Sources
Tiger leader Prabhakaran killed: Sri Lanka army sources, Reuters, 18 May 2009; Sri Lankan rebel leader ‘killed’, BBC, 18 May 2009; Rebels routed in Sri Lanka after 25 years of war, New York Times, 17 May 2009.

Quotations

“Today we finished the work handed to us by the president to liberate the country from the LTTE,” General Sarath Fonseka, state television broadcast, 18 May 2009.

“This battle has reached its bitter end. We have decided to silence our guns,”  Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE spokesman, 17 May, 2009.

“We announce today, with inexpressible sadness and heavy hearts that our incomparable leader and supreme commander … attained martyrdom fighting the military oppression. For over three decades, our leader was the heart and soul and the symbol of hope, pride and determination for the whole nation of people of Tamil Eelam. Since the failure of the peace process and the escalation of the war forced upon the Tamil people, the LTTE was faced [sic] to confront the Sri Lankan military that was supported by the world powers. This deliberate bias and position taken by the international community severely weakened the military position of the LTTE. Our leader confronted this threat without any hesitation. He would not waver in his desire to be with his people and fight for his people till the end. His final request was for the struggle to continue until we achieved the freedom for his people. His legend and the historical status as the Greatest Tamil Leader ever are indestructible,” Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the LTTE’s head of international relations, Tamil Tigers confirm leader’s death, Al Jazeera, 24 May 2009.

Related events
Tamil Tigers are formed
13 soldiers killed in Tamil Tiger ambush
LTTE aircraft and ground troops attack Sri Lankan air force base
Prabhakaran’s last significant ‘Heroes Day’ speech, 2007
LTTE suicide bomb kills 27 civilians and former military commander
Sri Lankan military forces recapture LTTE controlled territories

Related features
Feature: Assassination of an activist
Feature: 18th anniversary of expulsion of northern Muslims by LTTE
Feature: 25th anniversary of “Black July”, 1983

UN and human rights organisations reported substantial civilian casualties and large-scale displacement, describing the situation as an “unfolding humanitarian catastrophe”. Sri Lanka also came under severe criticism for not allowing international media to report from the conflict zone.
 
Quotations
“Today we finished the work handed to us by the president to liberate the country from the LTTE,” General Sarath Fonseka, state television broadcast, 18 May 2009.

“This battle has reached its bitter end. We have decided to silence our guns,”  Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE spokesman, 17 May, 2009.

“Our forces have recorded another historic victory. That is the complete dislodging of the Tigers from Elephant Pass and the security forces establishing their authority there. … I need not explain to you that the A-9 route is symbolic of the unity that exists between the north and the south of our country. The LTTE obtained several million rupees from the fraudulent taxes they imposed,” President Rajapakse.

“The fundamental problem is these people have to be allowed to leave. It’s very important that the continuation of the fighting not be allowed to cause an escalation of the suffering for the Tamil people of that region,” Richard Boucher, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State.

“Certain actions being undertaken by the Sri Lankan military and by the [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] may constitute violations of international human rights and humanitarian law,” Navi Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Sources of humanitarian and human rights situation
A Profile of Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues in the Vanni and Vavuniya, Centre for Policy Alternatives, 20 March 2009; ’500 killed’ due to medicine shortage, BBC Sinhala, 17 March 2009; Sri Lanka: Urgently Evacuate Civilians, Human Rights Watch, 4 March 2009; Grim scenes at Sri Lankan camps, Channel 4, 5 May 2009.

Sources
Army ‘takes key Sri Lanka pass’, BBC, 9 January 2009; Lankan forces capture strategic Elephant pass from LTTE, The Hindu, 9 January 2009; Sri Lankan troops seize key Elephant Pass, Reuters, 9 January 2009; Lankan army capture key junction town near Kilinochchi, The Times of India, 12 December 2008; Many dead in Sri Lanka, says UN, BBC, 6 March 2009.

Related events
Capture of Thoppigala
First elections in East for 14 years
Killinochchi recaptured
Prabhakaran and other Tiger leaders killed
Sri Lanka succeeds in Human Rights Council resolution

Related feature
Feature: Historical roots of conflict in Sri Lanka

Sources
Breakaway rebel group wins elections in eastern Sri Lanka, Hindustan Times, 11 March 2008; Former Tigers win Sri Lanka poll, Al Jazeera, 11 March 2008; Armed, state-backed ex-rebels win Sri Lanka poll, Reuters, 11 March 2008

Quotations

“I believe that the representatives of the people chosen in this peaceful election are the harbingers of success in the historic march to strengthen and widen democracy in our country.” President Rajapakse.

