Source
Sri Lankan civilians found dead, BBC, 18 September 2006.

Sources
Thousands of Muslims flee fierce fighting in Sri Lanka, The Independent, 5 August 2006; Soldiers seize town captured by LTTE, Times of India, 6 August 2007; Sri Lanka says Tigers killed 100 civilians as fighting subsides, AFP, 5 August 2006.

Quotations

“We still have no access to the area and therefore we can’t say anything about these reports [of the massacre and other civilian casualties],” Sukumar Rockwood, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

“Many walked for miles through minefields and jungle to escape the fighting, abandoning their homes to the fighting between government forces and the Tamil Tiger rebels. They had to brave rockets and mortar fire while carrying their children and a few possessions with them. At least five were killed when they were hit by artillery fire, according to a local political party,” The Independent, 5 August 2006.

“Sri Lankan soldiers on Saturday said they re-established control over a northeastern town that had been the scene of fierce clashes in recent days, and urged the thousands of civilians displaced by the fighting to return. The rebels, however, did not admit defeat, claiming instead that they withdrew from Muttur – a government-controlled town under the terms of a 2002 cease-fire – after accomplishing their objectives,” Times of India,  6 August 2007.

Related events
6 November 2006

According to media reports, hardliners within the Muslim community are gaining support for the idea that Muslims must arm themselves against attacks from the Tigers. Some reports suggest that they have established links with Islamic militants overseas.

Associated Press cites a Sri Lankan police intelligence report that says that Islamic extremists have already set up two training bases. While serious weapons training at these bases is yet to begin, the intelligence report says that the emphasis now is on “raising the level of anger among Muslims to prepare them for a jihad.”

However, so counterproductive is the killing of Muslims to the LTTE cause that doubts have been raised as to whether the Tigers were in fact behind the killings. The LTTE is currently trying to secure an interim northeast regional administration. “Alienation of Muslims, who may constitute the largest single community in the east can be a fatal blow to its viability,” points out Jehan Perera, a Sri Lankan analyst.

Some Sri Lankans have even pointed an accusing finger at “international forces opposed to the peace process”. It was also considered possible that an extremist section among the Muslims engineered the killings.

Quotations

“A Muslim refusal to agree to an LTTE-dominated interim administration for the northeast would make it difficult for the government to deliver such an administration to the LTTE. If there is a groundswell of opposition to the interim arrangements from the Muslim community, the Muslim MPs in parliament will be unable to acquiesce in it. This would also raise the possibility of a crossover of Muslim MPs into the ranks of the opposition, if the government goes ahead with the interim administration, regardless of Muslim opposition. … The political track is currently epitomized by the deliberations in Paris regarding a response to the government’s proposed interim administration for the northeast. Tamil intellectuals from Sri Lanka and abroad are attending these deliberations. These deliberations are expected to yield a demand from the LTTE that would ensure virtually total political control over the northeast. The military track, however, operates on a parallel, and is not subordinate to political imperatives. The intimidation and coercion of the Muslims is part of the LTTE’s strategy to physically dominate the northeast,” Jehan Perera, National Peace Council.

Sources
Sri Lanka’s explosive Muslim factor, Asia Times, 18 September 2003.

Extracts from the Press Statement of Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
“Sri Lanka Peace Talks – Agreed Statement on behalf of the Parties 21 March 2003 …

The parties met amid growing security concerns following recent incidents on land and at sea. While they acknowledged that parallel progress is needed in negotiations on security, economic and political issues, the parties left no doubt that they must now give top priority to improving the security situation, in particular at sea. The parties undertook to enforce better compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement by their personnel.

The Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE are deeply concerned about the latest incidents at sea, including on 10 March. To prevent future incidents at sea that could threaten the stability of the ceasefire, the parties have agreed to convene senior naval and political representatives from both sides within three weeks to work out effective arrangements for the operation of naval units in keeping with existing treaty obligations. The meeting will be convened by the Royal Norwegian Government and the Head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and will immediately start preparing the meeting with military leaders on both sides. The parties agreed to instruct their naval units to exercise restraint, as required by the Ceasefire Agreement, and to avoid provocative actions in the crucial period prior to the establishment of appropriate procedures.

