Source
NA. V. The United Kingdom, Press release, European Court of Human Rights, 17 July 2008.

Extracts
The applicant was born in 1975 in Sri Lanka. He currently lives in London. He is an ethnic Tamil. He entered the United Kingdom clandestinely on 17 August 1999 and claimed asylum the next day on the grounds that he feared ill-treatment in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). … He explained that he had been arrested and detained by the army on six occasions between 1990 and 1997 on suspicion of involvement with the Tigers. … He feared the Tigers because his father had done some work for the army. They had also tried to recruit him on two occasions in 1997 and 1998. …

The risk to Tamils returning to Sri Lanka
It was accepted by the parties to the case that there had been a deterioration in the security situation in Sri Lanka. However, the United Kingdom authorities, while recognising this deterioration and the corresponding increase in human rights violations, had not concluded that this created a general risk to all Tamils returning to Sri Lanka. Nor had the applicant in the present case sought to challenge that conclusion in his submissions. The Court saw no reason to reach a different conclusion.

Moreover the Court also found that the United Kingdom authorities had given serious and anxious consideration to the risk to Tamils returning to Sri Lanka. They had examined all the relevant objective evidence and, just as importantly, considered the appropriate weight to be given to it.

In the Court’s view, both the assessment of the risk to Tamils of certain profiles and the assessment of whether individual acts of harassment cumulatively amounted to a serious violation of human rights could only be done on an individual basis.

It was moreover in principle legitimate, when assessing the individual risk to returnees, to carry out that assessment on the basis of the list of “risk factors”, which the United Kingdom authorities, with the benefit of direct access to objective information and expert evidence, had drawn up.

The assessment of whether there was a real risk had to be made on the basis of all relevant factors which might increase the risk of ill-treatment. It was also possible that a number of individual factors which when they were considered separately did not constitute a real risk might, when taken cumulatively and when considered in a situation of general violence and heightened security, give rise to such a real risk.

The Court found that the information before it pointed to the systematic torture and ill-treatment by the Sri Lankan authorities of Tamils who would be of interest to them in their efforts to combat the Tamil Tigers.
In respect of returns to Sri Lanka through Colombo, the Court also found that there was a greater risk of detention and interrogation at the airport than in Colombo city. Hence the Court’s assessment of whether a returnee was at real risk of ill-treatment might turn on whether that person would be likely to be detained and interrogated at Colombo airport as someone of interest to the authorities. As regards the procedures followed at Columbo airport, the Court considered that at the very least the Sri Lankan authorities had the technological means and procedures in place to identify at the airport failed asylum seekers and those who were wanted by the authorities.

The risk to the applicant
As regards the alleged risk to the applicant from the Tamil Tigers, the Court accepted the domestic authorities’ assessment that while there might be a risk to Tamils in Colombo from Tamil Tigers, this would be only to Tamils with a high profile as opposition activists, or those seen as renegades or traitors. The applicant would therefore not be at real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 by the Tigers if returned to Colombo.

In assessing the applicant’s position in relation to the Sri Lankan authorities, the Court examined the strength of the applicant’s claim to be at real risk as a result of an accumulation of the risk factors identified by the domestic authorities. However, compared with the last factual assessment made by the national authorities, it did so in the light of more recent developments and in particular having due regard to the deterioration of the security situation in Sri Lanka and the corresponding increase in general violence and heightened security. In addition it took a cumulative approach to all possible risk factors identified by the applicant as applicable to his case. …

In conclusion, the Court took note of the current climate of general violence in Sri Lanka and considered cumulatively the factors present in the applicant’s case. In the light of its finding that those considered by the authorities to be of interest in their efforts to combat the Tigers were systematically exposed to torture and ill-treatment, it took the view that there was a real risk that the authorities at Colombo airport would be able to access the records relating to the applicant’s detention. If they did so, when taken cumulatively with the other risk factors identified by the applicant, it was likely that he would be detained and strip-searched. This in turn would lead to the discovery of his scars. On this basis, the Court found that there were substantial grounds for finding that the applicant would be of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities in their efforts to combat the Tigers. In those circumstances, the Court found that at the present time there would be a violation of Article 3 if the applicant were to be returned.

