The Northern and Eastern provinces were merged under the 1987 Indo-Lanka agreement signed by President J. R. Jayawardhana and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The judgement was the unanimous decision of a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which examined a petition by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), challenging the legality of the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces on the grounds that the LTTE had not relinquished their weapons. The Supreme Court held that the Emergency Regulation made in 1988 merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces was not in compliance with law.

Sources
North East merger illegal, BBC Sinhala, 16 October 2006; The importance of two provinces, BBC News, 17 October 2007.

Quotations

“The judgement knocks the bottom out of the peace process as a merged north-eastern province must be the basis for any peace negotiations.” R Sampanthan, Leader of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

“The SLMC had always taken a view that Muslim political strength had been weakened by the merger of the north and eastern provinces. But it would be wrong to assume that the court decision had ended the ethnic issue.” Rauf Hakim, Leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).

“The executive, judiciary, legislature or any other powers cannot change the future of the people in the east. Their destiny can only be decided by themselves. According to the Indo-Lanka agreement, the future of the eastern population has to be decided by a referendum.” President Rajapakse, SLFP.

Related events
7 November 1987
7 September 1988
24 January 2008

Sources
We killed Rajiv, confesses LTTE, Times of India, 27 June 2006;

Quotations

“As far as that event is concerned, I would say it is a great tragedy, a monumental historical tragedy, which we deeply regret, and we call upon the government of India and people of India to be magnanimous to put the past behind and to approach the ethnic question in a different perspective…We have made pledges to the government of India that under no circumstance will we act against the interests of the government of India.” Balasingham, LTTE’s chief negotiator.

“It’s good that after so many years they (LTTE) have admitted to having killed Rajiv Gandhi…For India, it was a national tragedy because Rajiv Gandhi was the most popular leader of his time. Now the question is of fixing responsibility for the crime.” Digvijay Singh, Congress General Secretary.

Related events
31 May 1991
14 May 1992

Source
Statelessness in Sri Lanka, UNHCR 2007.

Opinion

“It effectively solved the problem of statelessness amongst Hill Tamils in Sri Lanka. Those de facto stateless persons who held Indian passports (acquired under one of the previous citizenship agreements) but had remained in Sri Lanka, were required to sign a “special declaration” stating their intention to voluntarily acquire Sri Lankan citizenship and thus rescind their right to Indian citizenship (as no dual nationality is permitted). In cases of de jure statelessness, where individuals possessed neither an Indian or a Sri Lankan passport, no written declaration was required.” UNHCR 2007.

Related events
15 November 1948
1949
29 October 1964
1982
1988

Source
Sri Lanka seeks military support from India, Times of India, 10 August 2006.

Related events
29 May 2006
10 April 2006
4 September 2002
28 February 2001
26 January 1998
8 October 1997
31 May 1991

Sources
Fear grips Sri Lankans in South India, New York Times, 31 May 1991; Bomb kills India’s former leader Rajiv Gandhi, BBC.

Extracts from New York Times article

“Gandhi was killed in a bomb blast in a rural temple town southwest of Madras. The unidentified woman who detonated the bomb was believed to be a member of a guerrilla group seeking a separate state in northeast Sri Lanka.

“Almost as soon as word spread that Mr. Gandhi’s suspected killer was a Tamil militant from Sri Lanka, the relatively small Sri Lankan Tamil exile population has been seized with fear.

“Subramaniam Sivanandam, a former port superintendent in Colombo who came to India in 1982, shook his head solemnly and said: “There has been some violence. They have pelted our shops with stones. And there are little things that affect us. People don’t serve you at the food counter. A cyclo driver refuses to take you. People say nasty words on the street.”

“There are an estimated 210,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu state, of whom 115,000 are in Government-supported refugee camps, with the rest living mostly in the Madras area.

“Since the assassination, Vazhapadi Ramamurthy, the president of the Congress Party in the state of Tamil Nadu, and a key political ally, a highly popular woman known only as Jayalalitha who is running for Chief Minister here, have demanded the deportation of all Sri Lankan Tamils from this state of at least 50 million people. They said Sri Lankan militants have ruined peace-loving Tamil Nadu.

