Peace and Conflict Timeline (PACT) » Tamil militancy

18 May 2009

pact team — Mon, 18 May 2009 13:24:45 +0000

The Sri Lankan military reports the death of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, his intelligence chief ‘Pottu Amman’, and ‘Soosai’, the head of the Tiger’ naval wing. The military also reported it had found the bodies of Prabhakaran’s 24-year-old son Charles Anthony, the group’s political wing leader B. Nadesan, and the head of the LTTE Peace Secretariat, S. Pulideevan.

Sources
Tiger leader Prabhakaran killed: Sri Lanka army sources, Reuters, 18 May 2009; Sri Lankan rebel leader ‘killed’, BBC, 18 May 2009; Rebels routed in Sri Lanka after 25 years of war, New York Times, 17 May 2009.

Quotations

“Today we finished the work handed to us by the president to liberate the country from the LTTE,” General Sarath Fonseka, state television broadcast, 18 May 2009.

“This battle has reached its bitter end. We have decided to silence our guns,” Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE spokesman, 17 May, 2009.

“We announce today, with inexpressible sadness and heavy hearts that our incomparable leader and supreme commander … attained martyrdom fighting the military oppression. For over three decades, our leader was the heart and soul and the symbol of hope, pride and determination for the whole nation of people of Tamil Eelam. Since the failure of the peace process and the escalation of the war forced upon the Tamil people, the LTTE was faced [sic] to confront the Sri Lankan military that was supported by the world powers. This deliberate bias and position taken by the international community severely weakened the military position of the LTTE. Our leader confronted this threat without any hesitation. He would not waver in his desire to be with his people and fight for his people till the end. His final request was for the struggle to continue until we achieved the freedom for his people. His legend and the historical status as the Greatest Tamil Leader ever are indestructible,” Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the LTTE’s head of international relations, Tamil Tigers confirm leader’s death, Al Jazeera, 24 May 2009.

8 July 1985

pact team — Sun, 23 Mar 2008 17:14:45 +0000

The first attempt at peace talks between the government of Sri Lanka and various Tamil groups: the ‘Thimpu talks’ are initiated by the Indian government. The government lifts the eight month long night curfew in the Northern Province.

The talks lasted two rounds and took place in Thimpu, the capital city of the Kingdom of Bhutan. The Tamil Delegation consisted of representatives from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS), Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The LTTE, EPRLF, TELO and EROS were also constituent members of the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) formed in April 1984.

The first round of talks took place from 8 July to 13 July and the second round of the talks commenced on 12 August and concluded on 17 August 1985. During the first round, the Sri Lankan government delegation proposed draft legislation for devolution of power, which the Tamil delegation rejected and response put forward its four main demands, or ‘cardinal principles’:

(a) Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality;
(b) Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity;
(c) Based on the above, recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation; and
(d) Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who regard Sri Lanka as their country.

The Sri Lankan government rejected the first three of these demands arguing that they violated Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.

Sources
An Analysis of Thimpu Talks (1985) and the PA-LTTE Talks (1994-95) – Some Lessons on Processes of Negotiations in Armed Conflict, Ketheshwaran Loganathan (2001), presented at Exploring Possible Constitutional Arrangements for meeting Tamil Aspirations within a Unified Sri Lanka, Switzerland, 11-14 June 2001; Sri Lanka, Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at a Negotiated Settlement, Kethesh Loganathan.

Quotations

“I ask of you very little. Let us forget the issue of training camps, the existence of Sri Lanka terrorists in South Asia; their plotting and planning. I ask you to help me to prevent them coming here with arms. …If we can agree on a common scheme to do this, by some form of mutual or combined surveillance, it will enable me to withdraw the Armed Services from combat; to suspend the operation of the Terrorism Act, and to help the North and East of Sri Lanka to return to normalcy. …Cross border terrorism threatens the very fabric of this democracy. … Do please understand our position, which is now yours too, and help.” Letter from J.R. Jayewardene to Rajiv Gandhi, 1985, cited in Rohan Gunaratne, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of Indian Intelligence Agencies, Colombo, South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1994.

“[We wish] to express our disapproval over the usage of the category ‘militants’ in the ceasefire document to describe the united front of major Liberation Organizations, while ascribing the notion ‘Tamil political leadership’ to the TULF. Such categorization may create serious misconceptions and undermine our status as authentic political organizations representing the aspirations of our people.” Joint Memorandum of the Tamil delegation, July 1985.

“If the first three [Thimpu Principles] are to be taken at their face value and given their accepted legal meaning, they are wholly unacceptable to the Government. They must be rejected for the reason that they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, they are detrimental to a united Sri Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the several communities, ethnic and religious in our country. … The implementation of any agreement reached at these talks requires as a pre-condition a complete renunciation of all forms of militant action. All militant groups in Sri Lanka must surrender their arms and equipment. All training camps whether in Sri Lanka or abroad must be closed down.” H.W. Jayewardene, leader of the government delegation, in a prepared Statement rejecting the “Thimpu Principles”, 12th August 1985.