“In Batticaloa, not only TMVP, [but] many other armed groups are also there. Some of the Muslims also have arms. They have been keeping the arms with them. So I am not going to say this election is a free and fair one. ” Kingsley Rodrigo, chairman of the People’s Alliance for Free and Fair Elections.

“Supreme Commander Pillaiyan has spent most of his life wearing the jungle camouflage uniform of the Tamil Tigers. He joined the guerrillas at age 16, angry at the hardships faced by Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority and the rough way they were treated by the country’s armed forces. But four years ago, disillusioned with the Tamil Tigers’ longtime leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, he was among thousands of guerrillas who defected to the government side. He now wears a beige safari suit and black loafers and serves as Chief Minister of Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, although he still answers to his nom de guerre, Pillaiyan,” Inside Sri Lanka: Your cash going to arms, say ex-rebels, 22 September 2008.

Related events
Sri Lankan government captures Thoppigala
UPFA in coalition TMVP win control of Eastern Provincial Council
UPFA coalition sign agreement with TMVP

The statement further notes that “Accordingly, the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and the Management of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) dated 18th March 2002 between the Royal Norwegian Government and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka will also stand terminated with effect from 16th January 2008″.

Sources
Violence kills off Sri Lanka ceasefire, The Guardian, 3 January 2008; Sri Lanka truce end worries Norway, BBC, 3 January 2008; Sri Lanka: Cease-Fire Is Annulled, New York Times, 3 January 2008.

Quotations

“The Ceasefire Agreement had been violated nearly 10,000 times by the Tamil Tigers, so we should annul this agreement… national security was threatened at every corner.” Keheliya Rambukwella, the Government spokesman on security matters.

“This comes on top of the increasingly frequent and brutal acts of violence perpetrated by both parties, and I am deeply concerned that the violence and hostilities will now escalate even further,” Erik Solheim, Norwegian Foreign Minister.

“An intensification of hostilities will likely have a devastating effect on the human rights of many Sri Lankans from all communities… violations of these rules by any party could entail individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law, including by those in positions of command,” Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, statement released 15 January 2008.

Related events
Ceasefire Agreement signed
GoSL closes the A9 highway
SLMM reports death toll figures
Suspected LTTE bomb attack in Buttala

Sources
East in control, Colombo to tackle LTTE in north, The Hindu, 13 July 2007; Sri Lanka says captures last rebel stronghold in east, Reuters, 11 July 2007.

Quotations

“We have liberated the East so that the people could be free from the clutches of the LTTE. We will now concentrate on developing the east and holding elections so that the eastern people also could elect their representatives for democratic institutions freely,” Anura Priyadarshana Yapa, Cabinet Spokesperson.

Related events
Capture of Thoppigala
First elections in East for 14 years
Killinochchi recaptured
Recapture of Sampur from LTTE

Sources
Hardliner wins Sri Lanka election, BBC, 18 November 2005; Sri Lanka Votes, Torn by War and Tsunami, New York Times, 18 November 2005.

Quotations

“Democracy will be strengthened and law and order will be established in the country…For me, power is not an ornament, but a means to serve the people.” President Mahinda Rajapakse, Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 18 November 2005.

“We’ve got a very polarised society now, into three groups. Those who voted for me for the peace process, those who voted for Mahinda Rajapakse and those who are unable to vote.” Ranil Wickramasinghe, presidential candidate, leader of the United National Party, 18 November 2005.

“An almost total absence of participation in the polls and an atmosphere of violence and intimidation in much of the north and east have significantly affected these elections. …It has compromised the democratic process and institutions.” People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections.

“There is a constituency in the country, among the Sinhalese community in particular, that has concerns, fears, doubts about power-sharing. What Rajapakse is doing is tapping into those fears.” Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Center for Policy Alternatives.

“Presidential election of Sri Lanka is totally irrelevant to the Tamil people at this juncture when they are frustrated with the unproductive Cease Fire Agreement and the denial of post-tsunami humanitarian aid in an equitable manner” said Mr.S.P.Tamilselvan, Head of the LTTE Political Wing in an interview with the media after meeting with Tamil National Alliance Legislators yesterday, 10 November 2005.