“The comments embarrassed some national Congress Party officials, partly because India has traditionally opened its doors to refugees, like the Sri Lankan Tamils, fleeing violence and persecution.”

“As far as that event is concerned, I would say it is a great tragedy, a monumental historical tragedy, which we deeply regret, and we call upon the government of India and people of India to be magnanimous to put the past behind and to approach the ethnic question in a different perspective…We have made pledges to the government of India that under no circumstance will we act against the interests of the government of India.” Balasingham, LTTE’s chief negotiator, speaking on 27 June 2006.

Related events
14 May 1992
27 June 2006

Source
Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. Cousens, 2002.

“From the autumn of 1989 onward, fighting between the IPKF and the LTTE de-escalated considerably, and on March 31, 1990, the last unites of the Indian expeditionary force departed Sri Lanka’s shores.”

“The cost in human terms is heavy – 1,155 Indian soldiers had been killed in action and over 3,000 seriously injured. The LTTE had lost 711 of its members confronting the Indians, but membership in the Tiger movement more than tripled between 1987 and 1990, with almost 10,000 fighters mobilized by the time of the Indian withdrawal. These fighters moved rapidly to establish LTTE control over the north and east as the Indians pulled out.

“Between December 1989 and March 1990, one Tamil population center after another – Batticoloa and Trincomalee in the east and above all, the Jaffna peninsula including the city of Jaffna in the north – were triumphantly recaptured by hardened Tiger guerillas returning from forest and rural bases, in conjunction with local LTTE underground groups.

“By April 1990, the entire northeastern region, barring a few pockets, was effectively under LTTE administration. The Tigers augmented their arsenal considerably in these final months.

“Since mid-1989, they had surreptitiously received weapons and supplies to fight the Indians from their old enemy, the Sri Lankan armed forces, under orders from the Premadasa government. Now they captured large quantities of arms and ammunition left by the Indians to their Tamil collaborator militias, who collapsed and disintegrated virtually without a fight as the IPKF withdrew.

“The worst sufferers of the ISPA/IPKF, however, were the Tamil and Sinhalese civilian populations. Between 5,000 and 8,000 civilian Tamils (estimates vary) died in the violence in the north and east between October 1987 and March 1990, mostly at the hands of the IPKF – which earned the sobriquet “Innocent People Killing Force” as a result – and its armed Tamil collaborators (the LTTE also killed sizeable numbers of Tamils opposed to it and those viewed by the Tigers as “collaborators” for one reason or another).” Source: Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. Cousens, 2002.

Related events
29 July 1987
August 1987
7 September 1988
18 September 1989

Sources
Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. Cousens, 2002; The International Dimensions of International Conflict, Michael E. Brown 1996; Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF), Kumar Rupesinghe (1988), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

Extracts from articles and publications
“In April [1989], Premadasa [proposed] direct, unconditional dialogue between his government and the country’s two major rebel movements, the LTTE and the JVP. The offer was primarily directed at the JVP leadership, which in keeping with its reckless and impetuous character refused it outright and stepped up its campaign of violence against government targets and forces. But the Tigers, after some initial hesitation, accepted, and in May 1989 talks commenced in Colombo between senior government ministers and the LTTE representatives. The interests of the government and the LTTE converged on one point – the urgent need to bury the ISPA and get rid of the IPKF. Hence it should not have come as much of a surprise to New Delhi when on June 1, 1989, Premadasa used the occasion of a major Buddhist religious festival to declare that he desired that the last Indian soldier be out of Sri Lanka by July 29, the second anniversary of the ISPA. A total withdrawal from Sri Lanka by the July 29 deadline would have been a disastrous humiliation for the Rajiv Gandhi government in an election year…settling for a token withdrawal of about 600 IPKF troops by that date.” Source: Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. Cousens, 2002.

“At the insistence of the Sri Lankan government, the IPKF agreed to a phased withdrawal starting in July 1989. As the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka, the government in Colombo entered into negotiations with the LTTE, and it assisted the LTTE so much that it was able to dominate other Tamil groups. The negotiations followed a desultory course for about a year, but broke down following an outbreak of violence in June 1990.” Source: The International Dimensions of International Conflict, Michael E. Brown 1996.

