far as declining invitations when these conditions are not met. Given the high levels of insecurity, that include killings and abductions, faced by humanitarian agenices, human rights organizations and other civil society organisations we are also deeply concerned of the security implications for the actors who were invited to the meetings”.

Source
Press statement condemning military interference on Jaffna NGOs meetings with UN Under Secretary General on humanitarian affairs, Centre for Poverty Analysis, 9 August 2007;

Extracts from the Press Statement
“Our colleagues in Jaffna have also conveyed to us that on the day before Mr. Holme’s visit to Jaffna, the military commander called for a meeting at Palaly military headquarters, at which NGOs and civil society representatives were instructed not to refer to human rights issues and to restrict themselves to issues of humanitarian assistance during their meeting with Mr. Holmes. The military told the NGO and civil society representatives present that they, the military, would brief Mr. Holmes about the human rights and security situation, while the Government Agent would brief Mr. Holmes about the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

Humanitarian and human rights groups in Jaffna have expressed their serious reservations about this interference by the military and regret their inability to meet Mr. Holmes in a more private manner, which would have enabled them to freely share their views, perspectives and experiences with him.

We condemn this type of military interference in matters relating to civil society and NGO activity. This completely undermines existing practice in which visiting UN officials meet with civil society groups during country visits, insisting on privacy for such meetings, even going as far as declining invitations when these conditions are not met. Given the high levels of insecurity, that include killings and abductions, faced by humanitarian agencies, human rights organisations and other civil society organisations, we are also deeply concerned about the security implications for the actors who were invited to the meetings.

The steps taken by the military in Jaffna to restrict Mr. Holmes’ access to information can only reaffirm concerns in the international community that there is no transparency and accountability of the government and of the military when it comes to both human rights and humanitarian issues in the conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka.

We trust that Mr. Holmes will reflect these concerns in his reports, on the basis that his ability to obtain an objective assessment of the situation on the ground in the country, based on perspectives of various stakeholders including humanitarian agencies, was negatively affected by this situation.”

Between 1994 and 2002, the A9 remained permanently closed; with the start of the peace process in February 2002 the road was opened.

Source
Tough times continue for Jaffna residents, IRIN, 10 March 2008; Sri Lanka to open road to Jaffna, BBC, 20 November 2006.

Quotations

“The Government of Sri Lanka was compelled to temporarily close the A9 highway, entry/exit checkpoint at Muhamalai situated at the isthmus of the Jaffna peninsula on 11 August 2006. … The closure was necessitated due to the massive artillery and mortar attack launched by the LTTE on the government forces on that day which destroyed the entire infrastructure built by the GoSL at Muhamalai to facilitate the movement of people and goods. The GoSL is unable to open the checkpoint until the area is safe for the movement of civilians and supplies and until it can be assured that national security will not be compromised.” Government of Sri Lanka statement.

“Surely the government can find a way to open the A9 highway at least for humanitarian purposes, and negotiate with the LTTE about the issues that concern it? As these matters concern the humanitarian interests of the Tamil people, the LTTE will also be motivated to cooperate. The opening of the A9 highway could be the first step to opening the door to peace and the opening of the A9 to negotiations on the core principles of the final solution.” Jehan Perera, National Peace Council, Sri Lanka reels under humanitarian crisis, 9 November 2006.

“This road remains to be the main source of local income to the LTTE who patrol a stretch of this road from Muhamalai to Omanthai in the Northern Province. … It is believed that the LTTE daily collects more than Rs. 900,000 in the form of illegal tax and other revenue in [sic] this road. From Omanthai in the cleared area, an average of 7000-8000 civilians and 1000- 1200 vehicles cross the stretch of land daily.” A-9 Issue a ploy of the LTTE to avert peace talks, 7 November 2006, Ministry of Defence.

“The single road into the area, the A9, was an economic and humanitarian lifeline for Jaffna’s residents. Everything from food, basic commodities, pharmaceuticals, petroleum, even reconstruction materials, was soon in short supply.” Boosting food and livestock production in conflict-hit Jaffna, IRIN, 3 June 2008.

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Extracts from the Press Statement of Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
“Deliberations were conducted in a frank and constructive atmosphere, with both parties demonstrating their conviction that the peace process must be sustained even when difficult issues are addressed.

