Extracts from the 16th Amendment to the Constitution
Languages of Administration

(1) Sinhala and Tamil shall be the language of administration through out Sri Lanka and Sinhala shall be the language of administration and be used for the maintenance of public records and the transaction or all business by public institutions of all the provinces of Sri Lanka other than the Northern and Eastern Provinces where Tamil shall be so used;

(4) A Provincial Council or a local authority which conducts its business in Sinhala shall be entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his official capacity, in Sinhala, and a Provincial Council or a local authority which conducts its business in Tamil shall be entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his official capacity, in Tamil;

(5) A person shall be entitled to be examined through the medium of either Sinhala or Tamil or a language of his choice at any examination for the admission of persons to the Public Service, Judicial Service, Provincial Public Service, Local Government Service or any public institution, subject to the condition that he may be required to acquire a sufficient knowledge of Tamil or Sinhala, as the case may be, within a reasonable time after admission to such service or public institution where such knowledge is reasonably necessary for the discharge of his duties

Language of Legislation

(1) All laws and subordinate legislation shall be enacted or made and published in Sinhala and Tamil, together with a translation thereof in English;

(2) All Orders, Proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications made or issued under any written law other than by a Provincial Council or a local authority, and the Gazette shall be published in Sinhala and Tamil together with a translation thereof in English.

(3) All Orders, Proclamations rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications made or issued under any written law by any Provincial Council or local authority, and all documents including circulars and forms issued or used by such body or any public institution shall be published in the language used in the administration in the respective areas in which they function, together with a translation thereof in English.

Extracts from the 13th amendment to the Constitution
Article 18 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) is hereby amended as follows:
…
(2) Tamil shall also be an official language.
(3) English shall be the link language.
…
Establishment of Provincial Councils
…
(1) Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, a Provincial Council shall be established for every Province specified in the Eighth Schedule with effect from such date or dates as the President may appoint by Order published in the Gazette. Different dates may be appointed in respect of different Provinces.
(2) Every Provincial Council established under paragraph (1) shall be constituted upon the election of the members of such Council in accordance with the law relating to Provincial Council elections.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding provisions of this Article, Parliament may by, or under, any law provide for two or three adjoining Provinces to form one administrative unit with one elected Provincial Council, one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers and for the manner of determining whether such Provinces should continue to be administered as one administrative unit or whether each such Province should constitute a separate administrative unit with its own Provincial Council, and a separate Governor.
…
Full text of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.

Opinion
“The 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution gave effect to the devolution provisions of the controversial Indo-Lanka Accord, signed in July 1987 by President J.R. Jayewardene and the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi.

“For the Indian government, the accord was the culmination of four years’ diplomatic manoeuvring in which a range of strategies were deployed to help secure a satisfactory solution to Sri Lanka’s armed conflict. It is clear that the Sri Lankan government was pressured by India into signing the accord. Once it had signed, however, the government rammed the 13th amendment through Parliament despite strong opposition from inside and outside the ruling United National Party (UNP).

“The 13th amendment sought to devolve power to newly instituted provincial councils throughout Sri Lanka. It contained three lists detailing respectively the areas of government devolved to the provinces (List I), the powers retained at the centre (the Reserved List — List II) and a Concurrent List (List III) of shared functions which were ultimately controlled by Parliament. The provincial councils were elected in November 1988, but a number of clauses in the amended constitution allowed for the blocking of substantive devolution.

“Continued centralization was strikingly symbolized by the conspicuous strength of the executive presidency, although in some areas, such as health and education, devolved powers could be reclaimed by simple ministerial directive. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to practical devolution was the first phrase of the Reserved List which provided for ‘National Policy on all Subjects and Functions’ to be determined by Parliament. This phrase completely undermined powers apparently devolved to the provinces. Since the inauguration of the 13th amendment, Parliament has used this rubric often to encroach into the provincial sphere.

“In identifying the reasons why the 13th amendment did not bring about a sustainable solution to the ethnic conflict, many commentators have faulted the lack of political will at the centre. However, it also seems clear that the constitutional provisions themselves were fundamentally flawed. Because of its significant shortcomings, it is not surprising that Tamil political parties rejected the 13th amendment and demanded more substantive devolution of power.” Rohan Edrisinha, Trying times: constitutional attempts to resolve armed conflict in Sri Lanka, August 1998.