“The four basic principles that we have set out at the Thimpu talks as the necessary framework for any rational dialogue with the Sri Lankan Government are not some mere theoretical constructs. They represent the hard existential reality of the struggle of the Tamil people for their fundamental and basic rights. It is a struggle which initially manifested itself in the demand for a federal constitution in the 1950 and later in the face of continuing and increasing oppression and discrimination, found logical expression in the demand for the independent Tamil state of Tamil Eelam.” Joint Memorandum of the Tamil delegation, 12th August 1985.

Extracts from ‘An Analysis of Thimpu Talks (1985) and the PA-LTTE Talks (1994-95)’
“These proposals were only marginally different from the one which was placed before the All Party Conference of 1984 and had been rejected by the TULF. It once again demonstrated the Sri Lankan State’s incapacity to place before the Tamil polity far-reaching proposals that would be seen as a viable alternative to the pitched-up demand for Tamil Eelam. Further, the proposals were presented in a drab, legalistic form by a delegation comprising mainly of lawyers and bureaucrats. This irritated the Tamil delegation, particularly the representatives of the Tamil politico-military organizations, who were driven by ideological and political fervour and whose patience was being sorely tested. The TULF representatives had already been exposed to the draft legislation in the APC of 1984 and, although quite at home with the legalistic tenor, took a decision to take a back seat. … The Tamil Delegation declined to negotiate any proposals that had already been rejected by the TULF at the APC. Further, the Tamil politico-military organizations had taken the position that the burden of presenting a broadly acceptable formula lay with Colombo, since it was solely to be blamed for the militarization of the ethnic conflict. The Tamil Delegation, instead, subjected the Sri Lankan government delegation to a series of ‘lectures’ on what constituted the Ethnic Question and as to why the burden lay with Colombo to come out with a solution ‘worthy of our consideration’. And, as though to drive home the point, the Tamil Delegation placed before the Government delegation a set of ‘four cardinal principles. …

“The gap between the government’s set of proposals and the Thimpu principles was not just a difference of opinion or perception, but one operating at two totally different ideological and conceptual planes. The Government’s proposals while going beyond decentralization and delegation of power, envisaged in the pre-existing District Development Councils system, was nowhere close to the devolution of powers available in the Indian constitution. Further, it failed to recognize the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka as a National Question. …

“The ‘Thimpu Principles’, on the other hand, was a strident call for the recognition of the Tamil people as a nation with its inalienable right to self-determination. The decision to forward the Thimpu Principles was not only an assertion of Tamil nationalism, but a strategic move to avoid placing concrete proposals that was seen as a pre-mature abandonment of the goal for which arms had been raised – namely, a separate state of Tamil Eelam. The Thimpu princples, therefore, could not have been anything other than an articulation of an Ideal, bereft of constitutionalism and legalism.”

14 May 1985

pact team — Sun, 23 Mar 2008 17:18:43 +0000

One of the first attacks on Sinhalese civilians by Tamil militants. At least 146 men, women and children are killed at the central bus stand at the Anuradhapura town.

Sources
The Broken Palmyra – The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka: An Inside Account, Rajan Hoole, Daya Somasundaram, K.Sritharan and Rajani Thiranagama, The Sri Lanka Studies Institute, 1990; Letter from Amnesty International to President J.R Jayewardene, 7 June 1985.

Quotation

“The tragic events of the past weeks, including the killing of at least 146 mostly Sinhalese men, women and children in Anuradhapura by unidentified men alleged to be Tamil extremists, have further increased the heavy burden on security forces charged with maintaining law and order and the protection of the lives and safety of all citizens,” Letter from Amnesty International to President J.R Jayewardene, 7 June 1985.

Extract from The Broken Palmyrah, 1990
“In reprisal for the killing by the Sri Lankan forces of 70 civilians in Valvettithurai and the damage to the homes of Prabhakaran and several other LTTE leaders, the LTTE on 14 May 1985 conducted what came to be known as the Anuradhapura massacre. A few LTTE men drove into Anuradhapura and gunned down about 150 persons with ruthless efficiency and got away. In the ancient Sinhalese capital, the government forces were caught off guard. This gave the LTTE the reputation of being an efficient “killer machine,” that was to be both feared and respected. The many who approved of the Anuradhapura massacre little realised that such readiness to play around with lives of Sinhalese would result in making Tamil lives more insecure.”