Related events
Sri Lanka, India sign Indo-Lankan Peace Accord (ISPA)
JVP ignites insurrection
IPKF begins its withdrawal

Opinion

“The northeast or the north and the east? … The 13th amendment and Provincial Councils Act of 1987 established the north and east as one province, subject to ratification by referendum when circumstances permitted. As this referendum has not yet taken place, the constitutional status of the east remains obscure. While successive parliamentary committees since 1987 have sought to clear up the confusion, the only clarity thus far achieved is that all Tamil parties, not just the LTTE, are totally opposed to any northeast ‘demerger’.” Rohan Edrisinha, Trying times: constitutional attempts to resolve armed conflict in Sri Lanka, August 1998.

Related events
29 July 1987
14 November 1987
16 October 2006
24 January 2008

Source
Statelessness in Sri Lanka, UNHCR 2007.

Quotation

“However, in 2003 there were still an estimated 300,000 stateless persons of Indian origin living in Sri Lanka…Without citizenship they were denied the right to vote, own state land, open a bank account or benefit from official employment; they were also unable to obtain documents such as a passport, national ID, or birth certificate.” UNHCR 2007.

Related events
15 November 1948
1949
29 October 1964
1982
October 2003

Sources
Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, M. L. Marasinghe, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1988); J.R.Jayewardene of Sri Lanka, vol.2 (1956-1989), K.M.de Silva and Howard Wriggins (1994); Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF), Kumar Rupesinghe (1988), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

Quotations

J R Jayawardena, I have never mistrusted India, interview with India Today, published in Lanka Guardian, 15 September 1987:
Q. “If the accord has led to the end of violence in the north and east, then why has it not been welcomed by the Sinhalese?
A. Violence never lasts long. It has now – died down. There was some opposition to the accord in certain parts of the island. It was activated by the Sinhalese terrorists. During the opposition to the agreement, voiced by the Buddhist clergy and the SLFP, they found that the JVP was taking active interest in the violent activities. Others have backed out of the anti- accord agitation, but the JVP is still continuing.

Q. Don’t you think you will find it difficult to sustain this accord if your Prime Minister and minister for notional security are opposed to it?
A. In a democracy you have these freedoms. But when I bring legislations for the accord to Parliament, they will have to support them or they have to leave. I have signed a treaty and under the Constitution, I have the right to make treaties with any country. I need not to get cabinet support or approval for it. But when I have to go to the Parliament for legislative measures, they will all have to support them. …

Q. In the wake of opposition, how are you going to implement the accord?
A. Most of it has already been implemented. The terrorists have surrendered arms. Laws are almost ready for the devolution of powers to the Provincial Council and subsequent elections. The referendum for the merger of the east with the north will take place. For all these, I need parliamentary approval. We will have interim administration for north and cast.

Q. Are you sure that the Sri Lankan people approve of Indian forces?
A. That is immaterial. The only way they can question it is by votes. And that will be clear during the elections. There are ways in the democracy of seeking the people’s support for one’s actions as President. If we go to the people for every action, then the Government can’t function. Unfortunately, the Opposition is not opposing this government by democratic means. They are resorting to violence and this should be suppressed.

Q. What is the specific role given to the Indian peacekeeping forces?
A. They are acting under my supervision and directions and they will carry out those instructions. They have to supervise the surrender of arms by terrorists maintain law and order with our troops. They have to take part in all peaceful operations.

Q. What is the specific role given to the Indian peacekeeping forces?
A. They are acting under my supervision and directions and they will carry out those instructions. They have to supervise the surrender of arms by terrorists maintain law and order with our troops. They have to take part in all peaceful operations.

Q. Will they be present till the accord is fully implemented?
A. Well, that will take a long time. Provincial elections will take place at the end of the year. Till normalcy is restored not only the Indian but also our forces are necessary. But if there is peace, the forces are not necessary. We have enough troops of our own during peaceful times. I would like the Indian forces to remain as long as there is trouble in the north and east.