Related events
Sri Lanka, India sign Indo-Lankan Peace Accord (ISPA)
President authorises merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces
Supreme Court declares 1987 merger unlawful
APRC unveils power sharing proposals

Sources
Constitutional Reforms since Independence, Official website of the Government of Sri Lanka; A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (1988): The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict, Marianne Heiberg (2007): Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts.

Extracts from the Constitution
“The Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) adopted and enacted by the Constituent Assembly of the People of Sri Lanka on the 22nd of May 1972. …

CHAPTER I – THE PEOPLE, THE STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY …

2. The Republic of Sri Lanka is a Unitary State.
3. In the Republic of Sri Lanka, Sovereignty is in the People and is inalienable.
4. The Sovereignty of the People is exercised through a National State Assembly of elected representatives of the People. …

CHAPTER II – BUDDHISM
6. The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism while assuring to all religions the rights granted by section 18 (1) (d).

CHAPTER III – LANGUAGE
Official Language
7. The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala as provided by the Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956.
8. (1) The use of the Tamil language shall be in accordance with the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act. No. 23 of 1958. …

CHAPTER VI – FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
18. (1) In the Republic of Sri Lanka
(a) all persons are equal before the and are entitled to equal protection of the law;
(b) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or security of person except in accordance with the law;
(c) no citizen shall be arrested, held in custody, imprisoned or detained except in accordance with the law;
(d) every citizen shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and the freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching;
(e) every citizen has the right by himself or in association with others, to enjoy and promote his own culture;
(f) all citizens have the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association;
(g) every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, including publication;
(h) no citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the central government, local government, public corporation services and the like, shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment on the ground of race, religion, caste or sex;

Provided that in the interests of such services, specified posts or classes of posts may be reserved for members of either sex:
(1) every citizen shall have the right to freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka.
(2) The exercise and operation of the fundamental rights and freedoms provided in this Chapter shall be subject to such restrictions as the law prescribes in the interests of national unity and integrity, national security, national economy, public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or giving effect to the Principles of State Policy set out in section 16.

Opinion
“The coup de grace came when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and its Marxist allies in the United Front of 1970 pledged at the general elections in that year to remove section 29 (2) and replace the 1947-72 Constitution if elected to power. This was accordingly implemented when the Republican Constitution of 1972 was adopted. … In the name of this blanket provision [Section 18 (2)] the state could, without difficulty violate the rights of ethnic minorities; to violate the rights of ethnic Buddhist majority would be difficult because the governments’ dependence for their sustenance on the Sinhalese Buddhist electors”. Source: The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, 1988.

“Among the most contentious provisions, from a Tamil perspective, Buddhism was given the “foremost place” among the religions and the states entrusted to protect and foster Buddhism. Sinhala was made the official language, this in one interpretation, enshrining the 1956 Sinhala Only Act, as an inviolable and nonnegotiable constitutional principle. And Section 29 of the Soulbury constitution was deleted and not replaced by explicit judicial protections for minorities. Last, the 1972 constitution subjugated the judiciary to the control of the legislature by eliminating appeals to the British Privy Council on constitutional issues. This measure was a response to a Supreme Court finding against the 1956 Sinhala Only Act …” Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts, Marianne Heiberg, 2007.

Related events
September 1944
1947
November 1948
4 February 1978

A Tamil public servant, C Kodeeswaran, a senior officer in the executive grade of the Government Clerical service and President of the newly formed trade union – Arasanka Eluthu Vinaignar Sangam – refused to sit the Sinhala proficiency examinations which resulted in his losing his annual salary increments. In 1962, Kodeeswaran sued the Government in the Colombo District Court on the grounds that the regulation under which his increment was stopped was illegal and unreasonable. His argument was that the Official Language Act of 1956 which made Sinhala the sole official language was in violation of Section 29 of the constitution which prohibited discrimination. The trial judge, O.L. de Kretser, upheld the plea and ruled that the Official Language Act and the regulation was ultra vires and contravened Section 29 of the Constitution. In 1967, the government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the judgement on the ground that a government servant had no right to sue the government in a court of law for salary or increment; the Supreme Court did not address the constitutional issue and state that if it became necessary to consider it, the matter would be placed by the Chief Justice before a bench of five judges of the Supreme Court. Kodeeswaran subsequently appealed to the Privy Council which set aside the Supreme Court’s decision and directed that the Supreme Court should rule on the constitutional question.

Sources
Attorney-General of Ceylon v Kodeeswaran, Supreme Court S C. 408/64-D. C. Colombo, 1026/Z, Lawnet, Sri Lanka; Kodeeswaran v Attorney-General of Ceylon, Privy Council Appeal No. 38 of 1968, Lawnet, Sri Lanka.