Related news
“Sri Lanka’s hawkish newly elected President Mahinda Rajapakse on Monday swore in a hard-liner as prime minister, who in the past has pushed for crushing Tamil rebels to end Sri Lanka’s lingering civil war. The ceremony marked the start of 72-year-old Ratnasiri Wickremanayaka’s third stint as prime minister. As prime minister in 2000 and again in 2001, Wickremanayaka spurned compromise with Tamil Tiger rebel officials — pushing for a military solution.” Source: Hard-line Sri Lankan president swears in hawkish prime minister, International Herald Tribune, 21 November 2005.

“There is absolutely no truth in the widespread allegation among the southern political parties that we have entered into a deal with Mahinda Rajapaksa’s side and accepted a large sum of money.” S.P. Tamilselvan, Tiger spokesman, Tigers deny taking bribe to rig Sri Lanka elections, AFP, 2 October 2007.

Related events
SLFP wins general elections
President Rajapakse visits captured territories
Recapture of Sampur

In an interim injunction, the court stayed “till final determination” critical operative elements of the Regional Committee that was formed as one of the three tiers under the PTOMS agreement. The three-member Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously stayed the project approval and fund management functions of the committee – the most critical element of the joint mechanism at the regional level.

The court did not object to the other two tiers – the national and the district committee – and made it clear that the interim order “is not granted in respect of the entirety” of the MoU establishing the PTOMS.

Sources
Provisions of joint mechanism stayed, The Hindu, 16 July 2005.

Quotations

“We have succeeded in our struggle. There is nothing in the agreement now.” Vijitha Herath, international secretary of the JVP and former Cabinet Minister.

“The structure as provided in the MoU consisting of committees may be established and become functional subject to the restrictions imposed by the judgement.” Supreme Court ruling.

Related events
PA and JVP jointly campaign against interim administration
GoSL signs PTOMS agreement
Supreme Court declares 1987 merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces as unlawful
Experts’ Committee of the APRC reports

Sources
5,000 rally for breakaway Tiger, BBC, 19 March 2004; Sri Lanka’s bad moon keeps rising, Asia Times, 7 April 2004; Tiger vs Tiger, DBS Jeyaraj, Frontline, 9 April 2004.

Quotations

“[Karuna betrayed] the freedom struggle. To safeguard our nation and our people, it has been decided to get rid of Karuna from our soil. Anybody who opposes disciplinary action against Karuna will be considered as a traitor to the Tamil national cause,” LTTE statement, 25 March 2004.

“Karuna, who spent 22 years in the Tigers, said he broke with Prabhakaran in a dispute over Norwegian-brokered peace talks. Karuna thought there was a good deal on the table but Prabhakaran wanted to restart the war, he said. So Karuna announced he was leaving. “[Prabhakaran] got angry with me, but he’s a very angry person. I told him, ‘I don’t want to fight with you, we are brothers and sisters’,” Colonel Karuna, interview published in Inside Sri Lanka: Your cash going to arms, say ex-rebels, 22 September 2008.

“In March 2004, then LTTE’s eastern commander, Colonel Karuna, split from the LTTE protesting against alleged discrimination of the eastern Tamils by the Tiger’s northern leadership. The LTTE, on the other hand, alleged that Col. Karuna was forced to quit as he was involved in corruption and violated the Tiger’s code of conduct. Sri Lanka’s United National Party leaders claimed credit for successfully engineering the most serious split in the LTTE.” Asian Centre for Human Rights, Proposed Sri Lankan Peace talks: The Karuna Factor, 11 October 2006

“The military balance between Karuna and the mainstream LTTE is quite interesting and precariously fluid. In recent times, the Eastern component comprising Batticaloa and Amparai has become almost indispensable to the LTTE. The cadre strength of the LTTE is about 25,000 now. Of these, around 7,000 are either seniors whose fighting days are over, or injured and maimed fighters who cannot engage in active fighting now. This leaves about 18,000 fighters, including men and women. About 7,500 of them are from Batticaloa and Amparai districts. The region has become the provider of the largest segment of Tiger cadre in recent times. More than 2,000 cadre were recruited or conscripted from the Eastern region after the ceasefire came into force. The rest of the North-East could swell their numbers by only 500 to 600 during the ceasefire …

“If the Karuna crisis had erupted during a time of war as in the case of Mahatiya, the Tigers could have swiftly decimated the “offenders”. The former LTTE deputy leader, Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah alias Mahatiya, was arrested along with around 250 of his suspected supporters on charges of treason on July 31, 1993. He was detained, tortured and interrogated by the Tiger intelligence wing, led by Pottu Amman, at an undisclosed location. A confession of guilt was forcibly extracted, filmed and shown on video to Tiger cadre. Thereafter Mahatiya was executed. So too were many of his one-time bodyguards and supporters. Several hundreds of suspected Mahatiya confidants were detained for prolonged periods and released. The LTTE was purged of all alleged pro-Mahatiya elements.” DBS Jeyaraj, Frontline, 9 April 2004.