In this context, the parties agreed to strengthen the mandate and capacity of the SLMM to undertake preventive measures to avoid serious incidents at sea and on land. As a fundamental precondition for the SLMM to take on a stronger role, the parties pledged to ensure full compliance with the rulings of the SLMM, guarantee the security of its personnel in all situations, and take disciplinary action against anyone endangering the lives of SLMM personnel.

The parties also agreed to take steps to further strengthen the security situation on land, including the establishment of procedures with the cooperation of the SLMM for handling soldiers and cadres apprehended by the other party. In their political discussions, the parties reiterated their commitment to develop a federal system based on internal self-determination within a united Sri Lanka. As the point of departure for planning how to give effect to the general principles of federalism in a final settlement of the ethnic conflict, the parties discussed the essential elements of fiscal federalism.

The parties discussed preliminary issues and a framework for political matters and agreed to expand this into a complete plan at the seventh session of talks. The plan will outline the next steps to be taken by the parties and the topics that must be addressed in order to negotiate a federal solution for Sri Lanka. The parties recognise that a considerable amount of time will be required to address this wide range of topics, which will include geographical regions and the division of powers between the center and regions. In this context, the parties decided to invite the Forum of Federations, a Canadian-based international organization, to participate as consultants at the seventh session of talks.

The LTTE reported on the formation of a Political Affairs Committee consisting of twenty-one leading members of the organization. This committee will undertake an intensive study of federalism over the course of the next three months to build the LTTE’s capacity for political transformation. The committee will study federal systems in other parts of the world, arrange seminars for LTTE cadres, consult Tamil parliamentarians and academics and seek advice from lawyers and constitutional experts, to prepare the ground for the process of establishing internal self-determination within a united, federal Sri Lanka.

Following a proposal by the GOSL to prepare for local government elections in the North and East, the LTTE will favourably consider supporting the holding of such elections.

It was agreed that the rescheduled meeting between the LTTE and the Muslim representatives in Batticaloa be convened on 27 April 2003. Furthermore, the LTTE and Mr. Rauf Hakeem agreed to arrange a separate meeting between Muslim leaders and the leadership of the LTTE in Kilinochchi to discuss political matters and the participation of a Muslim delegation in negotiations at plenary sessions. The parties approved the proposal submitted by the Sub-Committee on Gender Issues to establish secretariats in Kilinochchi and Colombo.

Following up on the discussions in Berlin in February on human rights, the parties asked their international human rights adviser, Mr. Ian Martin, to develop three aspects of the proposed roadmap for adoption at the seventh session of talks:

The drafting of a Declaration of Human Rights and Humanitarian Principles. This would reflect aspects of fundamental international human rights and humanitarian standards, which both parties would undertake to ensure are respected in practice by their personnel, pending the full entrenchment of human rights standards in the eventual constitutional arrangements and in federal and local law.

The planning of a programme of human rights training for LTTE cadres and government officials, police and prison officials, which would contribute to the respect of these principles in practice, and of human rights education and awareness for other sections of the population. This programme would include specialised training offered by UNICEF in relation to the rights of the child, UNHCR in relation to rights of internally displaced persons and refugees, and ICRC in relation to international humanitarian law. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights would be invited to coordinate this programme.

Proposals for the strengthening of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka to enable it to develop the capacity for increasingly effective monitoring throughout the country. These proposals would involve international advice and assistance to the HRC from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other sources, and close coordination with the roles of UNICEF in relation to child protection, UNHCR in relation to the protection of returning internally displaced persons and refugees, and SLMM in relation to acts against the civilian population.