Q. How are you going to deal with JVP? Weren’t they crushed by Bandaranaike with foreign support?
A. It is very difficult to give reasons for the revival of the JVP. Many people blame me for it. When I took over, I released a majority of their cadres and leader. For over five years they were quiet. And I was under the impression that they had accepted the democratic norm of behaviour. They contested the municipal and local elections. They contested the referendum and lost in all these elections. But in 1983, my security informed me that these people are again militarily active. They were preaching violence, I proscribed them. They had a hand in the 1983 riots in Colombo. Since then, they have been working underground amassing a lot of support. I don’t know how they’ve done this.”

“The handing over of arms only signifies the handing over, the transfer, of this responsibility of protecting our people….I wish to very firmly emphasize that by virtue of our handing over our weapons to it, the Indian government should assume full responsibility for the life and security of every one of the Eelam Tamils.” Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE Leader, quoted in The Hindu, 4 August 1987.

“Premadasa, an ultranationalistic Sinhalese, was so deeply opposed to the Sri Lankan-Indian accord that the final cabinet decision to sign the treaty was taken while he was on a trip to Japan. When he returned, he boycotted the signing ceremonies in Colombo.” A National Sigh of Relief, Newsweek, 3 October 1988.

“When President Jayewardene signed the Indo-Lanka Accord, Sri Lanka lost its sovereignty over its internal affairs too. Article 2.16 (e) of the treaty states, “The governments of India and Sri Lanka will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the northern and Eastern Provinces”. Dr. Amal Jayawardene has noted that, in this respect, the Indo-Lanka Accord circumscribes Sri Lanka’s sovereignty more comprehensively than what the Indo-Bhutan Accord does to Bhutan’s sovereignty. Fools who have no clue as to the nature of international treaties will, not doubt, continue to indulge in their ranting about Sri Lanka’s sovereignty; and in so doing erode it by alienating more of its people from whom that sovereignty should flow voluntarily. Here I shall not go into an undertaking that the Sri Lankan state appears to have given India as the unwritten part of the treaty because it is unwritten. It continues to be honoured by Sri Lankan heads of state much to the puzzlement and chagrin of Sinhala nationalists. This was not the first time that Sinhala leaders bartered away their nation’s sovereignty without compunction to look after their selfish interests.
Dharmeratnam Sivaram, Is Sri Lanka Truly Sovereign? 4 February 2004

“As Rajiv Gandhi was about to depart for India, he was invited by the Commander of the Navy, Ananda Silva, to inspect a guard of honour. Gandhi obliged. As he was moving past the men, something totally unexpected happened. Vijithamuni Rohana de Silva, a naval rating from the South, suddenly lifted his rifle and brought it onto the visiting Prime Minister of India. Neither Ananda Silva nor Gandhi’s security men responded fast enough either to push Gandhi away from the sailor, or to immobilize the attacker.”
Rohan Gunaratna (1993), Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies.

“Rajiv Gandhi himself narrowly escaped serious injury, if not death itself, when an enraged sailor swung his rifle butt at him at the guard of honor ceremony prior to his departure from Colombo on 30 July. Pictures of the assault on the Indian Prime Minister were flashed around the world in newspapers and on television screens.” K.M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins (1994), J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka Vol.2 (1956-1989).

Extracts from articles and publications
Source: The International Dimensions of International Conflict, Michael E. Brown (1996):
“The primary task of the IPKF was to supervise the disarming of the LTTE in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, thereby helping to implement the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. Although sent to act as a neutral force between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE, the IPKF quickly became embroiled in the civil war was the LTTE, for a number of complex reasons, refused to abide with the terms of the accord.”

Source: Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, Elizabeth M. Cousens (2002):
“After the watershed represented by October 1987, the chances of implementation of the ISPA were next to non-existent, as the energies of the IPKF – whose combat strength rose to 70,000 by early 1988 and peaked at 105,000 in early 1989 – were almost entirely consumed by the Vietnam-style guerilla war being waged throughout the north and east by the LTTE.