Related events
Colonel Karuna’ becomes Member of Parliament
Karuna Amman arrested by British authorities
TMVP (formerly ‘Karuna faction’), wins control of the Eastern Provincial government
Karuna arrested by British authorities
UN Secretary-General recommends “targeted measures” against LTTE and Karuna faction

Sources
Ceasefire signed in Sri Lanka, BBC, 22 February 2002; Text of Sri Lanka truce deal, BBC, 22 February 2002

Quotations

“It feels very good and so many people have worked so hard for so long but the hardest part is ahead. … This is a basis for future efforts. You can’t sit and negotiate when people are shooting at each other.” Erik Solheim, Norway’s peace envoy.

“I have a strong belief that we will have peace, but I have no illusion that it will be easy.” Ranil Wickramasinghe, Sri Lankan Prime Minister.

“A favourable feature [of the current peace process] is the mediation of a third party. Besides, Ranil Wickremasinghe has taken some bold decisions. I am satisfied with the peace talks. … I believe that these will bring success to some extent to the peace efforts.” Velupillai Prabhakaran quoted in Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 09, Apr. 27 – May 10, 2002.

“We have told the Government and we have informed the Norwegians that de-proscription is a necessary condition for the commencement of the talks…. We want to be de-proscribed properly. The provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act should be amended properly so that we can be de-proscribed and accepted as the authentic representative of the Tamil people and so that we will participate in the peace process as representatives of our people with equal status [to that of the Sri Lankan government representatives]. That has been our official position.” Anton Balasingam quoted in Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 09, Apr. 27 – May 10, 2002.

“The president expressed surprise and concern that she was being informed, for the first time, of the contents of the agreement after it was signed by Mr V Prabhakaran and just a few hours before the prime minister proposed to put his signature to it.” Statement from the office of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, 2002.

Opinion
Interview with Austin Fernando, a Peacetime Secretary of Defence in Sri Lanka, Groundviews, 2 November 2008.

Text of Ceasefire Agreement
Preamble
The overall objective of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

The GOSL and the LTTE (hereinafter referred to as the parties) recognise the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict.

Bringing an end to the hostilities is also seen by the parties as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken.

The parties further recognise that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it.

This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.

With reference to the above, the parties have agreed to enter into a ceasefire, refrain from conduct that could undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of this agreement and implement confidence-building measures as indicated in the articles below.

Article 1: Modalities of a ceasefire

The parties have agreed to implement a ceasefire between their armed forces as follows:

1.1 A jointly agreed ceasefire between the GOSL and the LTTE shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Article 4.2, hereinafter referred to as D-day.

Military operations

1.2 Neither party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as:

a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;
b) Aerial bombardment;
c) Offensive naval operations.

1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.

Separation of forces

1.4 Where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL’s armed forces and the LTTE’s fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, maintaining a zone of separation of a minimum of 600 metres.

However, each party reserves the right of movement within 100 metres of its own defence localities, keeping an absolute minimum distance of 400 metres between them.

Where existing positions are closer than 400 metres, no such right of movement applies and the parties agree to ensure the maximum possible distance between their personnel.

1.5 In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 December 2001 shall continue to apply pending such demarcation as is provided in article 1.6.

1.6 The parties shall provide information to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) regarding defence localities in all areas of contention, cf. Article 3. The monitoring mission shall assist the parties in drawing up demarcation lines at the latest by D-day + 30.

1.7 The parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other party.

1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.

Freedom of movement

1.9 The parties’ forces shall initially stay in the areas under their respective control, as provided in Article 1.4 and Article 1.5.

1.10 Unarmed GOSL troops shall, as of D-day + 60, be permitted unlimited passage between Jaffna and Vavunyia using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9). The modalities are to be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the SLMM.

1.11 The parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, on the recommendation of their area commander, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other party. Such visits shall be limited to six days every second month, not including the time of travel by the shortest applicable route. The LTTE shall facilitate the use of the Jaffna-Kandy road for this purpose. The parties reserve the right to deny entry to specified military areas.

