The Northern and Eastern provinces were merged under the 1987 Indo-Lanka agreement signed by President J. R. Jayawardhana and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The judgement was the unanimous decision of a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which examined a petition by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), challenging the legality of the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces on the grounds that the LTTE had not relinquished their weapons. The Supreme Court held that the Emergency Regulation made in 1988 merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces was not in compliance with law.

Sources
North East merger illegal, BBC Sinhala, 16 October 2006; The importance of two provinces, BBC News, 17 October 2007.

Quotations

“The judgement knocks the bottom out of the peace process as a merged north-eastern province must be the basis for any peace negotiations.” R Sampanthan, Leader of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

“The SLMC had always taken a view that Muslim political strength had been weakened by the merger of the north and eastern provinces. But it would be wrong to assume that the court decision had ended the ethnic issue.” Rauf Hakim, Leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).

“The executive, judiciary, legislature or any other powers cannot change the future of the people in the east. Their destiny can only be decided by themselves. According to the Indo-Lanka agreement, the future of the eastern population has to be decided by a referendum.” President Rajapakse, SLFP.

Related events
7 November 1987
7 September 1988
24 January 2008

In an interim injunction, the court stayed “till final determination” critical operative elements of the Regional Committee that was formed as one of the three tiers under the PTOMS agreement. The three-member Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously stayed the project approval and fund management functions of the committee – the most critical element of the joint mechanism at the regional level.

The court did not object to the other two tiers – the national and the district committee – and made it clear that the interim order “is not granted in respect of the entirety” of the MoU establishing the PTOMS.

Sources
Provisions of joint mechanism stayed, The Hindu, 16 July 2005.

Quotations

“We have succeeded in our struggle. There is nothing in the agreement now.” Vijitha Herath, international secretary of the JVP and former Cabinet Minister.

“The structure as provided in the MoU consisting of committees may be established and become functional subject to the restrictions imposed by the judgement.” Supreme Court ruling.

Related events
PA and JVP jointly campaign against interim administration
GoSL signs PTOMS agreement
Supreme Court declares 1987 merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces as unlawful
Experts’ Committee of the APRC reports

At the time of his abduction, de Zoysa was the head of the Colombo office of the International Press Service. On 18 February 1990, an armed group broke into his mother’s house, and forcibly removed de Zoysa. The next day, de Zoysa’s body was found in the sea at Moratuwa, some 12 miles south of Colombo. He had been shot in the head and the throat, and his jaw had been broken. His body was identified by his journalist friend Taraki Sivaram, who was assassinated in 2006.

In 2005, two police officers were indicted for de Zoysa’s murder, but all were acquitted on 9 November 2005 by the Colombo High Court, ruling that the evidence presented by the prosecution was “contradictory and not credible”.

Richard de Zoysa was posthumously awarded the International Press Service Award in 1990. This award was established in 1985 to honour outstanding accomplishments in international journalism, promoting democracy and human rights.

Sources
‘Assassinated Journalists’, Free Media Sri Lanka; Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, Tisaranee Gunasekara, Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999;

Quotations

“In A Lost Generation, Prins Gunasekara has a very interesting story to tell—that when he met de Zoysa’s mother, Dr Manorani Saravanamuttu, she did not believe that Premadasa had anything to do with her son’s murder. On the contrary she had believed that it “was the handywork of some jealous persons in the Premadasa administration, like Ranjan Wijeratne, acting independently of President Premadasa. It may even be some old school feud carried too far. At least that is what Manorani Saravanamuttu told me… I told her it was alright telling me about her disbelief in Premadasa’s involvement but she should not voice such naïve statements elsewhere, as her own credibility would be doubted,” Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, Tisaranee Gunasekara.