“In the Autumn of 1988, the Indians made on last, desperate attempt to resurrect the ISPA [India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord] and to marginalize the Tigers, by holding elections to constitute the autonomous NEPC (North East Provinvial Council). This proved counterproductive, and actually delivered the last nail in the coffin of the ISPA. The only Tamil participants – in addition to some Muslim and Sinhalese parties in the eastern province – were two anti-LTTE former guerilla groups whose members had acquired a particularly unsavoury reputation as the IPKF’s local torturers and executioners. Members of these groups, whose sole political principle seemed to be a pathological loathing of the Tigers, were “elected unopposed” in most instances and placed by the Indians in charge of an NEPC that, non surprisingly, proved as farcical during the next year and a half as the “election” that had brought it into being. It expired more or less simultaneously with the IPKF withdrawal from Sri Lanka in early 1990, and its leaders fled to India.

“As president, Premadasa who had openly harboured reservations about the IPKF intervention from the outset, immediately found himself confronted with a truly dire situation. In the north and east the Tigers had clearly succeeded in stalemating, that is, from the point of view of the guerrillas, checkmating – close to 100,000 soldiers of the Indian army. In other words, Jayewardene’s overriding motive for agreeing to the ISPA – the hope that the Indians would if necessary do the Sinhalese elite’s dirty work for them and crush Tamil insurgency – had not been realized at all. But what made matters far worse was that the IPKF intervention had set off a vicious civil war among the Sinhalese. … In short the ISPA had brought disaster to Sinhalese and Tamils alike, and to the fractured island of Sri Lanka as a whole. The logical course for the Premadasa government was to get rid of the IPKF as soon as possible since that alone would take the steam out of the JVP insurgency and create a breathing space for the government.

Extracts from the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, 29 July 1987
1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;

1.2 Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a “multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society” consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers;

1.3 Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured;

1.4 Also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;

1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi ethnic, multi lingual and multi religious plural society in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfill their aspirations;

2. Resolve that
2.1 Since the government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:

2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e. from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.b to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3) the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.

2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31st of December 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:

a) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2 or:
b) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers

The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.

2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence or other reasons, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. …

2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum. …

2.9 The Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by August 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of the signing of this Agreement. All arms presently held by Militant Groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the government of Sri Lanka. …

The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel and moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect. …

2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency Laws, and to Combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these Laws. …

2.14 The government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co- operate in the implementation of these proposals. …

2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the government of India taking the following actions if any Militant Groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely,

a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.
b) The Indian Navy/Coastguard will co-operate with the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing Tamil Militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
c) In the event that the government of Sri Lanka requests the government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the government of India will co-operate by giving to the government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.
d) The government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident here, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
e) The government of Sri Lanka and India will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces. …

2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.

Annexure to the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement
…
2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed and all para military personnel will be withdrawn from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.

3. The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such para military forces, which came into being due to the ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka. …

5. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that a Joint Indo Sri Lankan Observer Group consisting of qualified representatives of the government of Sri Lanka and the government of India would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July 1987.

6. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16 (C) of the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping Contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required. Source: University of Western Sydney Library

Related events
JVP ignites insurrection
Merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces authorised
India, Sri Lanka agree on IPKF withdrawal
IPKF begins its withdrawal
IPKF withdrawal completed
Supreme Court declares 1987 merger unlawful

Sources
An Analysis of Thimpu Talks (1985) and the PA-LTTE Talks (1994-95) – Some Lessons on Processes of Negotiations in Armed Conflict, Kethesh Loganathan (2001); Sri Lanka, Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at a Negotiated Settlement, Kethesh Loganathan.

Quotations

“We do not seek to terminate the talks at Thimpu. But our participation at these talks has now been rendered impossible by the conduct of the Sri Lankan State which has acted in violation of the ceasefire agreements which constituted the fundamental basis for the Thimpu Talks.” Joint Statement by the Tamil Delegation on 17th August 1985, Thimpu, Bhutan.