The main focus of the parties was on the need to ensure implementation of urgent humanitarian priorities. It was strongly emphasized that the significant political breakthrough made at the third session of talks in Oslo in December 2002, at which the basic principles for a political settlement were outlined, will be sustained through continued discussions on political matters. At the same time, political progress must be underpinned by tangible improvements in the daily lives of people. To this end, there is a need for more effective implementation by the parties as well as the speedy provision of funds by donor governments.

The parties recognized that the situation with regard to the High Security Zones involves major humanitarian and security concerns for both parties. Recent controversies surrounding this matter were discussed in depth. The parties did not reach agreement on the continuation of the work of the Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and Normalization (SDN).

Notwithstanding the disagreement on this particular issue, the parties emphasized the need for progress in resettling the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. To this effect, the parties agreed on an “Action Plan for an Accelerated Resettlement Programme for the Jaffna District.” As the clear majority of resettlement cases relate to areas outside the High Security Zones, the first phase of the Action Plan will focus on such areas.

Members of the Sub-Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), representing both the GOSL and the LTTE, will meet with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) shortly to discuss UNHCR participation in effectuating this plan. The particular needs of the displaced Muslim population will be duly accommodated in the resettlement process.

The second phase of the Action Plan will focus on resettlement of IDPs and refugees in areas within the High Security Zones, as and when they are released by the Security Forces for resettlement. For this purpose, the GOSL will carry out a review with the assistance of an internationally recognized military expert, taking into account relevant humanitarian and security needs.

Following the strong political and financial support pledged by the international community at the Sri Lanka Support Meeting held in Oslo on 25 November 2002, the parties stressed the need for moving from planning to implementation of humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes. The rapid establishment of the North East Reconstruction Fund (NERF) will be decisive for the speedy disbursement of international assistance. The parties welcomed a decision by the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) to select the World Bank as the custodian of the NERF. Furthermore, the parties confirmed the SIHRN as the prime decision-making body for meeting immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs in the north and east. The GOSL in particular undertook to ensure that the respective roles of government institutions engaged in the north and east are properly clarified and co-ordinated with the SIHRN.

In line with the agreement on basic principles for a political settlement, in which a number of issues were identified for discussion, the parties will commence a process for discussion of human rights issues. Human rights will constitute an important element of a Final Declaration. As first steps in furthering human rights issues in the process, the parties agreed on the following:

A schedule on human rights issues will be worked out following discussions at the next session of peace talks. For this purpose, the assistance of the agreed human rights adviser to the parties will be sought.
…
The government expressed serious concerns related to the recent incident involving transportation of prisoners through Vanni. The LTTE gave assurances that the case will be examined and that appropriate action will be taken as a matter of urgency.

More generally, the parties agreed to ask the facilitator to propose procedures to ensure rapid corrective action by the parties in cases of incidents that are or can be perceived as disrupting the peace process.

Following an agreement made at the third session of talks, a committee was established to ensure the effective inclusion of gender issues in the peace process. … The parties agreed that a Muslim delegation will be invited to the peace talks at an appropriate time for deliberations on relevant substantive political issues. …” Source: Norwegian Embassy in Sri Lanka website, 5 December 2003.

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Sources
A Prime Minister in Jaffna, Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 07, Mar. 30 – Apr. 12, 2002; Sri Lanka PM visits troubled north, BBC, 14 March 2002.

Quotations

“We have gone further down the road for peace than on earlier occasions.” Ranil Wickramasinghe, Sri Lankan Prime Minsiter.

“I congratulate you for the courage to make the decision to visit Jaffna so soon after your election.” Thomas Sauvenderanayagam, Bishop of Jaffna.

“Year by year, if others had come here regularly, they could have improved the relationship. This isolation that the Tamil people feel now from the rest of Sri Lanka would not have grown.” V. Anandasangaree, vice-president of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and a Member of Parliament from Jaffna representing the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

Source
Sri Lanka polls: Fear keeps away potential candidates, The Hindu, 29 August 2000.

Source

Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999; Gaps in the Krishanthy Kumarasamy Case: Disappearances & Accountability, UTHR,  28 April 1999;

Quotation

“Like many Tamil civilians ‘disappeared’ in security force operations, Krishanthy was abducted from a military checkpoint; her family members and neighbor who attempted to find her were taken from the same checkpoint later that day.” Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999.