Related events
8 August 2007
29 October 2007

The petitioners argued that evicting Tamils from Colombo is wrongful, unlawful and illegal and violates the fundamental rights of those persons who were so evicted. Subsequent to the interim order of the Supreme Court on 8 June, many of the people evicted were brought back by the police to their lodging houses.

The petition held that the evictions violate the fundamental rights of those persons who were so evicted, guaranteed by Article 11, 12 (1), 12(2), 13(1), 13(2) and 14(1)(h) of the Constitution. Article 11 provides no person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 12 provides that all citizens are equal before the law and ensures that no citizen shall be discriminated against grounds specified in the Constitution. Articles 13 (1) and (2) provide protection from arbitrary arrest and detention. Article 14 (1)(h) provides for the freedom of movement and the right to choose his residence within Sri Lanka.

Source
Centre for Policy Alternatives, Press Release, 5 May 2008.

Related events
7 June 2007
26 July 2007

The Supreme Court directed the Inspector General of Police and the Defence Secretary to ensure a free and fair election, asking them to disarm all unlawful armed groups.

Source
Local bodies poll in Batticoloa after 14 years as plea is dismissed, The Hindu, 5 March 2008

Related events
11 May 2008
11 March 2008
24 January 2008
23 January 2008

The operation commenced in the early hours of the morning, with police and army officers visiting various lodges occupied predominantly by Tamils in Colombo and forcibly evicting them from their lodgings. It was reported that people were given less than half an hour to pack all their belongings and board buses. The evictions were directly attributed to the statement made by the IGP on 1 June 2007, claiming that Tamil people cannot remain in Colombo without a valid reason.

Sources
Ethnic cleansing claim after police move Tamils at gunpoint, The Guardian, 7 June 2007; Colombo police swoop on Tamil visitors from North-East, Hindustan Times, 7 June 2007; Sri Lankan government told to stop Tamil expulsions, Radio Netherlands, 8 June 2007.

Quotations

“Experience in the past 10 years shows that LTTE operatives use the lodges in the city to stay and plan out terrorist strikes,” Keheliya Rambukwella, Government spokesman.

“Humiliation of this magnitude ultimately points at a policy of gradual eviction of Tamils from Colombo,’ Mano Ganesan, parliamentarian and head of Civil Monitoring Commission.

“There is a sense that any Tamil can be targeted … This could escalate out of control,” Jehan Pereira, National Peace Council.

Related event
5 May 2008

The Northern and Eastern provinces were merged under the 1987 Indo-Lanka agreement signed by President J. R. Jayawardhana and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The judgement was the unanimous decision of a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which examined a petition by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), challenging the legality of the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces on the grounds that the LTTE had not relinquished their weapons. The Supreme Court held that the Emergency Regulation made in 1988 merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces was not in compliance with law.

Sources
North East merger illegal, BBC Sinhala, 16 October 2006; The importance of two provinces, BBC News, 17 October 2007.

Quotations

“The judgement knocks the bottom out of the peace process as a merged north-eastern province must be the basis for any peace negotiations.” R Sampanthan, Leader of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

“The SLMC had always taken a view that Muslim political strength had been weakened by the merger of the north and eastern provinces. But it would be wrong to assume that the court decision had ended the ethnic issue.” Rauf Hakim, Leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).

“The executive, judiciary, legislature or any other powers cannot change the future of the people in the east. Their destiny can only be decided by themselves. According to the Indo-Lanka agreement, the future of the eastern population has to be decided by a referendum.” President Rajapakse, SLFP.

Related events
7 November 1987
7 September 1988
24 January 2008

Source
Nallaratnam Singarasa v Attorney-General, Supreme Court of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 15 September 2006, S.C.Spl (LA) No. 182/99.