1.12 The parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall notwithstanding the two-month restriction, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit immediate family (ie spouses, children, grandparents, parents and siblings) in connection with weddings or funerals. The right to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

1.13 Fifty unarmed LTTE members shall as of D-day + 30, for the purpose of political work, be permitted freedom of movement in the areas of the North and the East dominated by the GOSL. Additional 100 unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement as of D-day + 60. As of D-day + 90, all unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North and the East. The LTTE members shall carry identity papers. The right of the GOSL to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

Article 2: Measures to restore normalcy

The parties shall undertake the following confidence-building measures with the aim of restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka:

2.1 The parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.

2.2 The parties shall refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could offend cultural or religious sensitivities. Places of worship (temples, churches, mosques and other holy sites etc.) currently held by the forces of either of the parties shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. Places of worship which are situated in “high security zones” shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public.

2.3 Beginning on the date on which this agreement enters into force, school buildings occupied by either party shall be vacated and returned to their intended use. This activity shall be completed by D-day + 160 at the latest.

2.4 A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended use shall be drawn up by the parties and published at the latest by D-day + 30.

2.5 The parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population. Such systems shall be in place from D-day + 60.

2.6 The parties agree to ensure the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from the LTTE-dominated areas with the exception of certain items as shown in Annex A. Quantities shall be determined by market demand. The GOSL shall regularly review the matter with the aim of gradually removing any remaining restrictions on non-military goods.

2.7 In order to facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, the parties agree to establish checkpoints on their line of control at such locations as are specified in Annex B.

2.8 The parties shall take steps to ensure that the Trincomalee-Habarana road remains open on a 24-hour basis for passenger traffic with effect from D-day + 10.

2.9 The parties shall facilitate the extension of the rail service on the Batticaloa-line to Welikanda. Repairs and maintenance shall be carried out by the GOSL in order to extend the service up to Batticaloa.

2.10 The parties shall open the Kandy-Jaffna road (A9) to non-military traffic of goods and passengers. Specific modalities shall be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the Royal Norwegian Government by D-day + 30 at the latest.

2.11 A gradual easing of the fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D-day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed, subject to the following exceptions: (i) fishing will not be permitted within an area of 1 nautical mile on either side along the coast and 2 nautical miles seawards from all security forces camps on the coast; (ii) fishing will not be permitted in harbours or approaches to harbours, bays and estuaries along the coast.

2.12 The parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall not take place. Arrests shall be conducted under due process of law in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.

2.13 The parties agree to provide family members of detainees access to the detainees within D-day + 30.

Article 3: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

The parties have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this agreement. Both parties shall fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their respective sides. The mission shall conduct international verification through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments entered into in this agreement as follows:

3.1 The name of the monitoring mission shall be the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM).

3.2 Subject to acceptance by the parties, the Royal Norwegian Government (hereinafter referred to as the RNG) shall appoint the Head of the SLMM (hereinafter referred to as the HoM), who shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this agreement.

3.3 The SLMM shall liaise with the parties and report to the RNG.

3.4 The HoM shall decide the date for the commencement of the SLMM’s operations.

3.5 The SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries.

3.6 The SLMM shall establish a headquarters in such place as the HoM finds appropriate. An office shall be established in Colombo and in Vanni in order to liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively. The SLMM will maintain a presence in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.

3.7 A local monitoring committee shall be established in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. Each committee shall consist of five members, two appointed by the GOSL, two by the LTTE and one international monitor appointed by the HoM. The international monitor shall chair the committee. The GOSL and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.

3.8 The committees shall serve the SLMM in an advisory capacity and discuss issues relating to the implementation of this agreement in their respective districts, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues. In particular, they will seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of this agreement at the lowest possible level.

3.9 The parties shall be responsible for the appropriate protection of and security arrangements for all SLMM members.

3.10 The parties agree to ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM members in performing their tasks. The members of the SLMM shall be given immediate access to areas where violations of the agreement are alleged to have taken place. The parties also agree to facilitate the widest possible access to such areas for the local members of the six above-mentioned committees, cf. Article 3.7.

3.11 It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the agreement, and to enquire into and assist the parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints.

3.12 With the aim of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level, communication shall be established between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and the LTTE area leaders to enable them to resolve problems in the conflict zones.

3.13 Guidelines for the operations of the SLMM shall be established in a separate document.

Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the agreement

4.1 Each party shall notify its consent to be bound by this agreement through a letter to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe on behalf of the GOSL and by leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on behalf of the LTTE respectively. The agreement shall be initialled by each party and enclosed in the above-mentioned letter.