“Had he lived, Richard de Zoysa would have been fifty on March 13th this year. He died eighteen years ago, almost the last victim of a period of abductions and killings about which there were hardly any protests at the time, except from a relatively small group of political activists opposed to the government. … The government of the time was after all the chosen instrument of the elite, that still makes decisions, that still constitutes the lens through which much of the West looks at us, and they had had no great problem with President Premadasa’s suppression of the JVP. … But Richard was himself a member of that elite, the scion of two long established families, one Sinhala, the other Tamil. Even though there were crude attempts to justify the killing – leaks about him belonging to the JVP, readings in Parliament from his diary in an attempt to suggest that his sexual proclivities had something to do with the death – in the end it was crystal clear that the government had gone too far. Certainly, it was almost immediately after his death that, his mother would say, Ranjan Wijeratne called the death squads together and told them, at a party at the BMICH she claimed, that their impunity was now over, they would have immunity for anything they had thus far done, but for the future they were on their own. My own view, which I have expressed elsewhere, and most recently in ‘The Limits of Love’, albeit fictionally, is that President Premadasa took advantage of the murder to call a halt to the killings that he had begun to feel were unnecessary now. In that sense, Richard’s murder was not in vain,” Dr. Rajiva Wijesinha, Daily Mirror, 13 March 2008.

Related events
13 November 1989
21 September 1989
August 1987

This event was the subject of a feature: Assassination of an activist.

Source
Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP, Rohan Gunaratna, 1990.

Quotations

“Based on intelligence on subversive activities, the army conducted operations in Ulpane, amongst other areas…In the afternoon of November 12, 1989, one of the army units conducting search operations in the Ulpane area came across a person whom they suspected to be Rohana Wijeweera. They questioned him as to his identity and he admitted that he was Rohana Wijeweera and that the others present were his wife and children. … On the same day, at about 2200 hrs, Rohana Wijeweera was brought down to Colombo where further investigations commenced. During the investigation, on questioning, Rohana Wijeweera volunteered to make an appeal to the youth of the country for the cessation of violence. … In the early hours of Nov. 14 1989, Rohana Wijeweera led the security forces and police team to this location of the military and propaganda HQ of the JVP/DJP organisation, located in the suburbs of the district of Colombo. Rohana Wijeweera asked H.B. Herath a high ranking official of the JVP, to hand over to the investigators whatever documents and other articles were available at the HQ. … Herath handed over certain articles and pretending to search for more articles, suddenly pulled out a weapon and fired in the direction of Rohana Wijeweera. The security forces reacted immediately and opened fire. In the course of this firing, both Rohana Wijeweera and Herath received serious injuries to which they succumbed.” Extracts from the official statement of the army commander, reproduced in Rohan Gunaratna (1990) Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP.

“However, controversy reigns over Wijeweera’s death to this date. Nearly a month after his death, Lakshman Jayakody the SLFP MP stated in Parlieament…that shanty dwellers on the Model Farm Road vouched that Rohana Wijeweera was killed at the Gold Club grounds and cremated immediately thereafter at 3 am on Monday morning. The cemetery keeper at Kanatte was available at 3 am to cremate Wijeweera’s body.” Rohan Gunaratna (1990) Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP.

Related events
August 1987
15 December 1987

Vijaya started his political life in the Lanka Sama Samaja Party. He later joined the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Later, he was jailed under the emergency regulations by J.R. Jayawardena for allegedly being a ‘Naxalite’, but  was never charged. He later founded the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (SLMP) which argued for peace in the war in Sri Lanka.

At the time of his assassination, negotiations were taking place to form a broader alliance of five leftist parties, including Vijaya’s Mahajana Party. At the funeral ceremony at Independence Square, attended by over half a million people, the leaders of the five parties signed an agreement to form the United Socialist Alliance and took oaths swearing their allegiance to it.

Lionel Ranasinghe alias Gamini, later confessed to Vijaya’s murder upon being questioned by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Ranasinghe, in a 141 page statement, confessed that he was merely carrying out orders given to him by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

Sources
Devolution only solution – CBK, BBC, 19 February 2008; Remembering Vijaya Kumaratunga, Tamil Week, 8 October 2006; Confessions of Vijaya’s killer, Frederica Jansz.