Extracts from the judgement
“The High Court convicted the Petitioner on the basis of his confession after a full voir dire inquiry as to its voluntariness. If the confession is adequate to base a conviction, a retrial (as contemplated by the Committee) would be a superfluous re-enactment of the same process. The Petitioner has been convicted with [sic] having conspired with others to overthrow the lawfully elected Government of Sri Lanka and for that purpose attacked several army camps. The offences are directly linked to the Sovereignty of the People of Sri Lanka, and the Committee at Geneva, not linked with the Sovereignty of the People, has purported to set aside the orders made in all three levels of Courts that exercise the judicial power of the People of Sri Lanka. …

“The resulting position is that the Petitioner cannot seek to “vindicate and enforce” his rights through the Human Rights Committee at Geneva, which is not reposed with judicial power under our Constitution. A fortiori it is submitted that this Court being “the highest and final Superior Court of record in the Republic” in terms of Article 18 of the Constitution cannot set aside or vary its order as pleaded by the Petitioner on the basis of the findings of the Human Rights Committee in Geneva which is not reposed with any judicial power under or in terms of the Constitution. …

“[Where] the President enters into a treaty or accedes to a Covenant the content of which is “inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or written law’ it would be a transgression of the limitation in Article 33 (f) [of the Constitution] and ultra vires. Such act of the President would not bind the Republic qua state. … [Recognition of the role of the ICCPR Committee to receive and consider communications] is a purported conferment of a judicial power on the Human Rights Committee in Geneva. …

“Therefore the accession to the Optional Protocol in 1997 by the then President and Declaration made under Article 1 is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution specified above and is in excess of the power of the President as contained in Article 33 (f) of the Constitution. The accession and declaration does not bind the Republic qua state and had no legal effect within the Republic. …

“In these circumstances the petitioner cannot plead a legitimate expectation to have the findings of the Human Rights Committee enforced or given effect to by an order of this Court.” Sarath N Silva, Chief Justice.

Quotations

“In a regrettable ruling handed down on 15 September 2006 the Sri Lankan Supreme Court has struck a blow against those human rights victims in Sri Lanka expecting to obtain redress through the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) for breaches of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Supreme Court held that the Sri Lankan state’s accession to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR – which allows individuals to complain directly to the HRC having exhausted domestic remedies – was unconstitutional. This is despite the fact that the complaints mechanism under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR has been in force in Sri Lanka for nearly a decade, and that by ratifying the ICCPR the State has undertaken to ensure respect for those rights protected by it.” Sri Lankan Ruling undermines UN Complaints Mechanism, Interights.

“The judgement renders Sri Lanka’s accession to the Protocol under the ICCPR of no force and effect within the domestic context. Needless to say, the State’s obligations in international law will continue in force unless and until it denounces the Optional Protocol. Denouncing of the ICCPR Protocol by the State will carry with it serious consequences in the international law sphere, particularly in the context of the recent intensification of the conflict in the North East. Then again, the country’s election to membership of the UN Human Rights Council imposes a particular obligation which will itself be in issue if the Government continues to be ambiguous in respect of the domestic implementation of its international law commitments. Undoubtedly this judgement will now make the Government acutely uncomfortable when it sends its representatives before international committees to plead Sri Lanka’s conformity with treaty commitments.” Kishali Pinto Jayawardena, Law & Society Trust, Volume 17 September & October Joint Issue – 227 & 228.

Related events
11 September 1980
3 January 1998
23 August 2004

In an interim injunction, the court stayed “till final determination” critical operative elements of the Regional Committee that was formed as one of the three tiers under the PTOMS agreement. The three-member Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously stayed the project approval and fund management functions of the committee – the most critical element of the joint mechanism at the regional level.

The court did not object to the other two tiers – the national and the district committee – and made it clear that the interim order “is not granted in respect of the entirety” of the MoU establishing the PTOMS.

Sources
Provisions of joint mechanism stayed, The Hindu, 16 July 2005.

Quotations

“We have succeeded in our struggle. There is nothing in the agreement now.” Vijitha Herath, international secretary of the JVP and former Cabinet Minister.

“The structure as provided in the MoU consisting of committees may be established and become functional subject to the restrictions imposed by the judgement.” Supreme Court ruling.

Related events
PA and JVP jointly campaign against interim administration
GoSL signs PTOMS agreement
Supreme Court declares 1987 merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces as unlawful
Experts’ Committee of the APRC reports

Source
Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, UN Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1033/2001 (23 August 2004); Law & Society Trust, Volume 17 September and October Joint Issue – 227 & 228.