Extract from the judgement of the Supreme Court
“A public servant in Ceylon has no right of redress by action in the Courts for a breach of any of the covenants and rules governing the salaries and conditions of service of public officers. This principle is operative except in respect of terms laid down by statute, and is unaffected, either expressly or by implication, by the provisions of the Ceylon Constitution.” Source: Supreme Court S. C. 408/64-D. C. Colombo, 1026/Z, Lawnet, Sri Lanka.

Extract from the judgement of the Privy Council
“A civil servant in Ceylon is entitled to sue the Crown for arrears of salary which, have accrued due, by the terms of his appointment, in respect of services which he has rendered during the currency of his employment. In such a case the fact that his appointment as a Crown servant is terminable at will, unless it is expressly otherwise provided by legislation, is not relevant. …

“Although in their Lordships’ opinion a civil servant in Ceylon does have a right of action against the Crown for arrears of salary which accrued due during the currency of his employment, this answer to the preliminary issue does not dispose of the Crown’s appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment of the District Judge. There are the other important constitutional issues to be decided upon which neither the Supreme Court nor their Lordships have heard argument. As already indicated, their Lordships would think it inappropriate to enter upon any of these matters without the benefit of the considered opinion of the Supreme Court of Ceylon thereon. They accordingly express no opinion upon any of the other issues as to the constitutionality of the Official Language Act or the effect of Treasury Circular No. 560 of 4th December 1961, or of any other material facts upon the plaintiff’s contract of employment. The case should be remitted to the Supreme Court for further consideration of these other issues and their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty accordingly.”

Source
Most of the material presented here on the February 1961 agitation campaign is extracted from Witness to History: A journalist’s memoirs, S. Sivanayagam (2005); Satyagraha: The Freedom Movement of the Tamils in Ceylon, S. Ponniah (1963).

Extracts from Witness to History: A journalist’s memoirs
“The satyagraha proper was limited to approved volunteers of the party who were strictly forbidden from any form of violence, either by word or deed, even under the gravest provocation. But such was the tremendous enthusiasm generated by this resistance movement among all sections of the people, that it gave the impression of a popular uprising, resulting in an initial sharp reaction from the government. … The police trampled on the satyagrahis with their boots, pulled them by their hands and feet, lifted some of them and hurled them away while attacking them with batons. … [Enraged] by police violence [some] hurled stones at the police jeeps and trucks. Thepolice then used tear gas to disperse the crowd outside, which fell back for a while, and kept surging forward again. … The Kachcheri did not function. …

“On 21 February the satyagraha was led by the MP for Vaddukoddai A. Amirthalingam: “Although the police were present, armed with shields, batons and helmets, there was a marked restraint in their behaviour. On the third day, the police arrived at the secretariat at dawn and took up positions trying to prevent volunteers from blocking the entrances, but a party of 300 volunteers … moved up despite the brandishing of batons and half-hearted use of force. …

“[On the 23 February] women plunged into the movement. Out of 500 satyagrahis led by the MP for Chavakachcheri VN Navaratnam, about 80 women … took up positions at the main entrance. … leading Muslims of Jaffna decided to throw their weight with the movement. …

“On the 24th the campaign spread to Mullaitivu, Mannar and the Eastern province. On the 25th, a large procession of Muslims led by Muslim lawyers and businessmen joined the satyagrahis in Jaffna.

“On the 26th, Nominated MP and leader of the plantation Tamils S. Thondaman warned against suppression of the campaign and alerted plantation Tamils to store food and provisions for three months should a struggle for Tamil rights becomes necessary. …

“On the 27th satyagraha and picketing was launched in Batticoloa and administration was brought to a halt both in the North and East. On the 28th, an Opposition suggestiong in the House of representatives that talks be initiated with the Federal Party was summarily rejected by Finance Minister Felix Dias (Banadaranaike), saying that the government was not prepared to negotiate under pressure. …

“[In the evening of 17 April] a special train carrying a detachment of 350 soldiers and 15 officers of the Sinha regiment, exclusively composed of Sinhalese, left for Jaffna. … Once the MPs were taken away, army men, some of them carrying rifles, swooped on the passive satyagrahis, attacking them with rifle butts, belts and clubs. The sleeping volunteers woke up groaning and writhing with pain. They were trampled with boots, kicked and dragged away from the kachcheri entrances. … They pulled down the party’s “post office” structure, smashed up cars and bicycles parked in the vicinity, ripping tyres with bayonets and ramming windscreens. …

“On the 20th April, when the curfew was expired, a 12 hour curfew from 6 pm to 6 am was substituted. …

“By April 24, Chelvanayakam and 58 others, including 14 MPs were under arrest … Jaffna came under virtual army occupation. … Indisciplined , trigger-happy soldiers shot dead and injured persons outside curfew hours on the pretence of enforcing curfew.”