The parties agreed to hold the seventh session of talks from 29 April to 2 May in Thailand, the eighth session from 12 to 15 June in Japan and the ninth session from 15 to 18 July in Europe (venue to be determined).” Source: Annexure 1, Human Rights Benchmarks in the Peace Process, Centre for Police Alternatives & Berghof Foundation, 2 April 2003.

Related events
6 January 2003
7 February 2003
April 2003
14 April 2003
10 June 2003

Source
Trying times: constitutional attempts to resolve armed conflict in Sri Lanka, Rohan Edrisinha writing for Conciliation Services, August 1998.

Extract from President Kumaratunge’s address to the nation, 3 August 1995
“The aspiration of the entire Sri Lankan populace is that the current national crisis centred around the north and east be brought to a peaceful, just and honourable settlement … The first task is … a new approach predicated on unqualified acceptance of the fact that the Tamil people have genuine grievances for which solutions must be found. With this objective in view, the government is seeking to rebuild the constitutional foundation of a plural society within a united and sovereign Republic of Sri Lanka. This republic will be a Union of Regions. This exercise is based on the following principles:

An effective constitutional framework for devolution of power to regions based on credibility, clarity, and an internally consistent and coherent value system, which is capable of effective implementation and includes structures for the just resolution of centre-region disputes;
To encourage the regions and communities which inhabit them to become constructive partners of a stable and pluralistic democracy;
To ensure that all persons may fully and effectively exercise all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law;
To give recognition to Sinhala and Tamil as official languages, to accord equality of status to these languages, and to recognize English as a link language;
To protect the identity of distinct communities and create conditions for the promotion of that identity, including the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, and nurture and promote their own language, and to transact business with the state in the national language of their choice.

Opinion

“Having failed in its attempts at negotiation, the government embarked on a new strategy for resolving the armed conflict which was at once highly ambitious and deeply controversial. On the one hand, a full-scale military assault was launched with the purpose of eliminating LTTE control of the north and east. On the other, the government sought to devise a devolution package behind which all constitutional political parties could unite.

“Seeking to engineer peace while continuing hostilities with a powerful and determined adversary was a novel and high-risk strategy. The PA government pressed ahead, however, and published the first of three versions of its devolution proposals on 3 August 1995. Seeking to redefine ‘the constitutional foundation of a plural society within a united and sovereign … Sri Lanka’, the proposals set out a basic framework for the structure of devolution, for government finance, for law and order, land, education, the administration of justice and the civil service. They also suggested a specific government commission on devolution and a division of powers based on just two lists of functions; one Regional, one ‘Reserved’.

“Unprecedented in their recognition of Tamil grievances and aspirations, the 1995 proposals were welcomed by many persons and groups committed to substantial devolution. They were fiercely opposed, however, by sections of the Sinhalese majority community. Considering their parliamentary majority of one, the government was nervous of this opposition. It was not surprising, therefore, that when the proposals were spelled out in greater detail, various changes were included to appease majority opinion. Along with the ongoing war against the LTTE, these changes did much to undermine the promise of the August 1995 proposals.” Rohan Edrisinha, Trying times: constitutional attempts to resolve armed conflict in Sri Lanka, August 1998.

Sources
The Politics Of Destruction & The Human Tragedy, Report No. 6, 4 February 1991: The Expulsion And Expropriation Of Muslims In The North, UTHR (J); Muslim Refugees: The Forgotten People in Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict, S. H. Hasbullah (2001); Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Out in the Cold, The Hindu, 31 July 2007; A Timely and Prudent Step by the LTTE, Frontline, Volume 19 – Issue 12, June 8-21, 200.

Extracts from UTHR (J) report
“But in every way Muslims and Tamils in the North had been traditionally totally integrated into local life as interdependent communities. There were Muslim traders, tailors, iron mongers, labourers and scholars. More recently, several of them took to farming in the Killinochchi area. As part of the arena of culture and scholarship, Muslims formed an important component of the University of Jaffna. There was no conflict at all.