Extracts from the Committee’s Views
1.1 The author of the communication is Mr. Nallaratnam Singarasa, a Sri Lankan national, and a member of the Tamil community. He is currently serving a 35 year sentence at Boosa Prison, Sri Lanka. He claims to be a victim of violations of articles 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (c), (f), (g), and 5, and 7, 26, and 2, paragraphs 1, and 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. …

Facts as submitted by the author

2.1 On 16 July 1993, at about 5am, the author was arrested by Sri Lankan security forces while sleeping at his home. 150 Tamil men were also arrested in a “round up” of his village. None of them were informed of the reasons for their arrest. They were all taken to the Komathurai Army Camp and accused of supporting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (known as ‘the LTTE’). During his detention at the camp, the author’s hands were tied together, he was kept hanging from a mango tree and was allegedly assaulted by members of the security forces. …

2.2 He was detained pursuant to the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 of 1979.

2.3 [Between July and September 1993 he was interrogated, held incommunicado, and denied legal representation and medical assistance. For two days he claims to have been tortured] which included being pushed into a water tank and held under water and then blindfolded and laid face down and assaulted. …

2.5 [During his interrogation, since] the author could not speak Sinhalese, the Police Constable interpreted between Tamil and Sinhalese. The author was then requested to sign a statement which had been translated and typed in Sinhalese by the PC. The author refused to sign as he could not understand it. He alleges that the ASP then forcibly put his thumbprint on the typed statement. The prosecution later produced this statement as evidence of the author’s alleged confession. …

2.9 On 12 January 1995, in an application to the High Court, defence counsel submitted that there were visible marks of assault on the author’s body, and moved for a medical report to be obtained. On the Court’s order, a Judicial Medical Officer then examined him. According to the author, the medical report stated that the author displayed scars on his back and a serious injury, in the form of a corneal scar on his left eye, which resulted in permanent impairment of vision. It also stated that “injuries to the lower part of the left back of the chest and eye were caused by a blunt weapon while that to the mid back of the chest was probably due to application of sharp force”.

2.10 On 2 June 1995, the author’s alleged confession was the subject of a voir dire hearing by the High Court, at which the ASP, PC and author gave evidence, and the medical report was considered. The High Court concluded that the confession was admissible, pursuant to section 16(1) of the PTA, which renders admissible any statement made before a police officer not below the rank of an ASP, provided that it is not found to be irrelevant under section 24 of the Evidence Ordinance. Section 16(2) of the PTA put the burden of proof that any such statement is irrelevant on the accused. (4) The Court did not find the confession irrelevant, despite defence counsel’s motion to exclude it on the grounds that it was extracted from the author under threat. …

2.11 According to the author, the High Court gave no reasons for rejecting the medical report despite noting itself that there were “injury scars presently visible on the [author's] body” and acknowledging that these were sequels of injuries “inflicted before or after this incident.” In holding that the confession was voluntary, the High Court relied upon the author’s failure to complain to anyone at any time about the beatings.

2.12 On 29 September 1995, the High Court convicted the author on all five counts, and on 4 October 1995, sentenced him to 50 years imprisonment. The conviction was based solely on the alleged confession.

The State party’s submissions on admissibility and merits

4.8 On the claim of torture, the State party submits that the trial court and the Court of Appeal made clear and unequivocal findings that these allegations were inconsistent with the medical report adduced in evidence, and that the author had failed to make such allegations to the Magistrate or to the police, prior to the trial.