Quotations

“It is said that non-violence is the essence of any satyagraha movement. But the so called satyagraha movement carried on by the Federal Party is by no means non-violent. Last Thursday, a Federal Party member of parliament and his associates had attempted to use force to prevent a highly-placed government official entering the kachcheri premises. Last night I saw for myself the torn clothes of this official.” Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, radio broadcast, 2 March 1961.

“The Federal Party has by its actions made it abundantly clear that their real objective is to establish a separate state. … [The government had acted] with the greatest restraint and patience. … [and is] now left with no other alternatives but to use all the forces at its command to establish law and order. It is not unlikely that a number of innocent people will suffer in various ways in consequence of these measures. … For any unfortunate happenings, the Tamil leaders must take the entire blame…” Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, 20 April 2008.

At no time did we underestimate the might of the Prime Minister’s government. We are quite aware that she has powers enough to turn her armed forces against us. We were quite aware that she has powers enough to turn her armed forces against us. …The Prime Minister has made a radio speech touching on satyagraha. That speech is more benefiting an imperial dictator speaking to his subjects than a speech made by a democratic leader to her people. In fact the manner and and the contents of her speech correctly depict the true status of the Tamil-speaking people in Ceylon. The rule over them is indeed colonial imperialism. … In her radio speech just before her departure to Great Britain, she made an appeal to those whom she called reasonable Tamils , “To disown the actions of the mischief makers, namely the Federalists”. … The factual position is that there is no section of the Tamil-speaking people, certainly in the northern and eastern provinces, which does not fervently support the satyagraha movement.” SJV Chelvanayakam, 4 March 1961.

Source
Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, Neil DeVotta (2004), Stanford University Press.

Extract from Emergency ’58: The Abrogation of a Pact
“On the morning of April 9 a police message reached Mr Ban­daranaike warning him that about 200 bhikkus or monks and 300 others were setting out on a visitation to the Prime Minis­ter’s residence in Rosmead Place to demand the abrogation of the Pact. They would arrive at 9 a.m.

“The Prime Minister left the house early that morning to attend to some very important work in his office. The bhikkus came, the crowds gathered, the gates of the Bandaranaike Walawwa were closed against them and armed police were hurriedly summoned to throw a barbed-wire cordon to keep the uninvited guests out. The bhikkus decided to bivouac on the street. Peddlers, cool-drink carts, betel sellers and even bangle merchants pitched their stalls hard by. Dhana was brought to the bhikkus at the appointed hour for food.

“In the meantime, the Prime Minister was fighting off the opposition to the Pact among his own party colleagues with desperate fury.

“At 4.15 p.m. the B—C Pact was torn into pathetic shreds by its principal author who now claimed that its implementation had been rendered impossible by the activities of the Federalists.

“The Prime Minister had gone home that afternoon accom­panied by half a dozen Ministers who stood on the leeward side of the barbed-wire barricade while Mr Bandaranaike lis­tened to the shrill denunciations of the monks. The Minister of Health sat on the Street facing the monks and preached a ser­mon, promising them redress if they would only be patient. The Prime Minister consulted his colleagues. The monks had won. The Magic Pact was no more. But the monks insisted on getting this promise in writing. The Prime Minister went into the house and the Health Minister, hardly able to sup­press the look of relief on her face, brought the written pledge out to the monks. Yet another victory for Direct Action had been chalked up.”

For a full account of the events leading up to and following the 1958 communal riots, we recommend Tarzie Vittachi’s award winning Emergency ’58: The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots, 1959 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Journalism, Literature and Creative Communication Arts.

Related events
‘Anti-Sri’ campaign launched
Campaign in response to the ‘anti Sri’
Communal riots spread across the country
Emergency declared
‘Senanayake-Chelvanayagam pact’ is signed

Opinion
“The government made the situation worse by sending to Jaffna government-owned buses with the Sinhalese symbol denoting ‘Sri’ on number plates; a crazy innovation that provoked Tamil anger. An anti-Sinhala Sri campaign in Jaffna led to the defacing of the Sinhala Sri letter on buses and substituting of the Tamil ‘Sri’ instead. S. Sivanayagam, Witness to History: A Journalist’s Memoirs (1930- 2004), 2005.