“By the end of September, the Muslims in Chavakacheri were warned that they should be prepared for an expulsion order. Following the end of the first week in October, a very senior LTTE leader visited Vakarai in the Batticaloa district in the East where anti-Muslim feeling was rife following recent incidents. This strongly suggests that the LTTE regarded some major action against Muslims as a means of regaining its tattered credibility in the East. On 15th October, Muslims in Chavakacheri were asked to leave the peninsula. They were forced out without being able to carry hard earned valuable items such as fridges and fans. The following report was given by sources from that area:

“The Muslims’ houses were looted and ransacked and they were treated in the most brutal manner. In effect, the liberators behaved like an invading army on the binge. The LTTE cadre pocketed whatever article, such as scent bottles, that they could pocket. In one house, the koorai (bridal attire) of a young lady, married on 30th June, was removed. The owners had been asked to vacate their houses, leaving the woman of the house in charge when the LTTE came to take the inventory. One man had taken his wife leaving a 60 year old lady behind. When asked, he replied, ‘Since they are behaving like an invading army, like the IPKF and the Sri Lankan army, there is no guarantee that my wife would be safe’. …

“On the 24th at 4.00 p.m, the LTTE made a public announcement by loud-speaker: “All Muslims living in Mannar island should leave by 28th October. Before leaving, they must seek permission and clearance at the LTTE Office. The LTTE will decide their exit route.”

“Most Tamils were utterly disturbed by this. A meeting of local citizens was arranged for the 25th morning. The Bishop who was at Madhu could not come. Those who met included Roman Catholic clergy, officials from Save the Children Fund, Christian laymen and other leading citizens. Following the meeting, a delegation went to see the local LTTE leader Suresh (former student, University of Jaffna) and asked for the order to be rescinded. …

“Each Muslim family was allowed to take one sovereign of gold, Rs.2,000/- cash and five travel bags per family. Printed forms were given for clearance.

“The Muslims from Puthukudiruppu, Tharapuram, Uppukulam and Erukkalampiddy were taken to the beach at a place near Erukkalampiddy known as `Five Coconut Trees’, and were left there until they could find boats. They had to spend nights in the open in rainy weather with no conveniences and no boutique to obtain food and water. On the 28th the MARR (Mannar Association for Refugee Rehabilitation) purchased all the bread baked in Mannar and obtained the LTTE’s permission to take bread and water to the Muslims. Over three days, the Muslims made their exit to Kalpitiya, 60 miles South, by sea. Boats owned by Muslim fishermen in Mannar and Kalpitiya were used. The journey was often hazardous in crowded boats. There was at least one case of a parent numbed by cold, dropping a child into the sea and not knowing it for some time. To the old and the sickly, who had not known any place in the world, but Mannar island, the emotional and physical strain of the removal may prove fatal.”

Quotations
“I made an apology to the Muslim people that what has happened in the past has to be forgotten, that we are willing to talk to them and resolve their problems. [The Tamil territory in the North and East] belongs to the Muslim people also,” LTTE’s political adviser Anton Balasingham, Press Conference, 10 April 2002.

“The rapprochement between the LTTE and the SLMC has certain significant elements which are very progressive. They have realised the inevitable need to engage the SLMC in order to resolve their problems. That is somewhat comforting, although we have not made an emotional response to the statement they have made of late. We have told them unequivocally that we are prepared to forgive and not forget the past in the hope that they will be sincere in their attitude towards Muslims. We have bitter memories of the past. But it is time we contended with the ground realities. That would mean that the LTTE also has to look at Muslims and their separate political identity as something that has become quite pronounced over a period of time,” Rauff Hakeem, Leader of SLMM, 23 May 2003.

Related events
LTTE mosque attack in Batticoloa leaves 116 people dead
LTTE attacks Muttur, displacing thousands of Muslims

Other features
Feature: Historical roots of conflict in Sri Lanka
Feature: Assassination of an activist
Feature: “Black July”, 1983

Sources
Tamils Kill 110 Muslims at 2 Sri Lankan Mosques, New York Times, 5 August 1990; Peace Secretariat for Muslims.