Extracts from ‘An Analysis of Thimpu Talks (1985) and the PA-LTTE Talks (1994-95)’
“The only instrument that came anywhere close to the norms of confidence-building measures in the run-up to the Thimpu Peace Talks was the cessation of hostilities document which was worked out by Indian government officials in consultation with the parties to the conflict. The document basically laid out a time frame and mutually reciprocal steps aimed at the phasing out of hostilities and eventual ceasefire.

The cessation of hostilities was to be phased out over a period of 8 weeks with a ceasefire coming into effect at the end of 6 weeks. The Sri Lankan security forces were to be confined to their bases at the final stage of the phased-out cessation of hostilities. The document eventually became academic when the entire process was telescoped to expedite the holding of peace talks on substantive issues.

The ceasefire was facilitated by the Government of India with a terse message from high ranking officials of the Government of India to the leaders of the Tamil politico-military organizations that if they refused to comply then “neither the Indian soil nor sea” would be made available to them. In short, the “external sanctuary” would be withdrawn. At the same time, assurances were given that if Colombo remained intransigent and failed to reciprocate or come forward to negotiate a political settlement, then the “hospitality” of India towards the Tamil politico-military organizations would continue.

The only monitoring mechanism in place were complaints made to Indian officials by the parties to the conflict as regards ceasefire violations by the “other’. In fact, when allegations and counter-allegations on ceasefire violations at the Thimpu Talks began to relegate discussions on substantive issues to the background, Indian officials prevailed on both parties to allocate a limited time at the commencement of talks on each day for trading of allegations and counter-allegations relating to ceasefire violations!

It therefore comes as no surprise that when the talks did fail and were called-off, the straw that broke the camel’s back was [the incident in Trincomalee]. The Tamil delegation pointedly referred to ceasefire violation by the security forces as the reason for their walk out. …

A desperate attempt was, in fact, made by the Indian Foreign Secretary, Romesh Bhandari, to build a rapport between the Government and the Tamil Delegation when the talks were definitely turning sour. A notable achievement of Romesh Bhandari was the holding of a reception for both delegations at Thimpu, where the spouse of one of the members of the Government delegation was heard commenting, “But, I thought they were terrorists. They are perfect gentlemen.” The niceties stopped there, and the mutual barraging continued at the negotiating table the following day. …

One lesson one can derive from the Thimpu Peace process is that while there was an elaborate framework for cessation of hostilities and ceasefire, the mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire was absent. What was in place was the exchange of allegations and counter-allegations which was more aimed at convincing the mediator, the Government of India, that the “other” was the perpetrator. Secondly, there was hardly any confidence building measures to speak of aimed at building mutual trust and confidence between the protagonists.”

Related events
8 July 1985
April 1985
August 1983
January 1984

The talks lasted two rounds and took place in Thimpu, the capital city of the Kingdom of Bhutan. The Tamil Delegation consisted of representatives from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS), Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The LTTE, EPRLF, TELO and EROS were also constituent members of the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) formed in April 1984.

The first round of talks took place from 8 July to 13 July and the second round of the talks commenced on 12 August and concluded on 17 August 1985. During the first round, the Sri Lankan government delegation proposed draft legislation for devolution of power, which the Tamil delegation rejected and response put forward its four main demands, or ‘cardinal principles’:

(a) Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality;
(b) Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity;
(c) Based on the above, recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation; and
(d) Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who regard Sri Lanka as their country.

The Sri Lankan government rejected the first three of these demands arguing that they violated Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.

Sources
An Analysis of Thimpu Talks (1985) and the PA-LTTE Talks (1994-95) – Some Lessons on Processes of Negotiations in Armed Conflict, Ketheshwaran Loganathan (2001), presented at Exploring Possible Constitutional Arrangements for meeting Tamil Aspirations within a Unified Sri Lanka, Switzerland, 11-14 June 2001; Sri Lanka, Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at a Negotiated Settlement, Kethesh Loganathan.

Quotations

“I ask of you very little. Let us forget the issue of training camps, the existence of Sri Lanka terrorists in South Asia; their plotting and planning. I ask you to help me to prevent them coming here with arms. …If we can agree on a common scheme to do this, by some form of mutual or combined surveillance, it will enable me to withdraw the Armed Services from combat; to suspend the operation of the Terrorism Act, and to help the North and East of Sri Lanka to return to normalcy. …Cross border terrorism threatens the very fabric of this democracy. … Do please understand our position, which is now yours too, and help.” Letter from J.R. Jayewardene to Rajiv Gandhi, 1985, cited in Rohan Gunaratne, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of Indian Intelligence Agencies, Colombo, South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1994.