4.9 On the issue of a violation of article 14, paragraph 5, it notes that the author was afforded every opportunity to have his conviction and sentence reviewed by a tribunal according to law, and that he merely seeks to question the findings of fact made by the domestic courts before the Committee.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

7.2 [A]s clearly appears from the court proceedings, the confession took place in the sole presence of the two investigating officers – the Assistant Superintendent of Police and the Police Constable; the latter typed the statement and provided interpretation between Tamil and Sinhalese. The Committee concludes that the author was denied a fair trial in accordance with article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant by solely relying on a confession obtained in such circumstances. …

7.4 On the claim of a violation of the author’s rights under article 14, paragraph 3 (g), in that he was
forced to sign a confession and subsequently had to assume the burden of proof that it was extracted under duress and was not voluntary, the Committee must consider the principles underlying the right protected in this provision…The Committee considers that it is implicit in this principle that the prosecution prove that the confession was made without duress….[T]he Committee also notes that the burden of proving whether the confession was voluntary was on the accused… Even if, as argued by the State party, the threshold of proof is “placed very low” and “a mere possibility of involuntariness” would suffice to sway the court in favour of the accused, it remains that the burden was on the author. The Committee notes in this respect that the willingness of the courts at all stages to dismiss the complaints of torture and ill-treatment on the basis of the inconclusiveness of the medical certificate (especially one obtained over a year after the interrogation and ensuing confession) suggests that this threshold was not complied with. Further, insofar as the courts were prepared to infer that the author’s allegations lacked credibility by virtue of his failing to complain of ill-treatment before its Magistrate, the Committee finds that inference to be manifestly unsustainable in the light of his expected return to police detention. Nor did this treatment of the complaint by its courts satisfactorily discharge the State party’s obligation to investigate effectively complaints of violations of article 7. …

7.6 In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective and appropriate remedy, including release or retrial and compensation. The State party is under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the future and should ensure that the impugned sections of the PTA are made compatible with the provisions of the Covenant.

Related events
11 September 1980
3 January 1998
15 September 2006

41 people were initially indicted for the killings, but 23 were freed due to lack of evidence. Out of the 18 people who faced a full trial, a further 13 were discharged for lack of evidence. In July 2003, the remaining five accused were sentenced to death by the Colombo High Court. These included three residents of the area, Sub-Inspector of Police S. Jayampathi Karunasena and Sub-Inspector of Police Tyronne Roger Ratnayake (who was later released on lack of evidence). In May 2005, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the remaining four were acquitted: the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General had failed to prove the charges.

Source
Mobs kills Tamil inmates in Sri Lanka prison attack, toll 25, AFP, 25 October 2000; Sri Lankan mob kills 25 former child soldiers, Associated Press, 25 October 2000; Two Sri Lankan police sentenced to death over Tamil prisoner massacre, AFP, 1 July 2003; Bindunuwewa accused acquitted, BBC Sinhala, 27 May 2005.

Quotations

“The killing of 29 LTTE prisoners undergoing rehabilitation in Bandarawela under the security and supervision of the state is an appalling crime. … The incident demonstrates that the war mentality cannot be limited to the north-east theatre of operations. Unless the government speedily emphasises constitutional reform and a political solution, we fear that the larger society will be brutalised beyond repair”. National Peace Council, 27 October 2000.

“If not for the complicity of police officers, this would have been avoided. When the victims went running to policemen seeking protection, they were fired at by the police.” Judge Sarath Ambepitiya, High Court in Colombo.

Opinion
“In July 2003, the High Court in Colombo convicted two mid-level police officers and three local residents of murder and sentenced them to death for their role in the massacre. Still, it took another year, and much prodding by the International Committee of the Red Cross, to arrange for something resembling a proper burial. Yet without death certificates, the families of the ten victims still have not received the $2,000 government compensation awarded the other 17 families, despite multiple letters and personal visits by family members to virtually every government official and bureaucrat directly or indirectly involved in the case. … That said, the principal responsibility for the massacres of course lies with the Sri Lankan state, and here, despite years of studying and living in Sri Lanka, I was in for an unexpected shock. Last August I attended one of the final Bindunuwewa appeals hearings. Held before a five-member bench of the supreme court, the justices—addressed by counsel as “your lordships” and adorned in dark red judicial robes and stiff white collars—had all the markings of decorum. At previous hearings earlier in the summer I had been disturbed by the apparent sympathy of most of the justices for the arguments of the lawyer for the second police officer convicted of murder. (The first had earlier been acquitted when the prosecution admitted that its evidence against him was insufficient.) But the final hearing was truly shocking. As the solicitor general repeatedly referred to the ways the Tamil inmates had been murdered – “beaten, stabbed, and some even roasted alive” he would say with a flourish – one of the justices began to mock his emphasis on the word “roasted”. This brought much laughter from the other justices and the defense lawyers, and even, most disturbingly, from the government lawyers themselves. … This conduct was only the most grotesque example of the judges’ utter disdain for the crimes under consideration and for the state’s responsibility to determine the truth. The proceedings were filled with bad jokes and undignified behavior, lacked any sense of gravity of the case, and indicated no awareness of the state’s obligation to protect the inmates whatever their political sympathies.” Alan Keenan, visiting assistant professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College, No Peace, No War: Have international donors failed Sri Lanka’s most vulnerable? Boston Review, Summer 2005.