Quotations

“It wasn’t only the southern community who noticed Vijaya’s leadership qualities; even the Tamil leadership acknowledged his capabilities and proven courage. In 1986, at the height of the ethnic conflict, when 6 policemen were taken hostage by the LTTE, it was Vijaya Kumaratunga who went to Jaffna to intervene and secure their release. Another remarkable facet of Vijaya was his valiant struggle to restore peace in the country. He was one of the few people who actively promoted the Indo Lanka Agreement, the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in 1987 when a vociferous minority took to the streets to demonstrate against what was then termed as a ‘sell out to India’. … An ardent proponent of the provincial council system, he firmly believed that devolution of power to the periphery was the fairest way of resolving the ethnic crisis and the issues of historical inequalities suffered by the minorities. As a result of this act, he earned the wrath of the JVP, who were vehemently against the Indian intervention and as it later conspired, it was this act that led to his assassination one year later. Before his death Vijaya was vilified by the JVP and Front organisations such as the Protection of the Mother Land as a traitor, as an agent of the LTTE seeking to divide the country. To date, he remains one of the few Sinhalese leaders who defied government pressure and death threats in order to have direct negotiations with all the Tamil leaders including the LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran.” Kumar Rupesinghe, Remembering Vijaya Kumaratunga.

“Jayantha told Herath and myself that we will be assigned a special task. He said Vijaya Kumaratunga has to be removed. Jayantha further said Vijaya Kumaratunga supports the Indian Peace Accord; he supports the provincial councils; he is holding meetings island-wide explaining things to people. Because of his popularity youth are going for his meetings. Because of this the bankrupt Left parties have formed a front with him. … Vijaya Kumaratunga’s front is being trained by the EPRLF and PLOTE. They will be used against us to protect Vijaya Kumaratunga’s front. Jayantha said Vijaya Kumaratunga has been warned by letter. He is working disregarding those [warnings]. He has even been sent a final warning. Therefore he has to be removed,”  Lionel Ranasinghe alias ‘Gamini’, Confession statement.

Related events
August 1987
10 November 2006

This event was the subject of a feature: Assassination of an activist.

Source
Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, Tisaranee Gunasekara, Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999.

Extracts
“The JVP drew first blood—of the Left, the security forces and the UNP, in that order. The use of lethal violence on the part of all these entities against the JVP (irrespective of the magnitude) was essentially a reactive violence, a counter violence. The game of political murder was commenced by the JVP…Significantly, the JVP’s first victim was not a representative of the bourgeois state or the Gunasekara UNP which proscribed the JVP, but a radical student activist, with impeccable anti-UNP credentials— Daya Pathirana, the leader of the Independent Students Union (ISU) of the University of Colombo! …

“The Daya Pathirana assassination was a watershed in the JVP’s post-1983 history. It played a key role in deciding the nature and the trajectory of the JVP’s second insurgency.”

Related events
August 1987
13 November 1989

Sources
Tisaranee Gunasekara (1999): Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, , Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999; Prins Gunasekara (1998): Sri Lanka in Crisis: A Lost Generation – The Untold Story.

Quotations

“In 1971 the JVP started off by attacking police stations. The second time around the starting point was lethal violence against radical left leaders and activists. In 1971 the JVP in the main targeted members of the police and the armed forces; though there were civilian killings, they were few in number. In 1987-89 the JVP gave priority to the killing of civilians—be it political rivals or simple citizens who disobeyed their innumerable orders and fatwahs. In 1971 it was the regime which branded even non/anti-JVP leftists ‘insurgents’ and imprisoned them – LSSP MP, Vasudeva Nanayakkara, breakaway SLFPer S D Bandaranaike and the leader of the Maoist Ceylon Communist Party, N Shanmugathasan being the best known examples. In 1987-89 the JVP branded leftists with proven anti-government/UNP credentials ‘traitors’ and targeted them and murdered quite a few. The contrast in political behaviour displayed in 1971 and 1987-90 demonstrates the contrasting character of the two insurrections”. Tisaranee Gunasekara (1999): Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, , Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999.