Extract from Emergency ’58: Goondas in Action
“Meanwhile race-hatred was being churned up elsewhere. Several months before the Tamil Federalists in the north, desperately anxious to find a popular gimmick to symbolize their struggle for linguistic equity, had begun to obliterate with tar the Sinhalese character – Sri – which had replaced the English letters on the registration plates of motor vehicles. New cars moving in the north and the east with the offending letter had their plates smeared with tar. The Tamil ‘Sri’ character was substituted for the officially accepted Sinhalese character. The Government took a top-level tactical decision not to prosecute any of the offenders for fear that they would be built up into martyrs. Federal supporters went about in the Peninsular and the east coast with illegal number plates.

“It is quite true that the use of the Sinhalese character for this purpose at a time when language was a sore point was unnecessary and provocative. Nevertheless the tame decision to permit people, however provoked they may have been, to flout the law blatantly and to continue to do so for months with complete impunity brought the prestige of the Government and the police into abject disrepute. The impression among the Sinhalese in the south was that the Government had abdicated its authority in the northern and eastern provinces of Ceylon. In the north the new buses of the Transport Board —inevitably SRI numbered— were daubed with the equivalent Tamil sign. This set off an ugly wave of reprisals in the predominantly Sinhalese areas.”

For a full account of the events leading up to and following the 1958 communal riots, we recommend Tarzie Vittachi’s award winning Emergency ’58: The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots, 1959 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Journalism, Literature and Creative Communication Arts.

Related events
April 1958
9 April 1958
May 1958
27 May 1958

Quotations

“The settlement envisaged setting up of regional councils in the north and east with powers in agriculture, education and selection of candidates for colonisation schemes; provision of a national minority of Ceylon without infringing on the position of the Official Language Act; and the provision of Tamil as the language of administration in the northern and eastern provinces.” From Witness to History: A Journalist’s Memoirs (1930- 2004), S. Sivanayagam, 2005.

“The failure to obtain a single-merged North-East province left him dismayed that narrow district parochialisms could emerge in the absence of an all-embracing Tamil region.” S.J.V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 1947 – 1977. A Political Biography, A.J. Wilson.

Source
Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, Neil DeVotta (2004), Stanford University Press.

Extracts from the Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956
An Act to prescribe the Sinhala Language as the One Official Language of Ceylon and to enable transitory provisions to be made.

1. This Act may be cited as the Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956. Sinhala Language to Be the One Official Language.
2. The Sinhala language shall be the one official language of Ceylon Provided that where the Minister considers it impracticable on the coming into force of this Act, the language or languages hithereto used for that purpose may be continued to be so used until the necessary change is effected as early as possible before the expiry of the thirty-first of December, 1960, and, if such change cannot be effected by administrative order, regulations may be made under this Act to effect such change.

Regulations
3. (1) The Minister may make regulations in respect of all matters which regulations are authrorized by this Act to be made and generally for the purpose of giving effect to the principles and provisions of this Act. …

Quotations

“We are completing by this [Sinhala Only] Bill an important phase in our national struggle. The restoration of the Sinhala language to the position it occupied before the occupation of this country by foreign powers marks an important stage in the history of the development of this island.” Phillip Gunawardene, Sri Lankan Cabinet Minister, Hansard, 14 June 1956.

“I pointed out that the result of forcing Sinhalese as the sole state language for official purposes on an unwilling minority brought with it great dangers. … If a minority feels deeply that an injustice and a great injustice has been done it is likely to embark upon forms of resistance and protests. The possibility of communal riots is not the only danger I am referring to. There is the graver danger of the division of the country. We must remember that the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Ceylon are inhabited principally by Tamil speaking people and if those people feel that a grave and irreparable injustice is done to them, there is a possibility of their deciding even to break away from the rest of the country.” Leslie Gunawardene, Opposition Member of Parliament, Hansard, 8 June 1956.

“Do you want two languages and one nation or one language and two nations? Parity Mr. Speaker, we believe is the road to freedom of our nation and the unity of its components. Otherwise two torn little bleeding states may arise from one little state. … Do we want a single state or do we want two? Do we want one Ceylon or do we want two? … These are the issues that in fact we have been discussing under the form and appearance of the language issue. … If you mistreat the [Tamils], if you ill treat them … if you oppress and harass them, in the process you may cause to emerge in Ceylon, from that particular racial stock with its own language and tradition, a new nationality to which we will have to concede more claims than it puts forward now. … If we come to the stage where instead of parity, we through needless insularity, get into the position of suppressing the Tamil [federal demand] there may emerge separatism.” Dr Colvin R de Silva, Opposition Member of Parliament, Hansard, June 1956.