Related events
October 1990
2 August 2006

Source
A pioneering leader, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, Frontline Magazine, Volume 17 – Issue 20, Sep. 30 – Oct. 13, 2000.

Extracts from obituary, published in Frontline Magazine, Volume 17 – Issue 20, Sep. 30 – Oct. 13, 2000

“The tragedy of September 16 involving an MI-17 helicopter of the Sri Lanka Air Force above the Urakanda mountain range in the Aranayaka area in Kegalle district of Sabaragamuwa province resulted in the death of a dynamic political leader of the island – Cabinet Minister M.H.M. Ashraff. Along with him were killed 14 others including crew members, security personnel, personal staff and political supporters. Investigations are on to ascertain whether the crash was an accident or the result of sabotage. Whatever the outcome of the probe, there is no denying that the demise of Ashraff, the founding president of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the island’s largest Muslim party, has created a political vacuum.

“Muhammed Hussain Mohammed Ashraff was a pioneering leader of Sri Lankan Muslims in particular and the country in general. He was ahead of his times in more ways than one. He realised the vast untapped political potential of his community and strove to charter a course that would have enabled his people to have their grievances redressed and aspirations fulfilled. At a time when the conflict within the island was perceived in simplistic terms as a ‘Sinhala versus Tamil’ issue, the efforts of Ashraff brought to the fore the problems faced by Muslims. The eloquent and effective advocacy of the Muslim cause by Ashraff led to a general awareness that the seemingly intractable ethnic crisis was not merely a Sinhala-Tamil bilateral issue but a trilateral one involving Muslims too. …

“Ashraff began his political career like many an Eastern Muslim leader as an admirer of the Tamil father figure S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, the founder leader of the Federal Party. He spoke on [Federal Party] platforms and in 1976 attended the historic Vaddukkoddai Conference where the newly formed Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) unanimously adopted the demand for a separate state of Tamil Eelam. In 1977 Ashraff was the driving force behind the Muslim United Front. He signed an agreement with Appapillai Amirthalingam of the TULF, which helped MUF candidates contest the elections under the TULF symbol on an Eelamist platform. Ashraff did not contest, but actively campaigned. The highlight of Ashraff’s speeches then was his public pronouncement that even if Amirthalingam himself abandoned the goal of Eelam Ashraff would continue to strive for it. While the Tamil candidates of the TULF swept the polls, no Muslim from the party won a seat in the polls. …

“Ashraff parted ways with the TULF in 1980 and the MUF entered a state of decay. He founded the SLMC on September 21, 1981. At that point, the SLMC was more or less an Eastern outfit concerned with socio-cultural issues. The July 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom and the consequent escalation of armed Tamil militancy led to a situation where Muslims became increasingly insecure and apprehensive of their future in a “Tamil” state. On the other hand, the contemptuous manner in which the J.R. Jayewardene regime dismis sed the Muslim opposition to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel touched a raw nerve in the community. Ashraff was instrumental in organising protest demonstrations over the issue. However, Sri Lankan Muslims were immune from the global tr end of growing Islamic consciousness and radicalism. The Muslim community in the East also produced a new generation of educated and ambitious youth. All this created a suitable climate for Ashraff and his brand of politics to arrive on the national scene. …

“While the interests of his own community were paramount for him, Ashraff was also extremely sympathetic to the Tamil problems and grievances. Except where the interests of Tamils and Muslims clashed directly, he tried to help realise the legitimate aspirations of Tamils. He also arrived at an understanding to achieve a working relationship with the Ceylon Workers’ Congress representing Tamils of Indian origin.”

Source
Most of the material presented here on the February 1961 agitation campaign is extracted from Witness to History: A journalist’s memoirs, S. Sivanayagam (2005); Satyagraha: The Freedom Movement of the Tamils in Ceylon, S. Ponniah (1963).