“Their anti-Indianism was extended more to the field of trade and commerce sanctions, an embargo on India exported/produced goods, than in the fighting field. The DJV [the armed wing of the JVP and headed by a politburo member, Saman Piyasiri Fernando, who was known as ‘Keerthi Wijayabahu’] banned the use of even India-manufactured drugs and medicine or anything imported from that country. The DJV/JVP are credited with the killing of Gladys Jayewardene, sister-in-law of President Jayewardene, Chairperson of the Pharmaceutical Corporation. Her crime: not adhering to the JVP/DJV order not to import Indian medicine… They (the JVP) would have even formed a united front with Premadasa to fight the bogey of the ‘Indian invaders’—the IPKF, as Chiang Kai Shek was compelled to join with the Maoist Communists, in fighting the Japanese invasion. Yet the hawks in the JVP/DJV combine appear to have been busy planning the assassination of their political dissidents— University Professors, University students, media employees, Buddhist monks in sympathy with the government and trade unionists who disagreed with them…” Prins Gunasekara (1998): Sri Lanka in Crisis: A Lost Generation – The Untold Story.

“While anti-Indianism was supposed to be the raison d’être of the JVP’s second insurgency, none of the JVP’s targets and victims were from the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The JVP’s anti-Indian struggle was launched entirely against Sri Lankans (and Sinhalese in particular); its targets and victims were exclusively Sri Lankan from UNP politicians to radical left activists; from policemen to soldiers; from bus drivers who refused to obey the JVP’s constant strike orders to voters who disregarded the JVP ban and went out to vote. None of the targets, none of the victims were from the IPKF”. Tisaranee Gunasekara (1999): Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999.

Related events
JVP is formed
JVP ignites armed insurrection; thousands killed
Rohana Wijeweera delivers speech before the Criminal Justice Commission
JVP participates in the District Development Council (DDC) elections
Government forces capture and kill JVP leader

Quotation

“The UNP (United National Party) in 1983 committed the signal (and completely unwarranted) error of proscribing the JVP on spurious charges. This unjust proscription of the JVP was perhaps the single biggest mistake committed by the J R Jayewardene regime, not excluding July 1983—since contrary to the current dominant myths, the UNP did not perpetrate the July 1983 riots; it just mishandled them. There was no evidence to connect the JVP, as a party, with the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983; nor was it secretly preparing to launch an armed struggle to overthrow the state or the UNP. On the contrary, the JVP was comfortably settling into the political mainstream and beginning to enjoy the fruits of high profile electoral politics. They did not willingly or voluntarily leave the mainstream; they were forced out of it by the Jayewardene regime”. Tisaranee Gunasekara (1999): Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999.

Related events
14 May 1965
April 1971
April 1971
1982
August 1987

“Wijeweera said: “The JVP would contest the TULF in all the electorates in the north and east in view of the support extended by progressive minded Tamils there. …The TULF had collaborated with the UNP and the SLFP several times while they were in power only to the detriment of the Tamil community. They had not won any rights for Tamils by such leadership. Those were lessons of political history. Instead, the Tamils should support a socialist party with a broad base in the entirety of the island with the potentialities to form a government. Then alone could their rights be won.” Extracts from Rohana Wijeweera’s rally speech, reproduced in Rohan Gunaratna (1990): Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP.

Related events
14 May 1965
April 1971
April 1971
August 1987

Related events
14 May 1965
April 1971
April 1971
1982
July 1983
August 1987

Source
Ceylon Daily News, 20 December 1974; H. A. I. Goonetetileke (1978): The Sri Lankan Insurrection of 1971: A Select Bibliographical Commentary, published in Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia, Bardwell L. Smith (1978).

Quotation

“In reaching our decisions as to the sentences to be imposed on the subjects, whom we have found guilty of the charges, we have attempted to to take account of several considerations which we think are relevant. In the case of the 13th suspect, Wijeweera, [who] also founded and led the JVP and who was primarily responsible for the decision to strike against the Government, we see no alternative but to impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life.” Criminal Justice Commission, 20 December 1974, as reported in the CJC Report, 1977.