“[We wish] to express our disapproval over the usage of the category ‘militants’ in the ceasefire document to describe the united front of major Liberation Organizations, while ascribing the notion ‘Tamil political leadership’ to the TULF. Such categorization may create serious misconceptions and undermine our status as authentic political organizations representing the aspirations of our people.” Joint Memorandum of the Tamil delegation, July 1985.

“If the first three [Thimpu Principles] are to be taken at their face value and given their accepted legal meaning, they are wholly unacceptable to the Government. They must be rejected for the reason that they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, they are detrimental to a united Sri Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the several communities, ethnic and religious in our country. … The implementation of any agreement reached at these talks requires as a pre-condition a complete renunciation of all forms of militant action. All militant groups in Sri Lanka must surrender their arms and equipment. All training camps whether in Sri Lanka or abroad must be closed down.” H.W. Jayewardene, leader of the government delegation, in a prepared Statement rejecting the “Thimpu Principles”, 12th August 1985.

“The four basic principles that we have set out at the Thimpu talks as the necessary framework for any rational dialogue with the Sri Lankan Government are not some mere theoretical constructs. They represent the hard existential reality of the struggle of the Tamil people for their fundamental and basic rights. It is a struggle which initially manifested itself in the demand for a federal constitution in the 1950 and later in the face of continuing and increasing oppression and discrimination, found logical expression in the demand for the independent Tamil state of Tamil Eelam.” Joint Memorandum of the Tamil delegation, 12th August 1985.

Extracts from ‘An Analysis of Thimpu Talks (1985) and the PA-LTTE Talks (1994-95)’
“These proposals were only marginally different from the one which was placed before the All Party Conference of 1984 and had been rejected by the TULF. It once again demonstrated the Sri Lankan State’s incapacity to place before the Tamil polity far-reaching proposals that would be seen as a viable alternative to the pitched-up demand for Tamil Eelam. Further, the proposals were presented in a drab, legalistic form by a delegation comprising mainly of lawyers and bureaucrats. This irritated the Tamil delegation, particularly the representatives of the Tamil politico-military organizations, who were driven by ideological and political fervour and whose patience was being sorely tested. The TULF representatives had already been exposed to the draft legislation in the APC of 1984 and, although quite at home with the legalistic tenor, took a decision to take a back seat. … The Tamil Delegation declined to negotiate any proposals that had already been rejected by the TULF at the APC. Further, the Tamil politico-military organizations had taken the position that the burden of presenting a broadly acceptable formula lay with Colombo, since it was solely to be blamed for the militarization of the ethnic conflict. The Tamil Delegation, instead, subjected the Sri Lankan government delegation to a series of ‘lectures’ on what constituted the Ethnic Question and as to why the burden lay with Colombo to come out with a solution ‘worthy of our consideration’. And, as though to drive home the point, the Tamil Delegation placed before the Government delegation a set of ‘four cardinal principles. …

“The gap between the government’s set of proposals and the Thimpu principles was not just a difference of opinion or perception, but one operating at two totally different ideological and conceptual planes. The Government’s proposals while going beyond decentralization and delegation of power, envisaged in the pre-existing District Development Councils system, was nowhere close to the devolution of powers available in the Indian constitution. Further, it failed to recognize the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka as a National Question. …

“The ‘Thimpu Principles’, on the other hand, was a strident call for the recognition of the Tamil people as a nation with its inalienable right to self-determination. The decision to forward the Thimpu Principles was not only an assertion of Tamil nationalism, but a strategic move to avoid placing concrete proposals that was seen as a pre-mature abandonment of the goal for which arms had been raised – namely, a separate state of Tamil Eelam. The Thimpu princples, therefore, could not have been anything other than an articulation of an Ideal, bereft of constitutionalism and legalism.”

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