“[By passing the 'Sinhala Only' Bill] against the unanimous opposition of the entire Tamil people who wanted a place of honour for their own language, [this] Government has struck a grievous blow at the unity of this country, which stands divided today. The members of this Government on the other hand have charged the Federal Party with endeavouring to divide the country/. … A federal solution within proper limits, and subject to proper safeguards, far from dividing a country which is already divided, is one of the best known methods of bringing about unity in a divided country. If democracy means anything, if human rights mean anything, no national minority proud of its language and culture can ever subscribe to the proposition that it should in respect of matters affecting its vital interest accept the dictates of a majority nationality merely because it is a majority. If this were so, it would amount to the tyranny of an impersonal majority … since this question affects the Tamil nationality vitally – I do not say the Tamil-speaking nationality – the Government cannot seek to impose anything, which is the result of a unilateral decision by the representatives of the Sinhalese people, on the Tamil people without doing violence to the elementary principles of democracy.” Senator S. Nadesan QC, Sri Lanka Senate Hansard, 26 June 1957.

Related events
5 June 1956
25 July 1957
9 April 1958
4 August 1958
24 March 1965

Sources
For the estimated 150 deaths: B.H. Farmer (1963): A Divided Nation, London Institute of Race Relations, OUP; Witness to History: A Journalist’s Memoirs (1930- 2004), S. Sivanayagam, 2005.

Opinion
“While making Tamils virtually illiterate overnight in the transaction of public business, the bill proved to be a millstone round the neck of the country as well, dragging it into ultimate tragedy and ruination. … The Tamil Federal Party under the leadership of that gentle Christian, Samuel James Velupillai Chelvanayakam believed in the philosophy of non-violent action as a way of protest against injustice. Tamils had traditionally come under the influence of the Indian Gandhian movement for independence from the time of he Jaffna Youth Congress of the 1920s and 30s. The value of the concept of satyagraha was, unlike in the case of the Sinhalese, ingrained in the Tamil mind. It is this that led them to organise what they believed was a peaceful satyagraha at the parliament end of the Galle Face Green (but disallowed) on that momentous day.” S. Sivanayagam, 2005.

“The moment the volunteers and leaders reassembled at the hotel end, a waiting mob of more than a thousand Sinhalese toughs ell on them like a pack of wolves in a most inhuman and cowardly attack. [The satyagrahis] were thrashed at felled prostrate on the ground. Their placards were seized and the wooden poles used as clubs. Some were trampled upon, kicked, beaten and spat upon. Not a single satyagrahi raised his hand in retaliation, except Dr. Naganathan. Five ruffians singled him out and chased him to the end of the promenade. He turned and met them alone with his fists and legs, satyagraha or not. Naganathan by nature was one who would never brook an insult to his manhood. … The police stopped the satyagrahis at the northern end of the Galle Face Green and blocked their way to the precincts of Parliament House. The volunteers sat down peacefully where they were stopped and remained there for the rest of the day. A prominent Sinhalese lawyer of Colombo, Mr Paranavitane of the law firm of De Silva and Mendis, and a Roman Catholic pries, Father Xavier Thani Nayagam, the famous Tamil scholar, emerged out of the crowds and sat down with the satyagrahis . The gesture did not pass unnoticed by the press.” V. Navaratnam, then Member of Parliament for Kayts, Rise and Fall of the Tamil Nation, 1995.

Related events
15 June 1956
25 July 1957
9 April 1958
May 1958
24 March 1965

The Constitution included Section 29 which prohibited discrimination in legislation against any specific community: “No … law shall … make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which any persons of other communities or religions are not made liable; or … confer on persons or any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions.”

Quotations

“[A constitutional] safeguard was provided for the minorities by Article 29 (2) of the Soulbury Constitution. It prevented parliament from conferring benefits on the majority community and imposing disabilities on the minorities. It was on the basis of this safeguard that the Tamils acquiesced in the granting of independence in 1948.” Prof. G.L. Peiris, then Minister of Constitutional Affairs of Sri Lanka, Daily News, 12 March 1997.

“[Section 29 (2) represents] the solemn balance of rights between the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental condition on which inter se they accepted the constitution; and these are therefore unalterable …” Privy Council in Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe (1964).

Related events
September 1944
November 1948
22 May 1972
4 February 1978