Related events
14 May 1965
10 August 1970
April 1971
April 1971
2 November 1973

Extracts from defence statement
“A representative of one social class is addressing the representatives of another social class. That is what is happening here. A representative of the exploited and oppressed proletariat is addressing the representatives of the exploiting and oppressing class. We should not forget that the living really with transpires here is a struggle for the fulfilment and class interests of two opposed social classes. Although I have been designated the ‘thirteenth suspect’ by this Commission in the present inquiry, the Chairman himself has stated that I am the chief suspect. That begin so it will be necessary right at the beginning to tell you who I, the thirteenth suspect, am. I am a Marxist-Leninist. I am a modern Bolshevik. I am a proletarian revolutionary. Marxism-Leninism is a clear doctrine. In no way is a terrorist. As a proletarian revolutionary, however, I must emphatically state that I am committed to the overthrow of the of the prevailing capitalist system and its replacement by a socialism system…

“To disown capitalism which had turned grey, reactionary and obsolete in the course of human social development, to say that this system must be replaced with the fore as befitting the latest and noblest historical stage in the course of the development of human society, and to act accordingly, is an no way a conspiratorial act. I am not a conspirator in the context of the development of history. I am no conspirator in the context of the development of society and humanity…
“Honourable Members of the Commission, may I make one request to begin with? I have been subjected to every possible indignity and harassment at the hands of the ruling class and have been for several years the target of numerous defamations, slurs and slanders, mudslinging and character assassination and all this without any protection from the law. The only request that I make of you, is to respect my right to express my innocence freely and without any let or hindrance. The ruling clique of capitalists will gag me for a long period, if not for all time. In these circumstances I do not wish to blame myself for not saying all that I have to say before you now. I beseech that I be not gagged…

“My view is that conditions were not ripe for organizing an armed revolutionary uprising to seize state power. The objective conditions were maturing fast, but they were still unripe. It had not reached a stage where the masses saw no other solution but revolution. It is true, however, that then, as now, society was moving in that direction. The subjective conditions were also lacking: that is, the existence of a revolutionary party that has steeled itself, won the support of the masses and is fit to lead them in an armed struggle for power. The Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna was developing and moving towards that goal, but had not reached full maturity. We had failed at that time to established the JVP in the Northern and eastern provinces and in the Estate sector as a political force. And then there was the question of mass support. It is true that out of the millions who voted for the Coalition Government, tens of thousands had by this time washed their hands of it. It is also true that this section was the politically developed section. They were abandoning the Coalition Government and moving Leftwards towards the JVP. But there was a section which, although disgusted and frustrated, did not break away from the government during those either months. On other words the JVP had not yet reached the stage where the masses could see it as a real alternative to the government, accept its leadership and join in the class under its banner. In our Marxist conception, a revolution – an armed uprising – is not something done behind the backs of the masses.

“In conclusion this is what I have to say: I admit that the capitalist class has been temporary victorious. But I do not see it as a defeat for the proletariat. This is only a big retreat for the proletariat; yes, I call it a big retreat. A retreat is not a defeat, but a phase from which it is possible to recover and march again to certain victory. No revolutionary movement has raced non-stop to victory in a straight line from start to finish. Forward marches followed by retreats are quite common in revolutionary movements. That is the position with which we are confronted today and it is from this position that I have come to give evidence before you. I have not spoken here by stretching my principles for personal gain. I remain an unrepentant Marxist and what I am defending here are Marxist principles rather than myself. For as a revolutionary Marxist I have nothing else to defend.

“Whatever the capitalist class may have expected to gain through the April incidents, their ultimate result has already been expressed by a revolutionary poet in the following stanza:

See these blossoms strewn on earth and withered lie
Their fragrance shall abide, shall never die.
To raise its sweetness high to limits limitless,
More buds will bloom and bloom and multiply.

“The poet expresses himself in clear and plain terms. The flowers of revolution have blossomed, but how they lie withered and dead. But their perfume has not ceased. To enhance that perfume and with that aim in view other buds will continue to bloom. In fact, gentlemen, the capitalist cause has no real reason to celebrate its success. For in the class struggle victory is a see saw until the proletariat finally emerges victorious. That is our belief. I have concluded my evidence.” Rohana Wijeweera, Statement before the Criminal Justice Commission, 2 November 1973.

Related events
14 May 1965
10 August 1970
April 1971
April 1971
20 December 1974