4.2 The agreement shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

4.3 This agreement may be amended and modified by mutual agreement of both parties. Such amendments shall be notified in writing to the RNG.

4.4 This agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by either party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given 14 days in advance of the effective date of termination.

Annexes
Annex A: List of goods
Annex B: Checkpoints
Source: Full text of the ceasefire agreement, The Guardian, 22 February 2002.

Related events
GoSL closes the A9 highway
SLMM reports death toll figures
Suspected LTTE bomb attack in Buttala

Sources
Key Sri Lankan air base attacked, BBC, 24 July 2001; Rebel Attack on Airport Shocks Leaders of Sri Lanka, NY Times, 25 July 2001; Intelligence failures exposed by Tamil Tiger airport attack, analysis by Rohan Gunaratna, Jane’s Information Group, 3 September 2001.

Extract from ‘Intelligence failures exposed by Tamil Tiger airport attack’
“A suicide squad of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) staged an audacious attack on Sri Lanka’s Bandaranaike international airport and the adjoining air force base at Katunayake on 24 July 2001. In three waves, a highly trained and heavily armed 14-man squad penetrated the 800-acre high security complex and destroyed or damaged 26 commercial and military aircraft. The attack is the biggest terrorist operation so far launched by the LTTE and the most destructive terrorist attack in the history of aviation. The suicide dimension – 14 members targeting 26 aircraft – made the operation cost effective. …

“The LTTE attack exposed the shaky foundations on which the country’s national security structure was founded. It questioned the government’s capacity to develop intelligence, forecast threats, protect its critical infrastructure and prepare appropriate force structures to disrupt LTTE operations in the government-held south. It also symbolised the sharp decline in the capability of the Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII), responsible for anti-terrorist (protective) intelligence as well as counterterrorist (offensive) intelligence.” Source: Intelligence failures exposed by Tamil Tiger airport attack, analysis by Rohan Gunaratna, Jane’s Information Group, 3 September 2001.

Related events
Norway agrees to act as facilitator
Tigers, Government observe one-month ceasefire
Widespread anti-Tamil communal riots, remembered as ‘Black July’

Quotation

“The bombing of the most sacred place of worship is one of the most tragic events of the country’s modern history…The National Peace Council also notes that the bombing and desecration of religious shrines has been a regular feature of the ethnic conflict over the past four decades, and in particular over the past 14 years of armed warfare. During this period there has been the bombing, looting and burning of temples, mosques, kovils and churches,” Bombing of the Dalada Maligawa, National Peace Council, 26 January 2001.

Related events
Bomb explosion at the Pettah market kills 113
Tigers attack Central Bank, killing more than 100 civilians
Thousands displaced following military operations in the northern Vanni
Government proscribes the LTTE
Government’s Operation Jayasikuru causes large-scale displacement

“If Velupillai Prabhakaran thinks that by these acts he can stop our military offensive, he is dreaming. We say quite clearly that these acts will make us even more determined to destroy terrorism,” Anuruddha Ratwatte, Deputy Defence Minister.

“It had to be the Tamil Tigers. Who else would have done such a thing like this?” Brigadier Sarath Munasinghe, Sri Lankan military spokesman.

“Deliberate arbitrary killings of civilians escalated sharply in 1996. Bomb attacks attributed to the LTTE on Colombo’s Central Bank building on January 31, and on a crowded commuter train in July, claimed a combined total of at least 160 civilian lives and injured some 1,550 people,” Human Rights Watch, 1997 World Report.

Related events
Bomb explosion at the Pettah market kills 113 people
Tigers bomb Temple of the Tooth

Extracts from statement of the LTTE, 26 May 1995
Why these double standards?

Sri Lanka government propaganda has seen to it that the truth behind the disruption of the peace process has been effectively concealed from the world . Firstly, a government that keeps on affirming that the Tamil people were equal citizens of the country, carried on a policy that means by implication:

That the Tamils living in the north were an exception. That supplying their basic human needs like food and medicine, and fuel and kerosene, fertiliser and urea, torch and radio batteries depending on many factors:

Their good behaviour;
The good behaviour of the Tigers;
The military implications to the government in permitting such items;
The given mood at given times of the military minions who man the checkpoints at Vavuniya.