“The latest fiasco concerns the Supreme Court’s overturning of convictions in the Bindunuwewa massacre case. The Trial-at-Bar comprising High Court Judges, Sarath Ambepitya, Eric Basanayake and Upali Abeyaratne delivered death sentences on five of the accused in July 2003. Two of the defendants were police Inspector Senaka Jayampathy Karunasena and Sub-Inspector Tyronne Roger Ratnayake. By 27th May, 2005 the five-member bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices T.B. Weerasuriya, Nihal Jayasinghe, N.K. Udalagama, N.E. Dissanayake and Raja Fernando had acquitted all five on appeal. The bench led by T.B. Weerasuriya ruled that the Attorney General failed to prove the charges without reasonable doubt.” Bindunuwewa: The Thin End of the Wedge of Impunity, University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR), 12 June 2005.

Source
Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999.

Extract
“On August 4, the Sri Lankan government reimposed a state of emergency throughout the country “for the preservation of public order”. The move permitted President Kumaratunga to cancel five provincial council elections, scheduled for August 28, in which critics expected the party to do poorly. The military claimed it would be difficult to provide security for candidates and polling booths. Members of the Free Media Movement (FMM) filed a case in the Supreme Court accusing the government of denying Sri Lankans the right to exercise their franchise.” Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999.

Source

Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999; Gaps in the Krishanthy Kumarasamy Case: Disappearances & Accountability, UTHR,  28 April 1999;

Quotation

“Like many Tamil civilians ‘disappeared’ in security force operations, Krishanthy was abducted from a military checkpoint; her family members and neighbor who attempted to find her were taken from the same checkpoint later that day.” Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999.

A Tamil public servant, C Kodeeswaran, a senior officer in the executive grade of the Government Clerical service and President of the newly formed trade union – Arasanka Eluthu Vinaignar Sangam – refused to sit the Sinhala proficiency examinations which resulted in his losing his annual salary increments. In 1962, Kodeeswaran sued the Government in the Colombo District Court on the grounds that the regulation under which his increment was stopped was illegal and unreasonable. His argument was that the Official Language Act of 1956 which made Sinhala the sole official language was in violation of Section 29 of the constitution which prohibited discrimination. The trial judge, O.L. de Kretser, upheld the plea and ruled that the Official Language Act and the regulation was ultra vires and contravened Section 29 of the Constitution. In 1967, the government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the judgement on the ground that a government servant had no right to sue the government in a court of law for salary or increment; the Supreme Court did not address the constitutional issue and state that if it became necessary to consider it, the matter would be placed by the Chief Justice before a bench of five judges of the Supreme Court. Kodeeswaran subsequently appealed to the Privy Council which set aside the Supreme Court’s decision and directed that the Supreme Court should rule on the constitutional question.

Sources
Attorney-General of Ceylon v Kodeeswaran, Supreme Court S C. 408/64-D. C. Colombo, 1026/Z, Lawnet, Sri Lanka; Kodeeswaran v Attorney-General of Ceylon, Privy Council Appeal No. 38 of 1968, Lawnet, Sri Lanka.

Extract from the judgement of the Supreme Court
“A public servant in Ceylon has no right of redress by action in the Courts for a breach of any of the covenants and rules governing the salaries and conditions of service of public officers. This principle is operative except in respect of terms laid down by statute, and is unaffected, either expressly or by implication, by the provisions of the Ceylon Constitution.” Source: Supreme Court S. C. 408/64-D. C. Colombo, 1026/Z, Lawnet, Sri Lanka.