April 1985

pact team — Sun, 23 Mar 2008 17:20:42 +0000

The LTTE joins the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF). In April 1984, three organisations, EROS, EPRLF and TELO, had come together to form the ENLF umbrella organisation.

Source
An Analysis of Thimpu Talks (1985) and the PA-LTTE Talks (1994-95) – Some Lessons on Processes of Negotiations in Armed Conflict, Kethesh Loganathan (2001).

Quotation

“The Tamil militant groups had emerged into a ‘politico-military- entity with remendous clout which clearly enjoyed the patronage of the Government of India.” Kethesh Loganathan (2001).

Related events
August 1983
January 1984
17 August 1985

5 May 1976

pact team — Mon, 24 Mar 2008 07:16:10 +0000

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, is officially formed as tensions increase in Tamil-dominated areas of the North and East.

Sources
Jain Commission Report, August 1997, published in India Today; Interview with Anita Pratap, March 1984, published in Sunday Magazine, India 11-17 March 1984.

Quotations

“I entered politics at a time-in the early seventies – when the younger generation had already lost faith in parliamentary politics. I entered politics as an armed revolutionary. What precipitated the disillusionment in parliamentary politics was the total disregard and callousness of the successive governments towards the pathetic plight of our people.

“I originally formed the movement with a group of dedicated youths who sincerely believed that armed struggle was the only way to liberate our people.

“I named the movement ‘Liberation Tigers’ since the tiger emblem had deep roots in the political history of the Tamils, symbolising Tamil patriotic resurgence The tiger symbol also depicts the mode of our guerrilla warfare. As soon as the Tiger movement was formed, I went underground and lost contact with my family.

“It is wrong to call our movement “separatist”. We are fighting for independence based on the right to national self determination of our people. Our struggle is for self determination, for the restoration of our sovereignty in our homeland. We are not fighting for a division or separation of a country but rather, we are fighting to uphold the sacred right to live in freedom and dignity. In this sense, we are freedom fighters not terrorists,” Velupillai Pirabakaran, leader of the Tamil Tigers, interview with Anita Pratap, March 1984, published in Sunday Magazine, India 11-17 March 1984.

“Revolutionary socialism is my political philosophy. By socialism I mean the construction of an egalitarian society where there is no class contradiction and exploitation of man by man; a free, rational society where human freedom and rights are protected and progress enhanced. Che Guevara is the guerrilla leader who inspires me the most,” Velupillai Pirabakaran, interview published in The Week Magazine, India, 3 March 1986.

Extracts from ‘Assignment Colombo’, J N Dixit (1998)
“The LTTE’s emergence as the most dominant and effective politico-military force representing Tamil interests was due to the following factors:

“First, the character and personality of its leader V Prabhakaran who is disciplined, austere and passionately committed to the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils’ liberation. Whatever he may be criticised for, it cannot be denied that the man has an inner fire and dedication and he is endowed with natural military abilities, both strategic and tactical. He has also proved that he is a keen observer of the nature of competitive and critical politics. He has proved his abilities in judging political events and his adroitness in responding to them.

“Secondly, he has created a highly disciplined, and dedicated cadres, a manifestation of which is inherent in what is called the ‘cyanide cult.’ Each regular member of the LTTE carries a cyanide pill and is pledged to committing suicide rather than being captured by the enemy.

“The third factor is the cult and creed of honesty in the disbursement and utilisation of resources. Despite long years spent in struggle, the LTTE cadres were known for their simple living, lack of any tendency to exploit the people and their operational preparedness.

“The fourth factor has been the LTTE’s ability to upgrade its political and military capacities including technological inputs despite the constraints imposed on it by Sri Lankan forces and later by India.

“The fifth factor is a totally amoral and deadly violent approach in dealing with those the LTTE considers as enemies.

“The sixth factor is Prabhakaran’s success in gathering around him senior advisors with diverse political, administrative and technological capacities, which contributed to effective training of his cadres, optimum utilisation of the military equipment which he had, and the structuring of an efficient command and control system.”

Extract from the Jain Commission Report, August 1997
“On 5 March 1976 V. Pirabhakaran led a raid on the State run People’s Bank, Puttur and escaped with half a million rupees in cash and jewelry worth Rs.2 lakhs after holding the employees at gun point. Soon after this crime, V. Pirabhakaran founded the LTTE on 5th May, 1976. After the founding of the LTTE, on Aug. 16, 1977, the Police and the Tamil Youth, clashed in Jaffna. This triggered off anti- Tamil riots resulting in major loss of life and property of Tamils and the creation of a large number of refugees. Violence became frequent in the Northern Peninsula. At least one incident of violence and confrontation was reported every day.”

January 1973

pact team — Mon, 24 Mar 2008 07:24:26 +0000

The Tamil Youth League is formed, strongly influenced by militant ideas and individuals.