In short, caring for the daily living needs of a section of what the government claims its own people was for the Sri Lanka government a matter for bargaining! The very fact that the Chandrika government treats basic human rights of the Tamil people as ‘concessions’, is in itself a throwback to the Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonic approach that the Tamils have been resisting for the Past 40 years. … If one were to talk of concessions, the only meaningful concession that came, was from the side of the Tigers. Having come down from their declared goal of a separate Tamil Eelam they were prepared to consider political accommodation on a Federal basis that would ensure a measure of self-rule for the Tamils in the north-east. This they did from a position of growing military strength. But what has been the response of the Chandrika government until now?

In a recent interview given to India Today, this question was asked from President Kurnaratunga: “The Tigers have complete control of the place. All they need is foreign recognition, but you can’t help them with that. So what can you offer them as a bargain?”. President Kumaratunga’s reply is very revealing. She says:

“The first thing is that they can live peacefully. Without getting bombarded from the air and sea and shot at from the ground. And I think that this is a strong, very strong point in favour of peace.”

Strange, but there it is in her own words. The only quid pro quo that the President could think of, was not a political alternative, but the stopping of actual bombardments and shelling from the sea and land!

The fact is, that the government is up to now keeping the whole country in the dark as to the political package that it has in mind. Why this hesitancy? Why this procrastination over a period of six months? Why cannot the international community ask the Sri Lankan government to spell out the details of the autonomy that it keeps saying it is prepared to offer the Tamil people?”

Related events
Peace talks commence between Tigers and Government
LTTE bomb kills former UNP minister and presidential election candidate Gamini Dissanayake

Extracts from sources
“On October 13, 1994, a delegation of influential officials left for Jaffna. The delegation was led by Kusum Balapatabendi, Secretary to the President. They were given a rapturous welcome by the people of Jaffna, who had gone through hell for over ten years. Quite clearly the Prime Minister had captured the imagination and the mood of the people of Jaffna. Preliminary negotiations with the LTTE commenced in Jaffna that day and the delegation returned to Colombo the following day bringing with them, as a gesture of goodwill from the LTTE, four policemen who had been in captivity since June 1990. To complete formalities, the following communique was issued in Jaffna on October 14, 1994.

“The first round of talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE was conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and goodwill. The talks were very constructive and held in Jaffna on October 13 and 14, 1994.”

“In his opening speech, Karikalan ,leade of the LTTE delegation, said that the LTTE is committed to peace and peaceful settlement of the Tamil question. Ever since the outbreak of hostilities in June 990, the LTTE leadership has been calling for a cessation of hostilities and peace talks. But the previous government had failed to take any positive steps to bring an end to the war and to start negotiations. But we are glad to note that the news government of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga has taken constructive measures to create congenial conditions for peace. We are also please to note that she is genuinely committed to political negotiations.

“The leader of the government delegation, K. Balapatabendi, said the existing situation in the north has become a national problem and that requires for its definitive resolution the involvement of all concerned in peace and harmony. He said that they would discuss how best the government could ensure the adequate supply and equitable distribution of essential commodities to all the people of the north. … Both parties agreed to have a second round of talks within the next ten days.” From War Or Peace in Sri Lanka, Saroj Pathak, T D S A Dissanayaka, Popular Prakashan, 2005.

“In 1994 Chandrika Kumaratunge was elected to lead the country on a peace platform. It was announced on 9th September 1994 that she and the LTTE leader had exchanged warm letters expressing an eagerness to commence the peace process. The first session of talks was fixed for 13th October. Offensive military activities were frozen. While hopes for peace bloomed in the North and South, the LTTE leader intervened in his characteristic style. On 19th September he sent a suicide bomber to sink a naval vessel. In late October 1994 another suicide bomber killed UNP presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake. However, a ceasefire was agreed upon and messages were exchanged. The LTTE kept making demands of a military nature and avoided engaging in political talks. On 19th April 1995 the LTTE unilaterally broke the ceasefire by sinking two naval vessels and shot down two air force planes with newly acquired missiles. It also massacred 45 harmless Sinhalese fisherfolk in Kallara, hoping for government reprisals against Tamil civilians as under the UNP in 1990. Throughout this whole process the LTTE warned people in the North and East against reciprocating the peace activity in the South.” From Briefing No. 4, Peace activism, suicidal politics and civil society, University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), 4th December 2001.

Related events
LTTE bomb kills presidential election candidate Gamini Dissanayake
Government commences operation ‘Leap Forward’ from Arali point in Jaffna

Sources
The Politics Of Destruction & The Human Tragedy, Report No. 6, 4 February 1991: The Expulsion And Expropriation Of Muslims In The North, UTHR (J); Muslim Refugees: The Forgotten People in Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict, S. H. Hasbullah (2001); Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Out in the Cold, The Hindu, 31 July 2007; A Timely and Prudent Step by the LTTE, Frontline, Volume 19 – Issue 12, June 8-21, 200.

