitalists will gag me for a long period, if not for all time. In these circumstances I do not wish to blame myself for not saying all that I have to say before you now. I beseech that I be not gagged…

“My view is that conditions were not ripe for organizing an armed revolutionary uprising to seize state power. The objective conditions were maturing fast, but they were still unripe. It had not reached a stage where the masses saw no other solution but revolution. It is true, however, that then, as now, society was moving in that direction. The subjective conditions were also lacking: that is, the existence of a revolutionary party that has steeled itself, won the support of the masses and is fit to lead them in an armed struggle for power. The Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna was developing and moving towards that goal, but had not reached full maturity. We had failed at that time to established the JVP in the Northern and eastern provinces and in the Estate sector as a political force. And then there was the question of mass support. It is true that out of the millions who voted for the Coalition Government, tens of thousands had by this time washed their hands of it. It is also true that this section was the politically developed section. They were abandoning the Coalition Government and moving Leftwards towards the JVP. But there was a section which, although disgusted and frustrated, did not break away from the government during those either months. On other words the JVP had not yet reached the stage where the masses could see it as a real alternative to the government, accept its leadership and join in the class under its banner. In our Marxist conception, a revolution – an armed uprising – is not something done behind the backs of the masses.

“In conclusion this is what I have to say: I admit that the capitalist class has been temporary victorious. But I do not see it as a defeat for the proletariat. This is only a big retreat for the proletariat; yes, I call it a big retreat. A retreat is not a defeat, but a phase from which it is possible to recover and march again to certain victory. No revolutionary movement has raced non-stop to victory in a straight line from start to finish. Forward marches followed by retreats are quite common in revolutionary movements. That is the position with which we are confronted today and it is from this position that I have come to give evidence before you. I have not spoken here by stretching my principles for personal gain. I remain an unrepentant Marxist and what I am defending here are Marxist principles rather than myself. For as a revolutionary Marxist I have nothing else to defend.

“Whatever the capitalist class may have expected to gain through the April incidents, their ultimate result has already been expressed by a revolutionary poet in the following stanza:

See these blossoms strewn on earth and withered lie
Their fragrance shall abide, shall never die.
To raise its sweetness high to limits limitless,
More buds will bloom and bloom and multiply.

“The poet expresses himself in clear and plain terms. The flowers of revolution have blossomed, but how they lie withered and dead. But their perfume has not ceased. To enhance that perfume and with that aim in view other buds will continue to bloom. In fact, gentlemen, the capitalist cause has no real reason to celebrate its success. For in the class struggle victory is a see saw until the proletariat finally emerges victorious. That is our belief. I have concluded my evidence.” Rohana Wijeweera, Statement before the Criminal Justice Commission, 2 November 1973.

Related events
14 May 1965
10 August 1970
April 1971
April 1971
20 December 1974

Source
Ceylon Daily News, 14 June 1972; H. A. I. Goonetetileke (1978): The Sri Lankan Insurrection of 1971: A Select Bibliographical Commentary, published in Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia, Bardwell L. Smith (1978).