Extract from the judgement of the Privy Council
“A civil servant in Ceylon is entitled to sue the Crown for arrears of salary which, have accrued due, by the terms of his appointment, in respect of services which he has rendered during the currency of his employment. In such a case the fact that his appointment as a Crown servant is terminable at will, unless it is expressly otherwise provided by legislation, is not relevant. …

“Although in their Lordships’ opinion a civil servant in Ceylon does have a right of action against the Crown for arrears of salary which accrued due during the currency of his employment, this answer to the preliminary issue does not dispose of the Crown’s appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment of the District Judge. There are the other important constitutional issues to be decided upon which neither the Supreme Court nor their Lordships have heard argument. As already indicated, their Lordships would think it inappropriate to enter upon any of these matters without the benefit of the considered opinion of the Supreme Court of Ceylon thereon. They accordingly express no opinion upon any of the other issues as to the constitutionality of the Official Language Act or the effect of Treasury Circular No. 560 of 4th December 1961, or of any other material facts upon the plaintiff’s contract of employment. The case should be remitted to the Supreme Court for further consideration of these other issues and their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty accordingly.”

Source
Signficance of the Abortive Coup, P. K. Balachandran, Hindustan Times, 29 May 2006; The Armed Services in a Period of Change: 1949-66, Dr KM de Silva, written for the Clingendael Institute of the Netherlands (2001) Witness to History: A Journalist’s Memoirs, S. Sivanayagam (2005).

Extracts from ‘The Armed Services in a Period of Change: 1949-66′
“[During] the Premiership of his wife Sirimavo in 1961, the armed forces were used for the first time in the Tamil areas of the North against a Civil Disobedience movement.

“Strains between the armed services and the civilian authority appeared when she sought to increase the number of Sinhalese-Buddhists in the officer corps of the armed services and the police, and to give greater influence to them in the running of the armed services and the police. …

“Pakistan under Ayub Khan seemed to be doing much better than that country’s civilian politicians in holding together and at stimulating economic growth; some of the leaders of the abortive coup of 1962 in Sri Lanka regarded him and his experiment in ‘indirect’ democracy as a model to be emulated in Sri Lanka then in the throes of its first phase of the Sinhala-Tamil conflict, and in the penultimate phase of the conflict between the Buddhists and Roman Catholics. …

“All the coup leaders blamed the governing party for the ill effects of their populist policies: turmoil in the form of ethnic riots; economic stagnation if not decline; and political instability. …

“They believed they had a remedy for all this, in the substitution of a Sri Lankan form of ‘indirect’ democracy under the rule of a junta of ex-Prime Ministers.”

Extracts from ‘Witness to History: A Journalist’s Memoirs’
“On February 13, the Finance Minister Felix Dias (Banadaranaike) gave a lengthy report of the abortive coup in parliament, in which he came out with two surprising statements: the name of the Governor General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke had been mentioned by the arrested persons; and that the former UNP Prime Ministers Sir John Kotelawala and Dudley Senanayake were, according to one arrested person, “in the know” of the plan to overthrow the government. …

“The coup trial began on July 18 1962 before three judges of the Supreme Court nominated by the Minister of Justice … Twenty four persons were charged with conspiracy in the alleged anti-government plot. … Mr Justice T S Fernando who delivered the decision said that in the court’s view the nomination of judges was essentially a judicial function and nowhere in the constitution was that power handed over to a body outside the judicature. … The judgement was commended by the ICJ in Geneva as “bold, fearless and independent” …

“[The Government] decided to amend the law enabling the Chief Justice to nominate the judges. … When the new trial court met on 6 January [1963] … [the presiding judge] said that [Attorney General] had intimated to the court that one of the judges had earlier in his capacity as acting Attorney General, taken certain steps regarding the investigation of the coup suspects … [and in view of this] the court felt it was not properly constituted. … For the second time the court dissolved itself. The coup accused were finally acquitted on an appeal to the Privy Council.” Witness to History: A Journalist’s Memoirs, S. Sivanayagam (2005).