Extracts from Witness to History: A journalist’s memoirs
“The satyagraha proper was limited to approved volunteers of the party who were strictly forbidden from any form of violence, either by word or deed, even under the gravest provocation. But such was the tremendous enthusiasm generated by this resistance movement among all sections of the people, that it gave the impression of a popular uprising, resulting in an initial sharp reaction from the government. … The police trampled on the satyagrahis with their boots, pulled them by their hands and feet, lifted some of them and hurled them away while attacking them with batons. … [Enraged] by police violence [some] hurled stones at the police jeeps and trucks. Thepolice then used tear gas to disperse the crowd outside, which fell back for a while, and kept surging forward again. … The Kachcheri did not function. …

“On 21 February the satyagraha was led by the MP for Vaddukoddai A. Amirthalingam: “Although the police were present, armed with shields, batons and helmets, there was a marked restraint in their behaviour. On the third day, the police arrived at the secretariat at dawn and took up positions trying to prevent volunteers from blocking the entrances, but a party of 300 volunteers … moved up despite the brandishing of batons and half-hearted use of force. …

“[On the 23 February] women plunged into the movement. Out of 500 satyagrahis led by the MP for Chavakachcheri VN Navaratnam, about 80 women … took up positions at the main entrance. … leading Muslims of Jaffna decided to throw their weight with the movement. …

“On the 24th the campaign spread to Mullaitivu, Mannar and the Eastern province. On the 25th, a large procession of Muslims led by Muslim lawyers and businessmen joined the satyagrahis in Jaffna.

“On the 26th, Nominated MP and leader of the plantation Tamils S. Thondaman warned against suppression of the campaign and alerted plantation Tamils to store food and provisions for three months should a struggle for Tamil rights becomes necessary. …

“On the 27th satyagraha and picketing was launched in Batticoloa and administration was brought to a halt both in the North and East. On the 28th, an Opposition suggestiong in the House of representatives that talks be initiated with the Federal Party was summarily rejected by Finance Minister Felix Dias (Banadaranaike), saying that the government was not prepared to negotiate under pressure. …

“[In the evening of 17 April] a special train carrying a detachment of 350 soldiers and 15 officers of the Sinha regiment, exclusively composed of Sinhalese, left for Jaffna. … Once the MPs were taken away, army men, some of them carrying rifles, swooped on the passive satyagrahis, attacking them with rifle butts, belts and clubs. The sleeping volunteers woke up groaning and writhing with pain. They were trampled with boots, kicked and dragged away from the kachcheri entrances. … They pulled down the party’s “post office” structure, smashed up cars and bicycles parked in the vicinity, ripping tyres with bayonets and ramming windscreens. …

“On the 20th April, when the curfew was expired, a 12 hour curfew from 6 pm to 6 am was substituted. …

“By April 24, Chelvanayakam and 58 others, including 14 MPs were under arrest … Jaffna came under virtual army occupation. … Indisciplined , trigger-happy soldiers shot dead and injured persons outside curfew hours on the pretence of enforcing curfew.”

Quotations

“It is said that non-violence is the essence of any satyagraha movement. But the so called satyagraha movement carried on by the Federal Party is by no means non-violent. Last Thursday, a Federal Party member of parliament and his associates had attempted to use force to prevent a highly-placed government official entering the kachcheri premises. Last night I saw for myself the torn clothes of this official.” Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, radio broadcast, 2 March 1961.

“The Federal Party has by its actions made it abundantly clear that their real objective is to establish a separate state. … [The government had acted] with the greatest restraint and patience. … [and is] now left with no other alternatives but to use all the forces at its command to establish law and order. It is not unlikely that a number of innocent people will suffer in various ways in consequence of these measures. … For any unfortunate happenings, the Tamil leaders must take the entire blame…” Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, 20 April 2008.