Extracts from UTHR (J) report
“But in every way Muslims and Tamils in the North had been traditionally totally integrated into local life as interdependent communities. There were Muslim traders, tailors, iron mongers, labourers and scholars. More recently, several of them took to farming in the Killinochchi area. As part of the arena of culture and scholarship, Muslims formed an important component of the University of Jaffna. There was no conflict at all.

“By the end of September, the Muslims in Chavakacheri were warned that they should be prepared for an expulsion order. Following the end of the first week in October, a very senior LTTE leader visited Vakarai in the Batticaloa district in the East where anti-Muslim feeling was rife following recent incidents. This strongly suggests that the LTTE regarded some major action against Muslims as a means of regaining its tattered credibility in the East. On 15th October, Muslims in Chavakacheri were asked to leave the peninsula. They were forced out without being able to carry hard earned valuable items such as fridges and fans. The following report was given by sources from that area:

“The Muslims’ houses were looted and ransacked and they were treated in the most brutal manner. In effect, the liberators behaved like an invading army on the binge. The LTTE cadre pocketed whatever article, such as scent bottles, that they could pocket. In one house, the koorai (bridal attire) of a young lady, married on 30th June, was removed. The owners had been asked to vacate their houses, leaving the woman of the house in charge when the LTTE came to take the inventory. One man had taken his wife leaving a 60 year old lady behind. When asked, he replied, ‘Since they are behaving like an invading army, like the IPKF and the Sri Lankan army, there is no guarantee that my wife would be safe’. …

“On the 24th at 4.00 p.m, the LTTE made a public announcement by loud-speaker: “All Muslims living in Mannar island should leave by 28th October. Before leaving, they must seek permission and clearance at the LTTE Office. The LTTE will decide their exit route.”

“Most Tamils were utterly disturbed by this. A meeting of local citizens was arranged for the 25th morning. The Bishop who was at Madhu could not come. Those who met included Roman Catholic clergy, officials from Save the Children Fund, Christian laymen and other leading citizens. Following the meeting, a delegation went to see the local LTTE leader Suresh (former student, University of Jaffna) and asked for the order to be rescinded. …

“Each Muslim family was allowed to take one sovereign of gold, Rs.2,000/- cash and five travel bags per family. Printed forms were given for clearance.

“The Muslims from Puthukudiruppu, Tharapuram, Uppukulam and Erukkalampiddy were taken to the beach at a place near Erukkalampiddy known as `Five Coconut Trees’, and were left there until they could find boats. They had to spend nights in the open in rainy weather with no conveniences and no boutique to obtain food and water. On the 28th the MARR (Mannar Association for Refugee Rehabilitation) purchased all the bread baked in Mannar and obtained the LTTE’s permission to take bread and water to the Muslims. Over three days, the Muslims made their exit to Kalpitiya, 60 miles South, by sea. Boats owned by Muslim fishermen in Mannar and Kalpitiya were used. The journey was often hazardous in crowded boats. There was at least one case of a parent numbed by cold, dropping a child into the sea and not knowing it for some time. To the old and the sickly, who had not known any place in the world, but Mannar island, the emotional and physical strain of the removal may prove fatal.”

Quotations
“I made an apology to the Muslim people that what has happened in the past has to be forgotten, that we are willing to talk to them and resolve their problems. [The Tamil territory in the North and East] belongs to the Muslim people also,” LTTE’s political adviser Anton Balasingham, Press Conference, 10 April 2002.

“The rapprochement between the LTTE and the SLMC has certain significant elements which are very progressive. They have realised the inevitable need to engage the SLMC in order to resolve their problems. That is somewhat comforting, although we have not made an emotional response to the statement they have made of late. We have told them unequivocally that we are prepared to forgive and not forget the past in the hope that they will be sincere in their attitude towards Muslims. We have bitter memories of the past. But it is time we contended with the ground realities. That would mean that the LTTE also has to look at Muslims and their separate political identity as something that has become quite pronounced over a period of time,” Rauff Hakeem, Leader of SLMM, 23 May 2003.

Related events
LTTE mosque attack in Batticoloa leaves 116 people dead
LTTE attacks Muttur, displacing thousands of Muslims

Other features
Feature: Historical roots of conflict in Sri Lanka
Feature: Assassination of an activist
Feature: “Black July”, 1983