Source
Sri Lanka polls: Fear keeps away potential candidates, The Hindu, 29 August 2000; Peaceful Options Must Continue to be Sought, National Peace Council, 20 May 1998.

Quotation

“The assassination of the Mayor of Jaffna provides further tragic evidence of the downward spiral of violence and war in Sri Lankan society. Individual political assassinations from whichever sources require the most severe condemnation because they remove the space for the democratic resolution of conflict.” National Peace Council, 20 May 1998.

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Source
Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1998.

Quotation

“The gap between those who have disappeared and the number of people whose whereabouts have been finally discovered is too huge, too important.” Bacre Waly N’diaye, UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.

Source
Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1998.

Quotation

“On May 13, Sri Lankan armed forces launched the largest military operation of the year in northern Sri Lanka. In a massive offensive which continued through October, some 20,000 troops backed up by artillery, armored vehicles, and air support were deployed to recover rebel-held territory and reopen a supply route to the Jaffna peninsula across the LTTE-controlled Vanni region. At the outset, an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 civilians fled the offensive, adding to the hundreds of thousands already displaced in the area. There were reports of civilian casualties, and many suffered from periodic shortages as restrictions were placed on the movement of food and supplies. In August, Tamil politicians charged that indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas not under government control had resulted in civilian deaths and injuries and had damaged homes, schools and places of worship.” Extracts from HUman Rights Watch World Report for Sri Lanka, 1998.

Extracts from sources
“On October 13, 1994, a delegation of influential officials left for Jaffna. The delegation was led by Kusum Balapatabendi, Secretary to the President. They were given a rapturous welcome by the people of Jaffna, who had gone through hell for over ten years. Quite clearly the Prime Minister had captured the imagination and the mood of the people of Jaffna. Preliminary negotiations with the LTTE commenced in Jaffna that day and the delegation returned to Colombo the following day bringing with them, as a gesture of goodwill from the LTTE, four policemen who had been in captivity since June 1990. To complete formalities, the following communique was issued in Jaffna on October 14, 1994.

“The first round of talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE was conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and goodwill. The talks were very constructive and held in Jaffna on October 13 and 14, 1994.”

“In his opening speech, Karikalan ,leade of the LTTE delegation, said that the LTTE is committed to peace and peaceful settlement of the Tamil question. Ever since the outbreak of hostilities in June 990, the LTTE leadership has been calling for a cessation of hostilities and peace talks. But the previous government had failed to take any positive steps to bring an end to the war and to start negotiations. But we are glad to note that the news government of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga has taken constructive measures to create congenial conditions for peace. We are also please to note that she is genuinely committed to political negotiations.

“The leader of the government delegation, K. Balapatabendi, said the existing situation in the north has become a national problem and that requires for its definitive resolution the involvement of all concerned in peace and harmony. He said that they would discuss how best the government could ensure the adequate supply and equitable distribution of essential commodities to all the people of the north. … Both parties agreed to have a second round of talks within the next ten days.” From War Or Peace in Sri Lanka, Saroj Pathak, T D S A Dissanayaka, Popular Prakashan, 2005.

“In 1994 Chandrika Kumaratunge was elected to lead the country on a peace platform. It was announced on 9th September 1994 that she and the LTTE leader had exchanged warm letters expressing an eagerness to commence the peace process. The first session of talks was fixed for 13th October. Offensive military activities were frozen. While hopes for peace bloomed in the North and South, the LTTE leader intervened in his characteristic style. On 19th September he sent a suicide bomber to sink a naval vessel. In late October 1994 another suicide bomber killed UNP presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake. However, a ceasefire was agreed upon and messages were exchanged. The LTTE kept making demands of a military nature and avoided engaging in political talks. On 19th April 1995 the LTTE unilaterally broke the ceasefire by sinking two naval vessels and shot down two air force planes with newly acquired missiles. It also massacred 45 harmless Sinhalese fisherfolk in Kallara, hoping for government reprisals against Tamil civilians as under the UNP in 1990. Throughout this whole process the LTTE warned people in the North and East against reciprocating the peace activity in the South.” From Briefing No. 4, Peace activism, suicidal politics and civil society, University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), 4th December 2001.

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