At no time did we underestimate the might of the Prime Minister’s government. We are quite aware that she has powers enough to turn her armed forces against us. We were quite aware that she has powers enough to turn her armed forces against us. …The Prime Minister has made a radio speech touching on satyagraha. That speech is more benefiting an imperial dictator speaking to his subjects than a speech made by a democratic leader to her people. In fact the manner and and the contents of her speech correctly depict the true status of the Tamil-speaking people in Ceylon. The rule over them is indeed colonial imperialism. … In her radio speech just before her departure to Great Britain, she made an appeal to those whom she called reasonable Tamils , “To disown the actions of the mischief makers, namely the Federalists”. … The factual position is that there is no section of the Tamil-speaking people, certainly in the northern and eastern provinces, which does not fervently support the satyagraha movement.” SJV Chelvanayakam, 4 March 1961.

Source
Special Report No. 3: The War and its Consequences in the Amparai District, University Teachers For Human Rights (Jaffna), 16 October 1990

Quotations

“And what is the position of the Tamil Community? I want to repeat that our position is this. We are inhabitants of this country. We have lived here and a branch of the Tamil Community has lived here possibly longer than our brethren the Sinhalese. This is our home. We have as much right to claim to have permanent and vested interests in this country politically and otherwise as the Sinhalese people. We do not propose to be treated as undesirable aliens. We do not and will not tolerate being segregated in ghettos and treated like Semites in the Nazi States of Central Europe,” G. G. Ponnambalam, speech before the State Council in 1939.

“[Any] attempt by artificial means to convert a majority into a minority is not only inequitable, but doomed to failure,” Report of the Soulbury Commission, London, 1945.

Opinion
“[Ponnambalam's] powerful advocacy for “balanced representation” in the legislature for the minority communities, 50 percent of the seats for the minorities (Ceylon Tamils, Indian Tamils, Muslims, Malays, Burghers and European combined), with the other 50 percent for the Sinhalese found no favour with the Commissioners. They were impressed with his eight-hour advocacy, but set their face against any scheme for communal representation,” S. Sivanayagam, Witness to History: A Journalist’s Memoirs (1930- 2004), 2005.

“[The official boycott of the Soulbury Commission by the Board of Ministers led by Senanayake was a] “statesman-like action, if not a diplomatic coup. The fact that the more … communal-minded (politicians) held aloof …, enabled the minorities to have the floor unchallenged. This manoeuvre avoided a repetition of the situation … of the Donoughmore Commission where there had been a spiraling of communal demands as accusations and denunciations [which] provoked counter-accusations, … until communal tension reached … in outbreaks of violence. It enabled G. G. Ponnambalam to strut about the political arena for a few months unimpeded,” Dr. Jane Russell (1982): Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution, 1931-1947.

“The riot was sparked by the inflammatory racist speech of [Ponnambalam] in Navalapitiya, attacking the Sinhala Buddhists and the Mahavamsa (see The Hindu Organ, June 1, 1939 and other newspapers of the time). It was then that S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike saw an opportunity, and went to every one of the cities touched by the riots, and established branches of the Sinhala Maha Sabha (see The Hindu Organ, June 19, 1939). It was in this extremely heated atmosphere that [Ponnambalam] developed his fifty-fifty solution as a means of safeguarding the dominant position of the Tamils. Far from bridging the gap between the communities, every action of [Ponnambalam] was designed to drive this ‘difference’ between the Tamils – descendants of the Dravidians, and the Sinhalese, a ‘hybrid mongrel race split of from the aboriginal Tamils and mixed with Aryan invaders’ (as stated by GGP in Navalapitiya in 1939). …The racism of the [Ponnambalam] et al was matched by the Bandaranaike group. It would seem that Bandaranaike the feudal aristocrat, and [Ponnambalam] the caste-conscious Catholic lawyer, were both power-hungry manipulators of the people for further their own interests. The elder statesmen of the times, i.e., Baron Jayatilleke, D. S. Senanayake (DS), Mahadeva etc. charted a reasonably non-communalist line,” S. Rasalingam, Tamils must ask for what is reasonable and accept their role in the conflict, Mawbima, 28 February 2008.

Related events
Soulbury Constitutional Commission established
Select Committee to look into official language policy
Soulbury Constitution adopted
700,000 Indian origin plantation Tamils become “stateless”

Sources
Exploring Confrontations: Sri Lanka – politics, culture and history, Michael Roberts, 1994; Kearney, R.N.,The 1915 riots in Ceylon – a symposium. Journal of Asian Studies, Feb.1970, vol.29, no.2, pp.219-222.

Quotation

“The marakkala kolahalaya (disturbances concerning the Moors) began on the night of the 28th May 1915, or rather in the early hours of the 29th May, opposite a mosque at Castle Street, Kandy.  During the next nine days or so the clashes and assaults spread through the Central, North Western , Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces; and at one point, on the 2nd June, were reported to be occurring simultaneously at 116 “centres”. On the odd occasion during this violent conflict, Moors shot or skilled Sinhalese; and there were masses struggles in one or two spots where the Moors had significant numbers. For the most part, however, the pogrom involved an assault on the person and property of Mohammedan Moors by Sinhalese (the latter joined by some Tamils in a few locatlities, for example at Kandy and Wattegama”) – with the focus in many localities being on Moor properties.  Large crowds were involved in the attacks on the Moors; mobs of over a thousand were reported at Matale, Wattegama, Kadugannawa, Gampola, Rambukkana, Panadura, Godapitiya and Akuressa.

“According to the official estimates, which must be taken as approximate, there were 25 murdered. 189 wounded, 4 incidents of rape. 4075 houses and boutiques looted, 250 houses and boutiques burned down, 17 mosques burnt and 86 mosques otherwise damaged.”  Source: Exploring Confrontations: Sri Lanka – politics, culture and history, Michael Roberts, 1994.

Related publications
Jayewardena, K., Economic and Political Factors in the 1915 riots. Journal of Asian Studies, Feb.1970, vol.29, no.2, pp.223-233; Rutnam, J.T., The Rev. A.G. Fraser and the riots of 1915. Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, July-December 1971, vol.1, no.2 (new series), pp.151-196.

Sources
The Clash of Ideologies and the Continuing Tragedy in the Batticaloa and Amparai Districts, UTHR report, 8 May 1991; Sri Lanka in the modern age: a history of contested identities, Nira Wickremasinghe, 2005; Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon’, Ponnambalam Ramanathan, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon, vol. X, April 1888, pp 234-64.

Opinion

“In this paper, he attempted to prove the similarities between the Ceylon Moors and the Eelam Tamils, thereby claiming that Moors were, ethnologically, Tamils.

He pointed out that the Moors like the Tamils, believed in almanac, and would never solemnise a marriage during the nahas period – [or] short time during the lunar month. He also pointed out to the close resemblance between the Muslim and Tamil weddings – like tying thali, arathi ceremony, offering of betal leaves at functions, and the acceptance of stridhanam [or dowry]. He also pointed out to the similarities in the practice of divorce and wills between these two communities.

Muslim were furious over the attempt by Ramanathan to prove that they were all Tamil converts to Islam. And hence they started to identify themselves as a distinct ethnic group, with ties to the Arab Muslims and started to identify themselves with the Arab world. They celebrated the coronation of the Turkish Emperor in 1900 in Colombo. They started to learn Arabic, a language that they had forgotten a long time ago.

They grieved the death of leaders of the Arab world. They also discarded the local surat caps and favored the Arabic fez caps and the Arabic dress. They carefully avoided showing any concern over incidents in India involving Muslims lest the Tamils should translate such concern as evidence of the Indian origin of the Ceylonese Moors,” Shan Ranjit, Sri Lanka Muslims: Tamil Converts or Arab Descendents? 29 October 2000.

“A skull of a Moorman cannot be distinguished from that of of a Tamil,” Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon’, Ponnambalam Ramanathan, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon, vol. X, April 1888, pp 234-64.